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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or 
regional trade agreements – have dramatically expanded in scope since World War II.  
While the proximate goal of economic integration is to increase commercial exchange 
between member states, there are strong reasons to believe agreements affect security 
relations as well.  In particular, by increasing interdependence between member states 
through trade and investment, economic agreements increase the opportunity cost of 
coercion.  However, they simultaneously marginalize commercial ties between agreement 
members and the outside world and exacerbate relative gains concerns through trade 
diversion.  Hence I argue that while conflict between agreement members likely abates, it 
may become more likely between members and non-members. 
Furthermore, in considering the impact of economic agreements on security 
relations, I take a broad view of the interstate conflict process that includes multiple 
coercive strategies.  Specifically, I consider how agreements influence the use of 
economic sanctions and military force as substitutable coercive strategies in disputes.  
Using the logic of policy substitution, I develop a formal bargaining model capturing a 
state’s decision between sanctions and military force.  I draw several implications from 
the formal model.  First, asymmetric trade relations between agreement members results 
in the use of military force by dependent states and economic sanctions by autonomous 
ones.  Second, symmetric trade relations between agreement members result in economic 
viii 
sanctions.  Finally, members and non-members of agreements are more likely to use 
military force in disputes.   
I evaluate these arguments using statistical test of dyad years from 1970 to 2001.  
Ultimately, I find the influence of agreements is highly contextual and based on 
economic relationships between states.  Conditional support is found for the idea that 
economic agreements reduce conflict between members and increase it with non-
members provided certain economic conditions exist.  However, other economic 
relationships can actually increase conflict between states in the same agreement.  
Furthermore, I do not find support for the argument that economic agreement members 
substitute economic sanctions for military force as strategies in disputes.  Conditional 
support does exist for a substitution effect between members and non-members, however.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or 
regional trade agreements – are powerful foreign policy tools for many states.  By 
lowering commercial barriers, agreements increase trade and investment among member 
states.  As a consequence, the number of extant agreements now numbers over two-
hundred individual arrangements with many more in various stages of negotiation.  The 
proliferation of agreements is accompanied by increasing complexity.  Many economic 
agreements now incorporate external trade policy harmonization and factor mobility in 
addition to standard trade liberalization.  In addition to increasing commercial exchange, 
states also gain from agreements by increasing their bargaining power in multilateral 
negotiations and signaling political commitment to particular policies.  Economic 
integration, therefore, appears to be a cornerstone of commercial policy for states. 
Rhetoric from scholars and politicians alike further suggests that commercial 
integration is as valuable for peace and security as it is for economic prosperity. In the 
late nineteenth century, Vilfredo Pareto advocated customs unions as pacifying 
mechanisms in Europe (Machlup 1992, 146).  John Maynard Keynes echoed this 
sentiment after World War I, believing that integration had the potential to tie European 
states together politically and prevent the devastation of war (Keynes 1920, 249).  French 
minister Robert Schuman, when advocating for the European Coal and Steel Community, 
firmly believed in economic cooperation as a means to peace: 
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“By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose 
decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal 
will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European 
federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.” (Schuman 1950) 
Yet economic agreements do not exist in a vacuum.  Economic integration can 
profoundly affect the welfare of non-member states by altering trade patterns and 
investment decisions.  Regional economic agreements – by necessity – are discriminatory 
institutions that incorporate a discrete number of states to maximize economic gains.  By 
doing so, economic agreements may implicitly cordon off areas of the global economy 
and foster acrimonious commercial relations.  In a process called trade diversion, for 
example, trade shifts from more- to less-efficient producers due to the unequal removal of 
trade barriers and tariffs (Viner 1950, 43; Krugman 1993, 384-385).  Indeed, the concern 
over the trend in regional trade agreements prompted then Director General of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Supachai Panitchpakdi to comment:  
"[Regional integration] threatens the primacy of the WTO, and foreshadows a 
world of greater fragmentation, conflict, and marginalization, particularly of the 
weakest and poorest countries." (Panitchpakdi 2002) 
Furthermore, economic integration involves strategic decisions about which states 
are included and excluded from membership.  Often these decisions are made based on 
security goals.  Many states integrate economically to resist aggressive states or 
particularly strong threats they may face.  For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), with a stated goal of developing a common market, was created in part due to 
concern over the Iran-Iraq war.  As Saudi Arabia’s Interior Minister Prince Nayif ibn 
Abd al-Aziz indicated during one of the organizations meetings in 1982:  
 “Undoubtedly, the GCC has made great progress in all fields in a short period of 
time.  Undoubtedly, the security field which all of you represent here is of 
paramount importance in the cooperation of GCC member states.” (Ramazani 
1988) 
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Given that economic agreements are both a component of an overall security 
strategy for some states and impact the economic power of states, it is prudent to consider 
the overall impact they have on conflict between nations.  This project, in turn, examines 
the relationship between economic institutions and interstate conflict in order to evaluate 
their ability to generate peace.  Specifically, I look to inform the following question: Do 
formal economic integration agreements influence interstate conflict?   
While informed by a broad literature on trade and conflict, many issues 
concerning the broader security implications of economic agreements have yet to be 
addressed.  In particular, I consider three important aspects of economic agreements and 
commercial relations in general that receive comparatively little attention.  First, where 
contemporary studies of economic interdependence and conflict assume the gains from 
trade are valued equally, I attempt to contextualize economic relations between states by 
considering more carefully the structure of commerce.  Economic agreements vary in 
terms of scope and depth, for example, in ways that likely influence their pacifying 
effects.  Likewise, asymmetrical relations between agreement members (or non-
members) may further color their interactions.  Second, I consider the seemingly 
contrasting effect economic agreements have on intra-agreement and extra-agreement 
relations.  While the economic effects of agreements may increase interdependence 
between members, thereby potentially pacifying relations, it may simultaneously reduce 
it with states excluded from the agreement.  Consequently, states forming economic 
agreements may face a tradeoff between intra-agreement peace (i.e., between member 
states) and extra-agreement conflict (i.e., between members and non-members).   
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Finally, I consider more carefully the causal mechanisms behind the influence of 
commerce on conflict.  In particular, I evaluate the belief that economic sanctions can 
substitute for military force as coercive policies.  In many ways economic agreements 
provide a natural test for this oft-held belief.  States in an economic agreement implicitly 
signal their economic interdependence and the salience of trade relations with other 
member states.  Given this, if economic sanctions truly substitute for military conflict, 
agreement members are theoretically the best positioned to substitute sanctions for 
military force.   
In this project, I specifically argue that economic agreements influence the 
relative utility of coercive policies among those states both included in and excluded 
from membership. Economic agreements foster greater intra-agreement interdependence 
by increasing trade, promoting investment, and providing intangible benefits to members.  
This, in turn, likely encourages the use of economic sanctions to address conflicts 
between members instead of military force.  On the other hand, the process of economic 
integration likely reduces or limits interdependence between members and non-members 
of agreements.  Economic sanctions are likely less effect, promoting the use of military 
force to address conflicts.  Consequently, while some relationships reduce overall conflict 
and violence, others may actually increase it by limiting the effective use of alternatives 
like economic sanctions.   
1.1  Layout of the Dissertation 
My dissertation proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 synthesizes the commercial and 
institutional effects of economic agreements with their political implications per the 
extant literature.  In Chapter 3, I develop a theory of economic agreements and interstate 
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conflict.  My argument is relatively straightforward.  Economic agreements increase 
economic interdependence between member states while simultaneously reducing 
relative interdependence with non-member states.  This process has different implications 
for intra- and extra-agreement relations.  Interdependence between agreement members, 
first, is likely a facilitator of peaceful intra-agreement relations.  The marginalization of 
ties between members and non-members, however, likely exacerbates tensions and 
increases extra-agreement conflict.   
The implications of my theory, however, go beyond simply the initiation of 
conflict and extend to the means by which states pursue conflict.  To this end, I develop a 
formal bargaining model considering a state’s choice between economic sanctions and 
military force to coerce adversaries.  The model begins with a challenger demanding 
concession from a defender, who then either accepts or rejects.  Given the defender 
rejects the demand, the challenger then decides whether to use economic sanctions or 
military force to compel the defender to acquiesce.  My analysis of the model indicates, 
somewhat intuitively, that states select the policy with which they are best suited to 
compel the defender.  States in a dominant economic position are more likely to use 
economic sanctions while more dependent states are more likely to use military force.  In 
terms of my argument concerning economic agreements, the implications once again are 
different for intra- or extra-agreement relations.  Interdependence between members of 
the same agreement likely increases both the effectiveness of economic sanctions and 
cost of military force, encouraging the use of the former.  When members engage in 
conflict with non-members, however, economic sanctions are less likely to be effective 
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given the lower degree of interdependence.  The result could be elevating military force 
to a first-best option when conflicts arise.   
I test the implications of my theory and formal model using a multi-method 
approach.  Chapter 4 describes in detail a research design which allows me to 
appropriately capture the complex details of economic agreements and their influence on 
both conflict and the strategies states employ.  In Chapter 5, I examine the effect of 
economic agreements and the trade relationships they influence on the onset of both 
economic sanctions and military force between two states in the same economic 
agreement.  I also offer an extended illustration of some plausible causal mechanisms in 
my analysis using the relationship between Uganda and Kenya, both members of the East 
African Community.  I conduct a second large-n analysis in Chapter 6 testing my 
argument that economic agreements exacerbate conflict between members and non-
members as interdependence is limited.  I evaluate the onset of economic sanctions and 
military force based on economic agreements and trade relationships between two states 
where either only one is in an agreement or both states are in separate agreements.  In the 
concluding chapter, I summarize my argument and consider the policy implications of 
my analysis.   
1.2  Defining Formal Economic Agreements 
Before proceeding with my analysis, however, a brief definition and discussion of 
formal economic agreements is warranted.  A formal economic agreement as I use it 
refers to any institution removing barriers to commercial exchange with discrete 
membership.  In general, this is broadly similar to the conventional use of regional trade 
agreements.  The World Trade Organization defines a regional trade agreement as a 
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territory that maintains separate tariffs or regulations for a “substantial part of the trade of 
such territory” (WTO 1994, Article XXIV).  In practice, the concept is stretched 
somewhat by the states that employ such arrangements such that a “substantial part” of 
trade is not in fact covered by agreements (an issue I address empirically).  Two key 
factors therefore define my use of economic agreements.  First, the arrangement must in 
some way reduce barriers to commerce between states so as to increase economic 
interactions between members.  Second, membership in the agreement must be discrete 
and non-universal.  That is, global institutions like the WTO and its predecessor the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are not considered in my theory or 
analysis.  While the GATT and WTO reduce barriers to commerce, their nearly universal 
membership provides a baseline of economic openness in the world.  My use of 
economic agreements, to this end, captures institutions that go beyond global standards to 
capture unique, discrete relationships between groups of states. 
Economic integration agreements also vary in scale and scope.  Balassa (1962) 
first developed a comprehensive economic theory of integration as a process.  He 
identifies five stages of integration in increasing order from free trade agreements to 
customs unions, common markets, economic unions, and total political integration.  
Subsequent authors have modified Balassa’s taxonomy for particular nuanced purposes 
(see Crowley 2001 for a summary of taxonomy).  Each level is differentiated by 
additional layers of policy convergence and depth of integration.  In the most basic, the 
distinction between levels is the mix of negative and positive integration initiatives, 
where negative integration is simply the removal of barriers and not the creation of new 
mechanisms.  Shallow agreements, such as free trade agreements, focus largely on 
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negative integration by removing impediments to trade.  Deep agreements, in contrast, 
remove barriers as well as creating common initiatives.  Customs unions, for example, 
incorporate free trade and the harmonization of external trade policies.  Consequently, the 
taxonomy I adopt in my analysis takes into account the incremental depth of economic 
integration.  A summary of the levels of integration and the policies they imply I use in 
my analysis, based largely on Balassa’s original taxonomy, are included in Table 1.1. 
1.3  The Political Salience of Economic Agreements 
Understanding how economic agreements influence conflict between states is 
important given trends in the global economy today.  As noted, economic agreements are 
incredibly popular tools of commercial policy for states in the contemporary world 
economy.  Starting from a base of almost zero following World War II, the number of 
extant integration agreements grew to include well over two-hundred unique 
arrangements.  It is not an exaggeration to say that, with only a few exceptions, every 
state in the world today is party to at least one economic agreement.  Agreements are now 
also more diverse in membership, broader in scope, and increasingly deep.  While most 
early agreements were restricted to European states, the proliferation of new states 
following decolonization encouraged participation in the developing world.  Figure 1.1 
illustrates the popularity of economic agreements by plotting the cumulative number of 
economic agreements in force from 1950 to 2011.  Evident in Figure 1.1 is the 
exponential growth of agreements since the end of the Cold War.  Between 1992 and 
2011, states formed between ten and eleven agreements annually on average.  The fifteen 
agreements added in 2011 indicate the popularity of economic agreements is unlikely to 
wane in the coming years.   
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The quantitative increase in economic agreements has also complicated 
commercial relations between states.  Crisscrossing and overlapping agreements create a 
more complex system of trade regulations for businesses to navigate.  As Bhagwati 
(1995, 2008) famously noted, there now exists a “spaghetti bowl” of trade deals that 
subject the same commodities to different tariffs, quotas, and rules of origins.  The 
ultimate result of such dynamics may, on one hand, expand commerce given the lower 
barriers to trade.  On the other hand, the complexity Bhagwati notes may stymie global 
trade by creating a chaotic system of competing preferences that increases uncertainty 
and suboptimal outcomes.  Indeed, Baldwin (1993) argues that the mere creation of a 
trade agreement between a discrete number of states encourages the formation of other 
agreements.  States concerned about competition from the new agreement may seek to 
form agreements to compensate for this implicit market discrimination.  Hence, 
agreements have a domino effect where agreements are formed in defensive fashion.  
Consequently, given their popularity and potential to influence global commerce, 
economic agreements are an important topic of consideration in international relations 
today.   
In addition to the economic consequences of agreements, it is important to 
understand their influence as part of state’s overall security strategies.  While the direct 
economic benefits of economic integration agreements are the most obvious motivation 
for their popularity, a number of political incentives underlie most arrangements.  Indeed, 
some go as far as to state the fundamental motivations of all economic agreements to be 
political.  In the words of Ali El-Agraa: 
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In reality, almost all existing cases of economic integration were either proposed 
or formed for political reasons even though the arguments put forward in their 
favor were expressed in terms of possible economic gains.  (El-Agraa 1997, 34)  
Perhaps the most basic political motivation to form an economic agreement is to 
underpin a broader security arrangement.  Schiff and Winters (1998), notably, identify 
several security-based motivations for regional integration.  First, states may seek 
economic integration to politically bind member states.  As the anecdotal quotes at the 
beginning of this paper indicate, policymakers often turn to economic agreements to 
achieve security goals.  European integration, as noted, was pursued largely for security 
goals.  Likewise, Argentina and Brazil sought economic integration to quell tensions 
between the two countries and focus on democratic consolidation (Schiff and Winters 
1998).  Former U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull also advocated economic integration 
as a means to pacify interstate relations (Hull 1948).  Second, although the main goals of 
agreements are economic in nature, many also include a component addressing external 
security and foreign policy threats.  The South African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) was formed in 1980 specifically to reduce states’ material 
dependence on South Africa.  By doing delinking their economies from South Africa, 
member states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zambia) sought to both resist pressure from South Africa and actively combat the 
Apartheid regime by economically isolating the country.  The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) likewise was formed in 1967 to resist external powers.  Of 
particular concern to ASEAN founders was the factious regional economy that opened 
them to manipulation by the competition between the United States and Soviet Union.  
Consequently, one of ASEAN’s core objectives is “… [to] ensure [states] stability and 
security from external interference in any form or manifestation…”  (ASEAN 1967).  It 
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is important to subject the beliefs of policymakers to empirical evaluation given the 
relatively common belief economic agreements are instruments of peace between states. 
1.4  Contributions 
My research makes several noteworthy contributions to both the scholarly study 
of political science and potential public policy.  First, I contribute to and expand the body 
of literature on economic interdependence and conflict.  In some ways my analysis is a 
critique or refinement of the mainstream belief that interdependence has a linearly 
pacifying effect on interstate conflict.  The assumption made by most studies linking 
interdependence with peace is that trade exclusively results in positive gains.  That is, the 
only way interdependence can increase conflict is if little interdependence exists.  Such 
an assumption may not be warranted, however, as it captures only the vulnerability of 
states to disruptions in trade.  While both states may be vulnerable, one may be more 
sensitive to disruptions such that it is less able to adapt policies to minimize damage from 
the disruption (Keohane and Nye 1977; Richardson and Kegley 1980).  Indeed, if the 
terms of trade decidedly favor one state in the trade relationship, it is unlikely they view 
interdependence similarly.   
My argument lends support, most importantly, to the belief held by Barbieri 
(1996, 2002), Grieco (1988, 1993), and others that the structure of trade relations is an 
important determinant of their influence on conflict.  That is, I consider more so when 
and in what ways economic relations influence conflict and not simply if they do so.  This 
line of inquiry has implications for policymakers as well.  On one hand it directly informs 
decisions to pursue close economic relations between states as a pillar of or compliment 
to security policy.  This is particularly useful for economic agreements primarily pursued 
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for security goals (e.g., the European Coal and Steel Community).  It is also helpful for 
security agreements that contain an economic component.  While the military alliance 
may intend to draw states closer together, it is possible economic frictions brought on by 
openness and competition could drive them apart.  On the other hand, it broadly informs 
trade and economic policy by highlighting the potential political consequences of 
economic policy decisions.  That is, economic agreements that do not specifically touch 
on security goals may nonetheless impact foreign policy decisions.   
Second, my analysis addresses a generally neglected area of international 
relations.  Specifically, how might the existence and operation of limited-membership 
international institutions influence states excluded from membership?  While copious 
research explores integration and conflict between members, relatively little considers 
how institutions affect non-members.  State decisions to seek integration are strategic 
choices that necessarily exclude certain parties.  It follows, therefore, that institutions 
may have as profound consequences for non-members as they do members.  I provide a 
piece of this puzzle in my analysis.   
Third, I consider the empirical validity of policy substitution in conflict scenarios.  
Sanctions have long been posited as means to prevent deadly conflict.  Woodrow Wilson 
firmly believed in the power of economic pressure to avoid conflicts like World War I:  
“A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender.  Apply this economic, 
peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force.  It is a terrible 
remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings pressure 
upon the nation that, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.” (Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliot 1990). 
His sentiment is carried out in practice by notably the United States, which uses sanctions 
more often than any other country as a tool of foreign policy.  However, while economic 
sanctions have long been posited as alternatives to war, few studies bring empirical 
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results to bear.  While sanctions may be alternatives to war, it is equally valid that they 
are utilized in different foreign policy roles that do not warrant the use of military force.  
Furthermore, the majority of sanctions literature is rightly focused on their effectiveness 
and consequences.  Understanding the consequences of sanctions, however, requires an 
understanding of the circumstances in which states employ sanctions.  That is, the 
effectiveness of sanctions may be conditioned on the type of engagement.  Sanctions may 
be more or less effective depending on whether they are used to avoid conflict or not.  If 
they are indeed substitutable policies, economic agreement members are the most likely 
group to do so given their formal interdependence and ready-made institutional 
mechanisms.  This contribution has important consequences for policy in particular, 
given the popularity of economic sanctions as conflict resolution tools today.  I consider 
in this analysis some of the conditions under which economic sanctions are more or less 
likely to be adopted by states.   
Overall, my research addresses the political ramifications of one of the most 
noteworthy trends in international political economy over the past fifty years.  Economic 
agreements have expanded in scope and scale such that nearly every economy in the 
world is now formally linked to at least one other.  Relatively little scholarly attention has 
been paid, however, to the broad security consequences of agreements.  Through my 
dissertation, I address this gap and help inform trade and economic policy by considering 
how the structure of economic relations influences conflict behavior.  If it is the case, as I 
argue, that economic agreements reduce conflict among members but increase it with 
non-members, states entering into economic agreements face a tradeoff between intra- 
and extra-agreement security.  Understanding this tradeoff will ultimately help states 
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determine the linkages between economic and security policy, thereby helping improve 
efforts in both arenas.   
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Table 1.1: Levels of Economic Integration 
 
   
Partial Scope 
Agreement 
Free Trade   
Area 
Customs     
Union 
Common 
Market 
Economic 
Union 
(PSA)  (FTA)  (CU)  (CM)  (EU)  
Reduction in Trade Barriers X  X  X  X  X  
Elimination of Trade Barriers 
   X  X  X  X  
Creation of a Common External 
Trade Policy       X  X  X  
Free Movement of Labor and 
Capital          X  X  
Coordination of Domestic 
Economic Policies             X  
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Figure 1.1: Growth in Economic Agreements 1950 – 2011 
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CHAPTER 2 
ASSESSMENT OF RELEVANT LITERATURE: INTERDEPENDENCE, CONFLICT, AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS  
 
The research question I put forward is firmly grounded in the literature on 
economic interdependence and conflict, but also includes other research areas, given the 
formal nature of economic agreements.  That is, economic agreements are international 
organizations that carry a temporal aspect related to the codified nature of association 
between member states.  I proceed in this chapter as follows.  First, I review and 
synthesis the extant literature on economic interdependence and conflict.  Second, 
stemming from the interdependence and conflict debate, I evaluate the use of economic 
sanctions as a tool to achieve foreign policy goals and their substitutability with military 
force as coercive options for states.  Third, I consider the political motivations and 
consequences of economic agreements from primarily a neo-functionalist perspective.  
Fourth, given the literature on economic interdependence and conflict, I explore the 
economic and political consequences of economic agreements for member states.  Fifth, 
given the discussion of prior research, I contextualize the extant literature on economic 
agreements and interstate conflict.  Finally, I consider gaps in this extant literature as it 
relates to my particular research question.   
2.1  Economic Interdependence and Conflict 
Economic agreements are naturally institutions designed to increase commercial 
interaction between member states.  As such, their influence on conflict is primarily 
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informed by the broad literature on economic interdependence and conflict.  Connections 
between commerce and conflict span centuries and are most often associated with 
enlightenment philosophers.  In particular, Immanuel Kant believed economic 
interdependence reinforced legal systems and socialized states to prefer cooperation 
rather than conflict (1991 [1795]).  Empirical assessments of Kant’s general claims, 
however, assume more varied causal mechanisms.  The line of inquiry most in line with 
Kant’s original thoughts holds that trade may pacify states through a socialization process 
that encourages the acquisition of resources through exchange rather than conquest 
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Rosecrance 1986; Hegre 2000).  Economic interdependence, 
furthermore, improves communication and conflict mediation mechanisms such that 
conflicts between interdependent states are resolved peacefully (Mitrany 1965; Haas 
1964; Stein 1993; Doyle 1997).  War is, therefore, not required between interdependent 
states, as they have alternative means of acquiring resources and resolving disputes. 
The most developed branch of the liberal peace holds that trade between nations 
confers tangible, material gains that provide incentives to avoid conflict.  Eliminating the 
flow of goods and services between states potentially sacrifices gains in aggregate 
welfare.  Trade therefore reduces conflict through opportunity costs insomuch as trade is 
disrupted by war (Polachek 1980, 1992; Dorussen 1999; Russett and Oneal 1997; 1999a; 
1999b; 2001; Benson 2004).  The opportunity cost argument is criticized on several 
grounds, however.  Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) argue that opportunity costs are 
insufficient to deter conflict.  Using a bargaining model, the authors demonstrate that 
opportunity costs simply increase the demand a challenger makes.  That is, if the 
defender derives benefits from its economic relations with the challenger – and the 
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challenger is aware – it simply demands more in pre-war bargaining.  Interdependence, 
therefore, is subsumed in the bargaining process (Garzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400). 
Second, Barbieri and Levy (1999, 2004) challenge the fundamental assumption of 
studies linking trade and conflict by testing whether conflict actually does disrupt trade.  
Although data availability limits their sample to seven dyads, the authors find little 
evidence to support the notion that war interrupts trade flows.  There is ambiguous 
evidence that trade drops initially in response to war and no evidence to suggest that war 
inhibits future trade.  In a later work the authors describe more fully the logic of trading 
with enemies in times of war, including systemic relative gains concerns, the alienation 
of neutrals in warring states, and dependency on trade taxes for war efforts (Barbieri and 
Levy 2004).  Anderton and Carter (2001) present a rebuttal to Barbieri and Levy, 
however, by focusing on the impact of major power wars on trade.  They find evidence 
that major power wars – and non-major power wars to a less extent – do reduce trade 
between combatants.   Studies considering the impact of war on trade suffer from several 
problems, however, including data availability, limited sample size, and selection bias 
(Barbieri and Levy 2001).  Consequently, the exact impact of military conflict on trade is 
ambiguous at best.   
Two additional veins of research explore economic exchange beyond trade 
relationships.  One specifically considers capital flows between states as inhibitors of 
conflict.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) provides tangible benefits to states by 
increasing physical and human capital stocks which, in turn, are jeopardized through 
interstate conflict (Souva 2002; Souva and Prins 2006; Gartzke 2007).  Furthermore, FDI 
provides private information that reduces uncertainty in the bargaining stages of war-
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initiation (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001).  Threats made by interdependent states are 
more credible given the potential losses they may incur.  A final strain of research by 
Brooks (1999) argues that the geographic diffusion of production, expansion of 
multinational corporations, and shift to knowledge-oriented economies renders conquest 
ineffective in capitalizing on economic assets.  Simply put, states cannot utilize what they 
conquer because of fractious production chains, the intangible nature of economic value 
based in knowledge, and disciplining role of corporations. 
While the preponderance of studies conclude that economic interactions reduce 
conflict, a dissenting body of research finds the opposite effect of trade on conflict.  The 
counter-argument to the liberal peace holds that asymmetric patterns of exchange 
encourage states to view commercial flows in terms of relative gains.  A state achieving 
greater wealth or increased productivity from an economic agreement may translate its 
new-found advantage into military power to be used against the other (Barbieri 1996, 
2002; Gilpin 1981; Gowa 1994; Grieco 1988; Grieco 1993).  Furthermore, a state may 
simply develop concern about the extent to which they depend on a rival for economic 
viability.  Reliance on another state for goods and/or markets is in and of itself a form of 
dependence exogenous to relative gains concerns.  Although levels of trade may be 
relatively equal, each state is still vulnerable to disruptions in the relationship.  Rather 
than interdependence, economic integration may foster simple dependence or the 
perception thereof in both states (Barbieri 1996, 2002; Mansfield and Pollins 2001, 836; 
McMillan 1997, 41).  Consequently, vulnerabilities implied by dependency may 
encourage more aggressive actions in the security arena to compensate for strategic 
imbalances (Gilpin 1981; Liberman 1996; Mearsheimer 1990; Mearsheimer 1994).  
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Alternatively, Crescenzi (2003a, 2003b) argues that the constraining influence of 
interdependence depends on each state’s the exit costs.  States that have many alternative 
options for import or export are not truly interdependent, as they can easily avoid the cost 
of conflict as it manifests in lost trade.  Asymmetric exit costs tend to yield limited 
conflict, as the weaker state lacks bargaining leverage.  Symmetrically low exit costs are 
most likely to escalate to militarized conflict. 
Empirically, Barbieri (1996; 2002) argues that the salience of bilateral trade 
relationships and the symmetrical nature of dependence in these relationships are 
important determinates of conflict.  Salience is defined as the importance of a bilateral 
trading relationship relative to others for two states in a dyadic relationship.  Symmetry is 
the equality of dependence for states in a dyad.  She finds through a large-n study that 
high interdependence, measured by the interaction of salience and symmetry, actually 
increases the likelihood of interstate conflict.  Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) argue 
that countries more open to global trade are more prone to conflict due to the lower 
opportunity costs of any one trade relationship.  The more numerous and diversely 
distributed the trade ties of a given state , the less valuable any one  connection is relative 
to the others.  Consequently, states with open markets incur less pain from the severing of 
any one trade tie.  The reduced opportunity cost of conflict both decreases the pain of war 
and reduces the effectiveness of economic sanctions, since states may easily adopt by 
shifting from one trade partner to another.   
2.2  Foreign Policy Substitution and Sanctions as Coercive Tools 
The third and somewhat underdeveloped mechanism by which economic 
interdependence promotes peace is the possibility that economic interdependence 
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increases the effectiveness of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms.  In other words, 
policies short of war may be substituted as a coercive means to achieve foreign policy 
goals as economic interdependence can increase the their effectiveness, thereby obviating 
the need for war.  The essence of policy substitution is that states may pursue foreign 
policy goals using several different means.  States possess a menu of options with which 
they may address foreign policy issues (Most and Starr 1984 and 1989; Starr 2000).  
Different situations (causes) will often tend to result in different policy responses 
(outcomes) across both nations and time despite similar foreign policy objectives.  For 
example, responses to a perceived security threat by a state range from increased defense 
spending, to securing allies, or preemptive war among others.  The exact policy option 
adopted is determined by various factors both internal and external to the state.  Cioffi-
Revilla and Starr (2002) further refine policy substitutability and its application to theory 
and empirical testing in compliment to opportunity and willingness.  Specifically, policy 
substitutability is a second-order causal mechanism to the larger framework of 
opportunity and willingness (Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 2002, 232).  In other words, policy 
substitutability is a decision-making process stemming from the ability and desire of a 
state to act.  A critical component of foreign policy substitutability, furthermore, is in the 
relative comparison of instruments to one another (Most and Starr 1984; Baldwin 1985, 
121-122; Most and Starr 1989).  Within the universe of potential responses to conflict, 
particular alternatives are more attractive compared to others based on the ability of states 
to inflict harm and withstand retaliation (Starr 2000, 132; Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 2002, 
232; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400; Stein 2003, 118).  Consequently, policy 
substitution can shed light on the process of conflict within the context of cost/benefit 
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analyses.  Foreign policy substitution is also strategic in nature.  States will implement 
particular policies in part influenced by their expected outcome and chances of success 
(Clark and Reed 2005).    
Of particular interest in the economic interdependence and conflict debate is the 
potential use of economic sanctions as substitutes for military force.  Economic sanctions 
may be used to selectively harm the economy of another state if interdependence is 
sufficiently high.  In this way, economic sanctions can be tools of coercion in which the 
sender state disrupts the flow of trade or capital in an effort to change an undesirable 
policy in the target state (Wallensteen 1968; Baldwin 1985; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 
1990; Drezner 2003).  Likewise, sanctions can simply be used as tools to punish the 
target for an action or policy (Nossal 1989, Drezner 1999).  The success for failure of 
economic sanctions, given this motivation, is directly related to the structure of economic 
relations between contending parties (Baldwin 1985, 189-195; Baldwin 1993; Whalley 
1996; Mastanduno 2003, 176; Morrow 2003, 91; Stein 2003).  Sanctions are particularly 
likely to succeed when used by relatively strong states against the relatively weak, as the 
latter is more dependent on the former for economic viability (Hirschman 1981).   
Economic sanctions may also substitute for military force insofar as 
interdependence enhances states’ ability to send costly signals.  In particular, Garzke, Li 
and Boemer (2001) argue that severing mutually valuable commercial ties enables 
interdependent dyads to credibly signal resolve in conflict.  Private information is 
therefore revealed concerning the disputant’s willingness to fight.  Similarly, Verdier 
(2004) argues that sanctions are important purveyors of private information from the 
sender state to the target state.  They may signal a sender state’s disapproval and/or its 
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resolve to see an offensive policy of the target state reversed, preferably without the use 
of military force (Drezner 2003; Garzke, Li and Boemer 2001; Morgan and Schwebach 
1997).  Economic sanctions and military threats may also generate audience costs insofar 
as leaders are punished for backing down from international confrontations (Fearon 1997; 
Schwebach 2000; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; 
Lektzian and Sprecher 2007).  Sending an economic sanction, in other words, may force 
leaders to pursue an aggressive policy vis-à-vis the target or risk being punished.   
   Despite their relative popularity, the ability of economic sanctions to generate 
meaningful costs through these mechanisms, and therefore succeed as signals of policy, is 
questionable.  First, the ability of states to tailor sanctions to specific dimensions reduces 
their overall impact and weight.  Indeed, Lektzian and Sprecher (2007) argue that 
sanctions are designed in such a ways as to minimize the cost imposed on senders.  The 
result, which they demonstrate empirically, is that sanctions often carry relatively little 
sunk or audience costs and result in a higher probability of military conflict overall.  
Second, when the field of available policy options is expanded to include military force, 
the audience cost value of sanctions is tenuous.  Insofar as the potential cost of military 
confrontation (i.e., casualties) exceeds the potential cost of economic sanctions, the sunk 
and audience costs generated will typically be lower for sanctions than military force.  As 
Fearon (1997) notes, “signaling anything less than total commitment leads to the 
inference that the defender will surely not fight” (75).  Taking these two points together, 
sanctions may be seen by defending states as signals of the challenger’s weakness simply 
because they are not military threats (Hufbauer 1998).  Sanctions may therefore be 
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viewed as foreign policy “on the cheap,” when military force is too expensive and 
diplomacy too frail (Hufbauer 1998; Schott 1998; Schwebach 2000).   
This is not to say that economic sanctions are completely devoid of an ability to 
signal resolve to defending states.  The true signaling power of economic sanctions may 
lay in the ability of the challenger to demonstrate the harm it can inflict on an opponent.  
That is, by imposing costs on a defending state, the challenger communicates its ability to 
disrupt political or economic systems in the target.  Hence, the signal is not necessarily 
one of intention or resolve, but of ability and capacity.  Jervis (1970) argues that signals 
(or what he calls indices) are more successful when the “statements or actions …carry 
some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be 
inextricably linked to the actor’s capabilities or intentions” (18).  Consequently, 
economic sanctions can be effective signals of the challenger’s capabilities in two ways.  
First, strong economic sanctions can demonstrate the degree to which the challenger is 
able to disrupt the defender’s economy and government by severing commercial ties.  
Second, the strength of sanction can signal the degree of resolve and domestic support for 
coercive actions (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007).  By implication, weak sanctions can 
signal the opposite effects – namely the inability to harm and a lack of domestic support.  
The mechanism behind the signaling value in this way, however, is identical to the 
compellence or punishment argument.  Specifically, sanctions are successful to the 
degree the challenger can harm the defender.  The success or failure of economic 
sanctions, therefore, likely rests on their ability to inflict some degree of economic 
damage on the target state. 
2.3  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions  
 26 
Turning to the actually effectiveness of sanctions, it is important to understand 
that success rates are strongly influenced by the goals states attempt to achieve and how 
success is defined.  First, it is possible leaders that impose sanctions are primarily 
motivated by domestic political gain.  Sanctions may be a mechanism by which 
governments demonstrate strong leadership or sympathy to domestic constituencies to 
gain political support in elections or for particular policies (Drury 1998; Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg 1988 and 1992; Mundo 1999; Whang 2011).  Evaluating whether sanctions 
compelled a target to change policy, in these instances, is likely of little use given it was 
not their primary goal.  Beyond this, however, sanctions may fulfill two objectives for 
states.  First, sanctions may be a punitive measure against a target for actions or policies 
of which the sender disapproves (Nossal 1998).  Punitive sanctions also serve a deterrent 
function, as they are in part meant to demonstrate the potential cost of objectionable 
policies in an effort to dissuade future transgressors (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 2007).  
Second, sanctions may be used to compel states to change particular policies or 
behaviors.   
The effectiveness of punitive and compellent sanctions is a topic of heated debate.  
The canonical empirical work on sanctions – Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990; 2007) – 
finds that they are successful in approximately one-third of cases (158).  Once again, 
however, success is dependent on the sender’s goals, as over one-half of sanctions 
succeed when they require only a modest policy change by the target.  Likewise, Petrescu 
(2010) finds that sanctions may be an effective deterrent to future actions.  In her 
analysis, she considers the likelihood that a state participates in a future military dispute 
given they were sanctioned in a previous military dispute.  Using statistical analysis, she 
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finds that a state is indeed less likely to become involved in military disputes if they are 
sanctioned in a previous dispute.  In contrast, Pape (1997) reevaluated the original work 
of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) using a more stringent definition of success.  
Ultimately, he argues that sanctions are only successful in compelling policy change 5% 
of the time once military actions and ambiguity over concessions are taken into account.   
Drezner (2003), however points out that previous conclusions about the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions were drawn without taking the threat of sanctions 
into consideration.  Using a game theoretic model, he illustrates that target states are 
more likely to acquiesce to the sender state’s demands before sanctions are actually 
imposed.  Citing a previous study by Elliott and Richardson (1997), he notes that in 
economic sanctions dealing with U.S. trade policy, threats were successful about 56% of 
the time as compared to implemented sanctions which were only successful about 33% of 
the time.  It could be argued that the threat of economic sanctions is a more useful policy 
tool than actual implementation; however, implementation is a necessary procedure 
without which the threat loses credibility (Lindsay 1986).   
The sanctions debate now generally rests on identifying the conditions under 
which sanctions can and do work.  Tsebelis (1990) models a two player game in which 
the sender has the choice to sanction or not and the target is given the choice to continue 
its policy or comply with the sender state’s demands.  Tsebelis provides six scenarios in 
which he considers different assumptions, all of which converge to the same equilibrium.  
Tsebelis finds that strategies of target and sender depend on the payoff of the opponent 
rather than their own payoff.  This suggests that leaders in the sending state are interested 
in punishing the target even at their own cost and that the target is interested in violating 
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even at its own cost.   Eaton and Engers (1992) suggest that the resolve of the sender and 
target should be the determining factor in whether sanctions are successful.  They create 
two models, one in which the sanction demand has a shadow of the future, and one in 
which the demand is a onetime event.  They find that sanctions and threats are more 
likely to be successful when expectation of future interaction exists.  Smith (1995) builds 
upon Eaton and Engers’ work by specifically incorporating the threat of sanctions into 
the model.  He finds that the success of sanctions affects whether or not a nation chooses 
to sanction, suggesting that sanctions are indeed meant to succeed despite their seeming 
ineffectiveness.  Drezner (1999) attempts to model the effects of conflict expectation on 
economic statecraft.  He finds that as concerns over relative gains and reputation 
increase, a state’s decision to utilize sanctions increases as well.  Drezner also shows that 
as opportunity costs rise for the target and decline for the sender, the more economic 
sanctions will be used and the more effective they are likely to be.   
 Game theoretic models of this nature are complimented by numerous empirical 
studies.  One set of studies considers the characteristics of the sending and receiving 
states in determining sanctions success.  Overall, sanctions are more likely to succeed 
when utilized against close trading partners, friendly nations, and democracies due 
largely to the vulnerability of these states to costs (Allen 2008; Jing, Kaempfer & 
Lowenberg 2003).  Other studies focus on the characteristics of the sanction itself in 
compelling policy change in targets.  Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (2007) argue that a 
combination of international cooperation and high costs to the target should bolster a 
sanctioning state’s success rate, although others find against this claim (Martin 1992; 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1998; Miers and Morgan 2002; Bapat and Morgan 2009).  
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Beyond this, targeting ruling elites or employing multiple strong sanctions at the dispute 
outset over incremental increases over time increase the probability of success (Morgan 
and Schwebach 1996; Allen 2008).  Finally, Ang and Peksen (2007) focus on the nature 
of the dispute itself by arguing that states’ perceptions of the issues involved affect 
sanction outcomes.  In particular, the greater the difference in salience between the 
sender and the target, the more likely a sanctions episode will end in success for the 
sender.  To a certain degree, this backs up a game theoretic model by Hovi, Huseby and 
Sprinz (2005) in which they, “demonstrate that a target country will yield to imposed 
sanctions only if it initially underestimated the impact of sanctions, miscalculated the 
sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believed that sanctions would be 
imposed and maintained whether it yielded or not.”  Consequently, given the extant 
literature, the effectiveness of sanctions is an issue of strategic conditions as much as 
economic circumstances. 
2.4  Economic Institutions in Integration Theory 
The second related body of literature on the commercial peace focuses upon the 
institutional aspects of organizations.  Integration and regime theory argue that 
international institutions accrue benefits to member states that justify their creation and 
maintenance.  As a consequence, individual states choose to become members of 
international organizations by adhering to formal, documented guidelines of association.  
In many ways, this is what distinguishes the potential effects of economic integration 
agreements from simple economic interdependence.  Consider first the motivations 
behind the creation of international institutions.  In the most basic sense, international 
institutions are responses to problems beyond the grasp of individual states (Mitrany 
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1965).  Common problems create demands for technocratic responses that should provide 
better overall outcomes for members.  In this way, international institutions are highly 
pragmatic tools at the outset (Haas 1958; 1964).  The likelihood that organizations will 
benefit member states is largely a function of the linkages between them.  Both Deutsch 
(1957; 1968) and Nye (1971), in particular, argue that integration must be preceded by an 
increase in overall transactions between potential members of economic unions.  
International organizations may both reflect and foster interactions and interdependence 
between member states.   
A second body of integration literature looks into the state to find motivations for 
cooperation.  Domestic constituencies in favor of integration may facilitate greater 
international cooperation through several mechanisms.  In particular, elites play critical 
roles in the integration process.  The socialization of elites – particularly within the 
bureaucracy – in the integration area enables both the realization of mutual gains and 
transmission of common values (Haas 1958; Deutsch 1968; Nye 1971; Wolf 1973; 
Moravcsik 1991; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Stone Fligstein, Sandholtz, and Stone 
Sweet 2001).  Likewise, shared values and ideology facilitate integration between states.  
Strong ideological systems, in particular, insulate the integration process from potential 
detractors and enable states to take short-term losses (Nye 1971).  Institutional 
mechanisms are also important in primarily a pragmatic sense.  Mansfield, Milner, and 
Pevehouse (2007) specifically apply their analysis to economic agreement formation and 
find that a greater number of “veto players” with the opportunity to derail trade 
negotiations reduce the likelihood of agreement formation.  Hence, domestic politics can 
profoundly influence economic integration. 
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Overall, the creation and maintenance of international institutions is dependent in 
large part on their ability to bestow benefits on member states.  Indeed, Keohane (1984) 
argues that institutions reduce transaction costs, limit uncertainty, and provide 
information that reduces the chances of members reneging on commitments.  All of these 
elements provide incentive to joint and sustain international cooperation through a 
codified framework.  Such benefits are particularly likely to be realized in economic 
regimes owing to the potential for mutual gains (Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 
1985).  Ultimately, cooperation in one area of policy – such as trade – “spill-over” into 
new functional areas that require expanded bureaucracy and integration (Haas 1964).  
Consequently, integration tends to beget integration in the neofunctionalist perspective. 
The success or failure of integration is not guaranteed by extent of 
interdependence or interaction between member states, however.  Indeed, disintegration 
can occur under several circumstances.  Perhaps the most intuitive reason for stagnation 
or disintegration is the inability of some institutions to address the distribution of gains.  
To some extent, states are concerned with the distribution of gains from both national 
power (Mearsheimer 1994; Grieco 1988; Grieco 1993) and economic equality 
perspectives (Nye 1971).  Symmetrical gains, therefore, increase the likelihood 
integration will succeed.  Domestically, Deutsch (1968) in particular identifies some of 
the conditions under which disintegration occurs.  These include the rise of new political 
groups, recalcitrant elites or the failure of values to mesh, lack of domestic reform, and 
failure by domestic elites to adjust to the new political climate.   
Also informative in the success or failure of integration, with particular respect to 
economic institutions, is the literature exploring political power and commercial 
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exchange.  In particular, several works expound on this internal integrative process as it 
relates to commercial exchange by linking the distributional effects of trade to political 
power shifts.  Following Stolper-Samuelson’s classic theorem, industries in which a state 
is abundantly endowed will gain from external trade while poorly endowed industries 
will suffer.  The political effects of this redistribution in economic power resonate 
through class cleavages.  Those controlling the abundant factor will tend to gain over 
those with the less abundant factor (Rogowski 1987; Midford 1993).  Broadly based class 
or industry cleavages may emerge depending on the mobility of factors, with high 
mobility across industry leading to class cleavages and low mobility to industry cleavages 
(Hiscox 2001).  In turn, those gaining from trade will look to capitalize, while those hurt 
by trade will tend to lobby for exclusions and rollbacks.   
2.5  Commercial and Political Consequences of Economic Agreements  
In the most basic sense, economic agreements remove barriers to exchange 
between member states which, in turn, increase intra-agreement welfare.  By removing 
barriers to trade, economic integration agreements have been shown to increase trade 
between members.  Using gravity models to estimate a “normal” level of trade in absence 
of agreements, a robust economic literature has shown that economic integration 
agreements do indeed increase exchange between members (Carerre 2006; Egger et al 
2008).  In particular, Baier and Bergstrang (2007), using sophisticated statistical 
instrumental variable models accounting for endogeneity, find that economic agreements 
more than double trade between two member states after ten years.  Second, the 
integration of markets and lowering of barriers facilitated by economic agreements 
implicitly broadens the markets of member states.  This is analogous to an exogenous 
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increase in the size of domestic markets that may provide significant economies-of-scale.  
Larger markets created by economic agreements may increase foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into member states as corporations look to exploit newly realized economics of 
scale (Joumotte 2004).  Corporations seeking to avoid the de facto discrimination of a 
limited economic integration agreement may find FDI an attractive alternative.  
Consequently, economic agreements also tend to attract multinational corporations (Chen 
2009).  Third, economic agreements encourage industrialization in developing states 
when shared by either developed or large developing states (Puga and Venables 1998).   
Economic agreements may also confer several political benefits on member 
states.  First, economic agreements may facilitate domestic reform and lock-in policy 
commitments.  Insofar as economic integration agreements are “sticky” or difficult to 
undo, accessing to a group binds domestic policy (Whalley 1996).  Furthermore, 
successive governments face constrains when considering “surprise” policies to the 
detriment of externally oriented actors in the state (Fernandez and Portes 1998; Schiff 
and Winters 1998).  In this way agreements can be credible signals of policy intentions.  
Second, the larger market conferred by an integration agreement may afford member 
states more bargaining weight in multilateral negotiations.  Whalley (1996), for example, 
contends that newly independent Eastern European states following the Cold War 
pursued as series of limited economic agreements as bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the EU 
(72).   Third, economic integration agreements may underpin broader security 
arrangements.  Schiff and Winters (1998), notably, identify three security-based 
motivations for regional integration – quelling domestic unrest, binding member states 
together politically, and creating institutions to balance against external threats.   
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 Finally, states seek economic agreements to lock-in access to important export or 
investment markets.  Market-access motivations are generally defensively oriented with 
the aim of preventing exclusion or responding to other regional trade agreements.  States 
excluded from one agreement may seek inclusion or creation of an alternative 
arrangement to ensure alternative markets (Baldwin 1993, 1997, 2006; Fernandez and 
Portes 1998).  During the interwar years, for example, Germany scrambled to secure 
exclusive resources through regional agreements in response to English trade 
arrangements (Eichengreen and Frankle 1995, 96).  The ultimate effect may be a 
“domino” effect where constituencies in excluded states seek defensive regional 
arrangements in response to de facto market discrimination and fears of trade diversion 
(Baldwin 1993).  Broader multilateral liberalization may be detrimentally effected 
insomuch as states have less incentive to add additional members to a regional grouping 
(Krugman 1993; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1999).  Alternatively, regionalism may be a 
stepping stone on the way to broader agreements and inter-region cooperation.  The 
reduced number of units in multilateral negotiations and information conveyed by 
regional openness may encourage broader liberalization (Baldwin 1993; Baldwin 2006).   
That economic integration agreements are universally desirable, however, is a 
topic of debate in economics scholarship.  Initially, limited economic integration was 
unequivocally encouraged as a stepping-stone to broader liberalization (El-Agraa 1997).  
Viner (1950), however, identified the potential negative externalities of regional 
economic integration.  While he notes that agreements reduce internal barriers to trade 
and increase the implicit size of the domestic market, both of which tend to benefit the 
member state, Viner also identifies the possibility of agreements to limit international 
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trade (Viner 1950).  States joining an agreement may implicitly gain from protection if 
the RTA-wide tariff is higher than the state tariff (Viner 1950, 48).  Indeed, economic 
agreements are inherently discriminatory in that they liberalize only specific geographic 
areas, thereby disadvantaging excluded states in some fashion (Bhagwati 1993).  Indeed, 
agreements may create strong incentives to raise external trade barriers to maximize 
internal welfare gains (Krugman 1991, 1993; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 
1997, 200-201; Schiff and Winters 1998).   
Because of the tendency for many RTAs to accommodate internal trade and 
restrict external trade simultaneously, trade flows may shift from non-members to 
members of an agreement.  Trade diversion, as it is called, occurs in the context of an 
agreement when exchanges of goods are shifted from more- to less-efficient producers 
due to the unequal removal of trade restrictions (Viner 1950; Krugman 1991; 1999; 
Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 2001).  That is, eliminating trade barriers to select 
states (i.e,. agreement members) may reduce their real cost of goods compared to states 
who do not receive the same reduction in trade barriers.   This process was first identified 
by Viner (1950) and subsequently expanded upon by numerous authors (Krugman 1991; 
1999; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 2001).  Figure 2.1 depicts a hypothetical 
process of trade diversion according to Viner (1950).  Imagine three countries called 
Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie.  Assume Alpha imports wheat from Bravo and Charlie based 
exclusively on price.  Furthermore, it has a 20% tariff on both countries.  Bravo and 
Charlie export wheat for $1.10 and $1.00 a bushel respectively.  With the tariff applied to 
both states, it is easy to see that Alpha imports wheat from Charlie given its lower price 
($1.20 compared to $1.32).  Suppose now that Alpha and Bravo sign an agreement that 
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eliminates barriers to the wheat trade.  As a result, Bravo can export to Alpha at a total 
cost of $1.10.  Charlie, however, is still assessed a tariff of 20% maintaining its total 
export cost at $1.20. Consequently, Alpha shifts its trade from Charlie to Bravo despite 
its relative inefficiency.  
Consequently, members of an RTA may achieve welfare gains at the expense of 
the external world as intra-RTA trade displaces exports from non-member states (Schiff 
and Winters 2003, 189).  Empirically, numerous studies either using gravity models to 
predict baseline levels of trade or case studies identify trade diversion across several trade 
agreements (see Schiff and Winters 2003, 190 for a review, as well as Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1995; Eichengreen and Frankel 1995; Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland 1996; 
Yeats 1997; Gupta and Schiff 1997; Chang and Winters 2002; Magee 2008; Martinez-
Zarzoso, Felicitas, and Horsewood 2009).   
Trade agreements also incentivize protectionism among agreement members vis-
à-vis the external world which potentially compounds the issue of trade diversion.  First, 
depending on the agreement type, barriers between members and non-members may 
actually increase once agreements are signed (Viner 1950).  Furthermore, both Krugman 
(1991; 1993) and Schiff and Winters (1998) show formally that agreement members have 
strong incentives to raise external barriers and generate trade diversion as a welfare-
maximizing strategy.  As an example, Brazil lobbied heavily for the inclusion of 
extensive information technology trade liberalization in Mercosur negotiations, but 
subsequently opposed a similar potential multilateral agreement (Schiff and Winters 
2003, 72).  Higher external barriers may be part of a state-led strategy of insulating infant 
industries to build industrial capacity by specifically limiting external trade (Pomfret 
 37 
2001, 352; Foroutan 2000).  Despite the fact that it is bad economic theory, trade 
diversion may be good politics.  Constituencies within agreement members that benefit 
from trade diversion have strong incentives to maintain and accelerate the process 
(Winters 1996; Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998).  Furthermore, independent of observed 
trade effects, diversion worsens the terms of trade for non-members as they are forced to 
lower prices to remain competitive (Schiff and Winters 2003; Chang and Winters 2002).  
A similar process occurs with respect to investment.  Economic integration can also 
divert investment from non-members to members by firms seeking access to the 
relatively larger market created by the agreement.  Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1996), 
in particular, find that the European Single Market Program diverted investment from 
European Free Trade Area countries. 
Economic agreements may also affect the distribution of power between domestic 
constituencies.  In particular, economic integration agreements may formalize and 
institutionalize many of the mechanisms advantaging the trade-endorsing class.  
Insomuch as the formation of an economic integration agreement reflects a bargaining 
process between two states, the negotiated arrangement likely solidifies those parties on 
which domestic political support rests (Grossman and Helpman 1995).  In other words, 
many agreements by design cater to (at least potentially) powerful constituencies.  This 
effect is reinforced if members can secure exclusions from the removal of barriers, as in 
relatively shallow agreements, or protection with joint external barriers, as in customs 
unions (Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998).  Commercial agreements then create binding 
policies for states that, if violated, risk retaliation from other members of the agreement 
and punishments by market forces (Whalley 1996; Fernandez 1996; Schiff and Winters 
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1998).  Consequently, many agreements have strong forces that discourage their easy 
recall.  Power tends to shift from the “losers” in liberalization, or those in import-
competing industries facing more competition, to the “winners” created by liberalization, 
which generally include competitive export industries.   
2.6  The Commercial Institutional Peace 
The first theoretical connections between formal economic integration and 
conflict were made by turn-of-the-century European scholars.  Vilfredo Pareto, speaking 
at European Peace conferences in both 1889 and 1900, advocated customs unions as a 
means to achieve peace on the continent (Machlup 1992, 146).  John Maynard Keynes 
echoed this sentiment after World War I, believing in the ability of integration to 
politically bind European states (Keynes 1920, 249).  European politicians also believed 
firmly in the ability of economic integration to prevent the wars witnessed in the first half 
of the twentieth century.   
Empirically, research indicates trade agreements succeed in reducing conflict.  
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) first explored the connection between preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) and conflict.  The authors argue that preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs), which encompass the entire range of possible economic arrangements, reduce 
militarized interstate disputes between states by increasing trade, facilitating investment, 
and providing forums for conflict resolution.  Using a large-N analysis with an interaction 
between PTA membership and absolute bilateral trade, Mansfield and Pevehouse 
ultimately find that PTAs reduce conflict only as trade between member states increases.  
Subsequent works have expanded the theoretical framework to account for more 
particular causal mechanisms.  Bearce (2003) and Bearce and Omori (2005) test three 
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potential causal mechanisms behind the pacifying influence of economic integration – 
trade interdependence, elite interactions, and conflict resolution forums.  Ultimately, they 
find a stronger role for the latter two in reducing conflict.   
Several additional works disaggregate the category of PTA to account for 
institutional variation.  First, Haftel (2007) specifically addresses how institutional 
variation across economic integration agreements influences conflict.  He argues that 
institutions incorporating broader scopes of activity and more regular meetings of elite 
politicians reduce conflict.  Ultimately, he finds support for his argument using a limited 
sampling of agreements existing during the 1980s and 1990s.  Second, Vicard (2011) also 
considers the heterogeneity of trade agreements in his analysis.  He argues that shallow 
agreements that do not require political coordination (i.e., partial scope or free trade 
agreements) do not constrain conflict.  He does not account, however, for the extent of 
economic interaction between members created by the economic agreement itself.  
Finally, Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) explore the effect of monetary and capital 
interdependence on conflict between states.  Specifically, common currency 
arrangements, including pegged exchange rates and joint currency areas, are posited to 
reduce conflict by signaling policy intentions and increasing the cost of conflict.  
Through statistical analysis, the authors find that joint currency arrangements pacify 
while pegged arrangements, which represent a degree of asymmetry in commercial 
relationship, tend to increase the possibility of conflict between states.   
2.7  Opportunities in the Extant Literature 
The current literature exploring the commercial institutional peace, while 
important first steps, do not fully address the potential influence of economic integration 
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on conflict tendencies.  First, the majority of the current literature places all economic 
agreements into the “black box” of preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  In reality, 
economic agreements differ greatly in scale and scope.  There is a vast difference, for 
example, between NAFTA and the European Union in both stated and realized goals.  
Furthermore, those works that do account for institutional design make linear 
assumptions such that an increase in the depth/scope of an agreement yields more peace.  
There is no a priori reason, however, to believe that the influence of agreements is 
uniform or even linear across all types.  In the extreme, some agreement types may 
encourage peace while others conflict.  This is particularly important given the noted 
potential of international commercial exchange to influence domestic power dynamics 
(Hiscox 2001).  For example, asymmetrical agreements, which are more common in 
shallow institutions (Fernandez 1996, 8), may encourage domestic forces to look on such 
arrangements as detrimental in the short- or long-term.   
Second, the current literature considers primarily bilateral trade and its influence 
of conflict.  Consequently, empirical studies to date interact the presence of an agreement 
with bilateral trade as the primary driver of conflict within commercial agreements (with 
the exception of Vicard, who does not use any interaction terms).  However, the utility of 
economic agreements is not necessarily limited to bilateral interactions.  Greece, for 
example, may not trade as much with Portugal as with Italy.  They still may be dissuaded 
from engaging in conflict with Portugal, however, if it risks expulsion from the EU and 
losing preferential trading rights with Italy.  Given the diverse influences integration, a 
more comprehensive analysis of costs is warranted.   
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A third potential contribution to the literature on economic integration and 
conflict is less a criticism than an extension of existing works.  Much of the integration 
literature to date rightfully addresses intra-group dynamics, or how member states 
interact with one another.  Formal economic integration, however, impacts not only intra-
member relations, but also relations with the external world.  Trade diversion and the 
incentives agreement members have to raise external barriers likely influence the 
decision-making calculus of states excluded from the agreement.  In short, looking only 
at trade diversion, conflict may actually be more likely between agreement members and 
non-members owing to the reduced importance of extra-agreement trade.  In other words, 
formal economic integration marginalizes the external world.  This is likely to be 
exacerbated to the extent that regionalism begets regionalism in a “falling domino” 
fashion.  That being said, while barriers may reduce trade, they provide strong incentives 
to invest in an agreement area to avoid implicit discrimination.  Consequently, while it is 
likely that agreements influence relations between members and non-members, the exact 
nature is difficult to determine.   
A fourth and final shortcoming of the commercial institutional peace literature is a 
broader criticism of conflict literature and a potential area of improvement.  Conflict 
studies are extraordinarily well versed at predicting when war does not take place.  
Democracies, highly developed states, economically interdependent states, and allies tend 
not to engage each other militarily.  While this is no doubt an important avenue of 
research, such studies say little about what states actually do.  “War” and “not war” are 
generally explored without consideration given to alternative means of conflict 
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resolution.  If states have a strong motivation to avoid war, by what means do they 
resolve interstate conflicts?   
Economic integration agreements provide a unique “natural experiment” of sorts 
whereby alternative conflict resolution mechanisms gain effectiveness.  In other words, 
policies short of militarized conflict can be substituted to achieve foreign policy goals 
(Most and Starr 1984, 1989).  In particular, sanctions – either positive or negative – 
should be more effective, and therefore employed more often, between economic 
agreement members.  First, economic interdependence between member states, realized 
or otherwise, may increase the effectiveness of non-violent coercion.  Second, 
institutional structures are more likely to survive bouts of sanctioning given the ability of 
such tools to be tailored to specific situations.  Third, the formal organization offered by 
an economic agreement may allow for coordinated action.  Finally, the bargaining power 
and market potential of an economic agreement may increase the appeal of positive 
sanctions.  The observable outcome of this dynamic may be increased sanctions usage, 
both positive and negative, by agreement members corresponding to decreases usage of 
militarized conflict.   
Questions about the effect of agreements on conflict and the substitutability of 
foreign policies – either separately or jointly – cannot be addressed without carefully 
considering the relationship between economic and security relations.  In this project, I 
pursue a framework that carefully considers the overall impact economic agreements 
have on international relations.  Economic agreements can have impacts well beyond the 
states immediately involved in it.  Consequently, I include not only intra-agreement 
dynamics in my analysis, but also the extent to which agreements impact the broader 
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regional and global economy.  Likewise, the multitude of foreign policy options available 
to states requires a careful analysis of alternatives and their strategic interplay.  It is 
important to appropriately model the relationship between economic sanctions and 
military force – both theoretically and empirically – in order to truly understand how 
states pursue the conflict process.  In the following chapter, I present a framework that 
addresses these factors.  Conflict between states is in part a consequence of their 
economic relationship.  Specifically, formal economic agreements influence the salience 
of trade ties in ways that affect the relatively utility of economic sanctions and military 
force in resolving disputes.  Ultimately, therefore, conflict behavior is in part a 
consequence of the policy options made available by economic circumstances and 
relations between states. 
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Without Economic Agreements 
Prices With Alpha-Bravo Economic Agreement 
Figure 2.1: An Illustration of Trade Diversion 
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT:  
DISPUTE INITIATION AND POLICY SUBSTITUTION 
 
While the extant literature on interdependence suggests a strong role for 
commercial institutions in reducing conflict, the economic processes they promote are 
multifaceted and complex.  This complexity in turn suggests a more nuanced and 
comprehensive view of economic agreements in shaping state behavior.   First, economic 
agreements are highly heterogeneous in depth and scope.  Different levels of economic 
integration incorporate policies that may exhibit unique and non-linear influence on 
interstate conflict.  Second, economic agreements do not exist in a vacuum and, indeed, 
may have strong influences on commerce beyond intra-agreement ties.  There are 
important reasons to believe the formation of an economic agreement influences strategic 
relationships with non-member states.  Finally, one of the posited causal mechanisms 
behind the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is the substitutability of 
economic sanctions for military force.  Only a handful of studies, none of which address 
economic agreements specifically, consider the relationship between war and economic 
sanctions as policy options (see Clark and Reed 2005 for a noteworthy exception).  In 
principle, economic agreements provide the ideal circumstances with which to observe 
the use of militarized and economic conflict.  Members of economic agreements establish 
clear or formal commitments to increase interdependence and exchange.  Within this 
context, sanctions are more likely to convey meaningful information to dispute 
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participants that should obviate the need for military conflict.  Agreements, therefore, 
provide an opportunity to evaluate these claims.   
Below, I develop a theory that embraces the complexities of economic agreements 
and how they influence conflict between members and non-members.  Economic 
agreements confer material benefits on member states that, in turn, alter their relationship 
with those within and outside the agreement.  The nature and extent of material benefits, 
furthermore, are dependent upon the structure of economic relations between states in the 
agreement.  This is determined by the institutional mechanisms present in the agreement 
and the natural trade patterns between states as determined by geography, population, 
development, and other factors.  Furthermore, in order to evaluate the ability of economic 
agreements to engender peace, the complete range of interactions between states must be 
taken into account.  While agreements may reduce tensions between members, the 
economic forces it sets in motion may stimulate or exacerbate tensions between members 
and non-members.   
I examine the relationship between economic agreements and interstate relations 
(or conflict) by using a combination of verbal and formal theory.  First, I consider a 
variety of theoretical arguments about the impact of economic agreements on the 
initiation of conflict.  I use the term “conflict” in this section to refer to policy 
disagreements between states that are sufficient enough to compel some degree of 
coercive action.  Following the theoretical review, I develop a formal bargaining model 
using the logic of policy substitution to explore the means by which states engage in 
conflict.  While agreements influence whether states initiate conflict, they also influence 
the tools states use as coercive instruments.  Consequently, in discussing the bargaining 
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model, I frequently refer to coercive policies as the phenomenon being explained.  I draw 
hypotheses from both a non-formal model of conflict and a formal bargaining model for 
empirical testing in subsequent chapters about how economic agreements influence 
conflict.    
3.1  Economic Agreements and Interdependence 
In the most basic sense, economic agreements foster institutional ties that promote 
economic interdependence between member states.  First, economic agreements tend to 
increase trade between members by virtue of lower barriers to trade (Carerre 2006; Baier 
and Bergstrang 2007; Egger et al 2008).  Second, the integration of markets facilitated by 
economic agreements provides significant economies-of-scale that may attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into member states (Joumotte 2004; Chen 2009).  Third, 
integration agreements foster informal trade networks between members that increase the 
salience of all ties in the agreement.  In other words, while a particular bilateral trade 
relationship may be unaffected by an economic agreement, states may still derive utility 
from the agreement by trading with other members.  Fourth, in a formal sense, economic 
integration creates joint economic institutions and draws states into coordinated economic 
management.  Fifth, agreements are often “sticky” or difficult to rescind without 
suffering consequences from members states and markets in general.  In this way 
commercial agreements act as constraints on decision-makers and bind domestic policies 
to more open orientations and remove uncertainty (Whalley 1996).  Consequently, we 
might expect members of economic agreements to attach greater salience and weight to 
intra-agreement connections given the potential benefits. 
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As such, the extensive benefits and linkages states derive from membership in an 
economic agreement foster greater economic interdependence between members.  
Interdependence, in turn, is more than simply the sum of exchange between two states 
(Baldwin 1980; Keohane and Nye 1977; Crecenzi 2003).  Keohane and Nye (1977) are 
noteworthy in their development of the concept of interdependence in international 
relations.  In particular, the authors further define the power aspect of interdependence as 
a function of how quickly states respond to changes in the relationship (sensitivity) and 
the extent to which a state is affected by the change (vulnerability).  As tariffs, quotas, 
and regulations within agreements fall, the total amount of bilateral trade between 
members likely increases as states realize comparative advantages, economies of scale, 
and increased efficiency from production (Viner 1950; Johnson 1999).  States in 
agreements may also attract more foreign direct investment owing to the relatively larger 
market area the agreement creates.  Investment decisions by businesses are highly 
sensitive to the uncertainty and political risk generated by conflict (Chan and Mason 
1992; Kobrin 1982).  Increased investment resulting from membership can thus link 
states to agreement members.  This holds true even if the investment flows from a third-
party, non- member to an agreement member, as the investment may be to gain access to 
the preferential trade area.   
States in economic agreements, by virtue of greater commercial exchange and 
reliance on intra-agreement ties, are likely to be more vulnerable to disruptions stemming 
from conflict between member states.  It may also be the case that members of 
agreements are more sensitive to disruptions, as the codified trade network facilitated by 
the formal agreement enables states to more rapidly disseminate losses from a particular 
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bilateral conflict over the intra-agreement trade network.  Likewise, foreign direct 
investment can generate vulnerability interdependence that is costly to break in the case 
of interstate conflict (Rosecrance and Thompson 2003).  Economic integration also 
implies expectations about future commercial relationships and benefit (Mansfield and 
Pevehouse 2000).  Hence, interdependence between member states is a combination of 
realized and anticipated commercial gains.   
While economic agreements likely increase interdependence between members, it 
may also influence relationships between members and non-members.  In particular, 
lowering barriers between members may unilaterally reduce the salience of a member 
state’s trade ties with the external world.  Considering a member state’s aggregate trade 
flows, agreements may have two distinct influences.  On the one hand, the total amount 
of trade a particular state conducts may increase as a result of exchanging more with 
fellow agreement partners.  Lower barriers, in other words, may simply increase the 
amount of trade already taking place between two agreement members.  On the other 
hand, flows may actually shift such that members conduct more trade with others in the 
agreement and less with non-members without necessarily increasing the total value of its 
trade portfolio.  In the former case, the member grows more reliant on international trade, 
in general, and on member states, in particular, given the localized increase with 
agreement partners.  In the latter case, members’ reliance on international trade  (i.e., its 
total level of national trade) remains unchanged, but dependence on agreement members 
as a whole increases given the shifting trade patterns.   
Consider the first scenario where an agreement member’s trade with other 
members increases without affecting its ties with non-members.  The overall implication 
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is likely the reduced salience of trade outside the agreement area.  Increased trade among 
all members within an agreement dilutes the relative importance of each tie with non-
member states.1  Shifting or expanding sources of imports and markets for export from 
non-members to members necessarily decreases the importance of those ties.  As 
agreement members rely on each other for a greater portion of their overall trade 
portfolio, they rely less on states outside the agreement.  Furthermore, the mere 
expectation of greater exchange among member states should reduce interdependence 
between members and non-members.  States that sign agreements signal both the 
importance of their commercial relationship and the desire to see it develop further.  In 
other words, states seek economic agreements to lock-in and enhance access to markets 
they view as important and critical for future development (Whalley 1996; Fernandez and 
Portes 1998; Schiff and Winters 1998).  The more states look to the agreement for future 
commercial relations, the less important non-members become.  Reductions in the 
salience of trade relationships applies to non-members as well.  While members are 
drawn to their agreement partners, non-members are likely to identify their long-term 
commercial interest with other states given the implicit barriers they face to exchange 
with the agreement.  The salience of non-member ties with agreement members, 
therefore, is similarly impacted by the process of economic integration.   
Consider now the second scenario where increased intra-agreement trade comes at 
the expense of trade with the external world.  This process, known as “trade diversion,” 
                                                           
1
 It also follows that agreements with many members dilute the relative importance of each trade tie 
between agreement members.  As more states are incorporated into the group, the relative importance of 
each bilateral partnership may decrease.  However, agreements carry institutional ties (i.e., formal 
membership) that links between members and non-members do not possess.  To the extent these links can 
be leverage by the group to punish or coerce an individual member, even non-salient trade ties between 
agreement members can be considered “important.” 
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exacerbates the marginalization of trade relationships between members and non-
members.  Economic agreements are inherently discriminatory in that they liberalize 
specific geographic areas and exclude others (Bhagwati 1993).  Furthermore, economic 
agreements may simply shift trade flows from non-members to members without 
increasing aggregate trade flows.  This process (trade diversion) was first identified by 
Viner (1950) and subsequently expanded upon by numerous authors (Krugman 1991; 
1999; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 2001).  Figure 3.1 depicts a hypothetical 
process of trade diversion according to Viner (1950).  Imagine three countries called 
Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie.  Assume Alpha imports wheat from Bravo and Charlie based 
exclusively on price.  Furthermore, Alpha has a 20% tariff on both countries.  Bravo and 
Charlie export wheat for $1.10 and $1.00 a bushel respectively.  With the tariff applied to 
both states, we expect that all else being equal,  Alpha would import more wheat from 
Charlie given its lower price ($1.20 compared to $1.32).  Suppose now that Alpha and 
Bravo sign an agreement that eliminates the tariff  barrier on wheat.  Now, Bravo can 
export to Alpha at a total cost of $1.10.  If Charlie is still assessed a tariff of 20%,  with a 
total export cost at $1.20, Alpha is likely to shift its trade from Charlie to Bravo despite 
Bravo’s relative inefficiency.  
Trade agreements also incentivize protectionism among agreement members vis-
à-vis the external world, which potentially compounds the issue of trade diversion.  First, 
depending on the agreement type, barriers between members and non-members may 
actually increase once agreements are signed (Viner 1950).  Furthermore, both Krugman 
(1991; 1993) and Schiff and Winters (1998) show formally that agreement members have 
strong incentives to raise external barriers and generate trade diversion as a welfare-
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maximizing strategy.  As an example, Brazil lobbied heavily for the inclusion of 
extensive liberalization in information technology during negotiations on Mercosur, but 
subsequently opposed a similar multilateral agreement (Schiff and Winters 2003, 72).  
Higher external barriers may be part of a state-led strategy of insulating infant industries 
to build industrial capacity by specifically limiting external trade (Pomfret 2001, 352; 
Foroutan 2000).  Despite the fact that it is bad economic theory, trade diversion may be 
good politics.  Constituencies within agreement members that benefit from trade 
diversion have strong incentives to maintain and accelerate the process (Winters 1996; 
Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998).  Furthermore, independent of observed trade effects, 
diversion worsens the terms of trade for non-members as they are forced to lower prices 
to remain competitive (Schiff and Winters 2003; Chang and Winters 2002).  
 A similar process occurs with respect to investment.  Economic integration can 
divert investment from non-members to members by firms seeking access to the 
relatively larger market created by the agreement.  Preferential trade agreements are 
particularly attractive to investors because they provide businesses admission to the entire 
area.  By investing in Ireland, for example, Intel’s products gained access to the entirety 
of Europe through the European Economic Area.  Countries that do not enjoy such 
access, like some Eastern European and Balkan states, that otherwise would have been 
competitive with Ireland may have been disadvantaged by their lack of access.  Indeed, 
Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1996) find that the European Single Market Program 
diverted investment from European Free Trade Area countries.  Consequently, 
agreements can disrupt investment flows in a similar pattern to trade.   
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The overall implication of trade diversion or the threat thereof is likely, all else 
being equal, to produce sharp reductions in interdependence between members and non-
members of agreements.  The material shift in trade flows away from non-members to 
members affects bilateral interdependence in two ways.  First, less trade occurs between 
members and non-members, thereby reducing the extent of commercial exchange.  
Second, non-members constitute an even smaller portion of their trade portfolio.  In the 
first scenario, trade between members and non-members is unchanged and 
marginalization is due largely to growth in the denominator (the member’s overall trade 
portfolio).  In the second scenario, trade diversion marginalizes member and non-member 
ties by reducing the numerator (the member’s trade with the non-member) and holding 
the denominator constant.  Consequently, members are likely less vulnerabile to 
disruptions in trade with non-members, given the reduced salience of those ties.  
Economic agreements influence both short- and long-term commercial relationships, 
thereby influencing interdependence by potentially reducing the long-run gains available 
to both business and government.   
3.2  Implications for the Initiation of Interstate Conflict 
By altering interdependence between states, economic agreements likely 
influence their propensity to engage in conflict.  The net effect of these influences, 
however, differs depending on whether the agreement encompasses one or both states in 
a political conflict.   Increased interdependence between two states in the same agreement 
likely reduces the onset of violent interstate conflict.  Conflict between members and 
non-members, however, is likely exacerbated to the extent interdependence is limited or 
diminished by the agreement.  
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3.2.1  Conflict Between Agreement Members 
Conflict between members of the same agreement – whether through economic or 
military means – is likely to be relatively costly insofar as it jeopardizes commercial 
exchange and the future of the agreement.  Insofar as states materially gain from the trade 
fostered by membership in the agreement, any political action that aims to sever or limit 
the resultant ties reduces the welfare of agents involved in trade.  The opportunity cost of 
conflict is born by several actors in this scenario.  Governments incur a cost in terms of 
lost revenue.  While agreements are likely to limit the tariff revenue states gain from 
commerce with other members, states still gain tax revenue from increased economic 
activity.  Sanctions, which are specifically designed to disrupt commerce between states 
as a means of compellence, and war may suspend or eliminate bilateral flows of goods 
and capital.2  Industries or firms dependent on external sales, in turn, risk substantial 
losses from conflict that ultimately limits the government’s ability to extract revenue.  
FDI flows may also be affected by conflict, as the risk generated by disputes may 
discourage investment or promote in divestment.  States lose overall economic activity 
and tax revenue as a result, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict (Souva 2002; 
Souva and Prins 2006; Bussmann 2010).  Potential losses in tax revenue, therefore, may 
encourage states to avoid conflict with particularly important economic partners. 
Perhaps more important, however, are the actions of the externally-oriented 
businesses themselves.  Insofar as they depend on other agreement members’ markets for 
sales, businesses face substantial risk from trade disruptions with said member.  In the 
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 Barbieri and Levy (1999) challenge this assumption by showing that the effects of war are temporary and 
less severe than typically assumed.  While using a sample of six individual cases, their findings are 
potentially problematic for conflict studies.  My analysis, while potentially affected by this, considers the 
cost of conflict beyond the opportunity cost argument and takes a broader view of interdependence.     
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most basic sense, conflict can be viewed as a barrier to trade that threatens the welfare of 
exporters in an economy (Mansfield and Pollins 2001).  Just as an increase in tariffs 
jeopardizes the gains of exporters (through retaliatory tariffs), conflict between 
agreement members risks harming the extant trade relationship.  Industries or 
constituencies facing this challenge are more likely to press leaders to maintain openness 
(Magee 1980; Rogowski 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994).  In particular, export-
oriented entities faced with such losses are likely to either lobby politicians to avoid 
conflict or withdraw support for those that do engage in conflict.  In either circumstance, 
politicians dependent on the support of business have incentives to avoid disruptions to 
the trade relationship (Magee, Brock, and Young 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994).   
Economic agreements are particularly likely to embolden domestic constituencies 
given their institutionalized nature.  First, agreements are more likely to encourage 
domestic businesses to export more goods by lowering barriers between member states.  
Agreements are by definition arrangements that promote economic openness between a 
discrete set of states.  The openness they foster encourages the accumulation of economic 
and political power by actors invested in international commerce (Schiff and Winters 
1998).  In general, relatively more competitive industries will benefit from expanded 
export markets while relatively less competitive industries will suffer from increased 
competition (Viner 1950).  Competitive export-oriented firms will tend to thrive, while 
import-competing firms will tend to suffer.  Resources tend to shift from the “losers” who 
suffer from liberalization to the “winners”   (Rogowski 1987; Midford 1993).  Such 
policies expand the range and number of businesses dependent on other agreement 
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members’ markets for commercial viability, in turn increasing the potential pressure on 
politicians to avoid conflict.   
In addition, agreements are by definition arrangements that promote economic 
openness between a discrete set of states.  The institutional structures of economic 
agreements are likely to be affected by conflict.  For example, the 1969 Football War 
between El Salvador and Honduras brought a premature end to the Central American 
Common Market.  Likewise, security tensions between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania 
exacerbated economic tensions that resulted in the termination of the East African 
Community.  Consequently, conflict between two agreement members may put at risk the 
entire arrangement, including ties with third-parties.  On the one hand, agreements may 
be unsustainable after conflict due to the distrust it may generate.  On the other, fellow 
agreement members may sanction the aggressor in the conflict, thereby denying it further 
access to the special economic area.   
Economic integration, as far as it generates interdependence or the perception of 
it, makes conflict in any form more costly.  Governments sacrifice tax revenue from 
externally-dependent firms.  Exporters suffer losses from conflict that encourages them to 
pressure politicians for peaceful relations.  Lastly, conflict between two agreement 
members may end the entire agreement or otherwise result in the sanctioning of the 
aggressor, thereby denying it access to the entire preferential trade area.  My first 
hypothesis is thus stated as: 
H1: Economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between member 
states. 
3.2.2  Conflict Between Members and Non-Members 
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As I have argued, economic agreements decrease the salience of members’ 
external trade ties.  Increased trade between members within an agreement dilutes the 
relative importance of each tie with non-member states.  Furthermore, shifting sources of 
imports and markets for exports from non-members to members necessarily decreases the 
importance of those ties.  As agreement members rely on partner states for greater 
portions of their trade portfolio, they correspondingly rely less on outside states for 
commercial viability and overall trade.  Economic interdependence between members 
and non-members is likely reduced as a result of shifting commercial relationships.  The 
more states look to agreement members for future commercial relations, the less 
important non-members become.  Reductions in salience, while not necessarily uniform 
in magnitude, apply to both members and non-members when long-run gains from trade 
are considered.  While the former obviously are drawn to their agreement partners, the 
latter are expected or must find ways to identify their long-term commercial interests 
with other states given the implicit barriers they face to exchange with the agreement.  
Indeed, trade agreements tend to spur additional trade agreements by states looking to 
“lock in” preferential markets (Baldwin 1993).  The salience of non-member ties with 
agreement members, therefore, is similarly impacted by the process of economic 
integration.   
The marginalization of economic ties between economic agreement members and 
non-members influences conflict behavior by reducing the opportunity cost of both 
sanctions and military force.  One of the important reasons interdependence reduces 
conflict is the forgone benefits states incur by engaging in combat (Polachek, 1980; 
Doyle 1997).  By diversifying trade partners, or even emphasizing certain ties over 
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others, states necessarily decrease dependence on any one source.  Agreement members 
therefore suffer less by initiating conflict with non-members by virtue of their more 
salient ties with other agreement partners.  The notion that trade deters conflict is also in 
part based on a long-term expectation that future trade relations will be hurt by war 
(Doyle, 1997; Oneal & Russett, 1997).  By erecting an implicit barrier between members 
and non-members, economic agreements marginalize the future utility of trading 
relationships in ways that similarly impede their deterrent effect.  This holds for both 
members and non-members as the agreement signals intentions of future trading 
relations.   
Economic agreements may also lower the cost of conflict by providing member 
states alternative markets for products.  Crescenzi (2003a; 2003b) argues that states 
facing lower “exit” costs – or a greater ability to replace lost trade – are less constrained 
in conflict.  Economic agreements, in turn, may lower the exit costs for member states by 
providing established trade networks.  When engaged in conflict with a non-member 
state, members of an economic agreement may be able to leverage intra-agreement trade 
ties to replace trade lost due to conflict.  Likewise, Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) 
argue that decreases in systemic trade costs, part of which is associated with barriers, 
reduce the multilateral impact of bilateral conflict.  That is, lower systemic trade costs 
allow states to shift trade to other nations, thus reducing the negative externalities of 
conflict.  Consequently, as economic agreements reduce trade costs for members, the 
ability of members to leverage intra-agreement ties to absorb excess trade affected by 
hostilities with non-members reduces the overall cost of those conflicts.  Given the 
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overall marginalization of ties between members and non-members, the deterrent effect 
of integration is likely restricted.   
The marginalization of salient trade ties between members and non-members, 
while limiting the deterrent effect of interdependence, does not in and of itself indicate 
the start of acrimonious relations or an increase in conflict.  However, economic 
agreements may also produce security externalities that exacerbate relative gains 
concerns and strategic vulnerabilities between members and non-members.  First, 
economic agreement members benefit from their association with an exclusive 
commercial area.  Members gain wealth and productive capacity stemming from 
increases in intra-agreement trade that generally do not privilege the excluded state.  
Trade increases domestic economic efficiency in the aggregate, as producers are able to 
acquire materials at lower cost and export at higher rates.  Increases in domestic 
efficiency, in turn, free resources for use in military applications (Baldwin 1985; 
Hirschman 1981; McKeown 1984; Root 1984; Gowa and Mansfield 1993).  That is, 
states that achieve greater wealth and productive capacity from trade may, in turn, 
convert their commercial advantages into military power to be used against excluded 
states (Gowa 1995).  Trade can therefore alter the distribution of power and capabilities 
between partners, allies, and rivals (Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield and Pollins 
2001).  By extension, economic agreements that promote freer trade increase the 
efficiency with which domestic resources can be utilized by member states, thereby 
adding to their potential military capabilities and aggregate power.   
Second, the process of trade diversion may actually transfer gains from non-
member states to member states.  Trade in this capacity may be viewed as a zero-sum 
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game where members gain at the explicit expense of non-members.  While trade 
diversion has clear welfare consequences in the economic sense for all states involved, 
the more important dynamic for conflict behavior is the material shift in trade.  Consider 
again the relationship depicted in Figure 3.1 both before and after an economic agreement 
is formed.  Once an agreement is formed, the trade linkage between Alpha and Charlie is 
severed and results in a clear loss for Charlie, given it no longer exports to Alpha.  
However, while it clearly suboptimizes trade, it is not clear that Alpha suffers any 
absolute losses from trade diversion.  Indeed, Alpha obtains goods at a lower cost with 
liberalization that may result in aggregate gains from increased efficiency.  Agreement 
members, therefore, likely experience increases in aggregate economic activity while 
states excluded from economic agreements are more likely to experience absolute 
declines in trade or terms of trade.  Consequently, trade diversion may imply relative 
losses for excluded states and corresponding gains for agreement members.  Given the 
strong incentives agreement members have to increase trade barriers to the external world 
(Viner 1950; Krugman 1991; Krugman 1993; Schiff and Winters 2003), the simple 
possibility of diversion may influence state behavior.  In other words, the fear of trade 
diversion, marginalization, and associated relative losses may be as compelling as the 
realization of loss.  The codified nature of economic integration signals that losses will 
continue for those outside the agreement.  
Increased efficiency and the effects of trade diversion stemming from economic 
agreements can therefore foster asymmetrical economic relationships between members 
and non-members in ways that encourage conflict.  Member states gain strategic 
advantages through increased economic efficiency and insulation from the cost of 
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conflict with non-member states.  As economic agreements are inherently discriminatory 
(Bhagwati 1993), the strategic gains member states enjoy do not extend beyond the 
borders of the agreement.  Security externalities may therefore manifest such that non-
member states are more strategically vulnerable.  Relative losses resulting from trade 
diversion compound this effect, as it represents a direct relative gain for member states 
and loss for non-member states.  Vulnerabilities are compounded if agreements exclude 
states from particularly important or strategic markets or resources.  For example, both 
Britain and Germany pursued economic agreements in the interwar period to lock-in 
strategic markets and exclude the other from gaining footholds which ultimately fueled 
distrust and aggression (Eichengreen and Frankle 1995, 96).  Indeed, after German 
victories in Europe, Bidwell and Upgren (1941) expressed concern over German 
economic power from the United States’s perspective: 
“By exercising coordinated control over Europe's vast purchases, Germany might 
monopolize the foreign trade of certain of the republics, by bilateral agreements 
and bulk purchases, so as practically to exclude United States' goods. Further, we 
may expect that German economic power would be utilized to influence to our 
disadvantage unstable political situations whenever they appeared.”  (Bidwell and 
Upgren 1941, 285) 
Strategic imbalances may in turn encourage both members and non-members to 
take more antagonistic stances.  Acute vulnerabilities may compel non-member states to 
adopt more aggressive policies in the security arena to counteract perceived weaknesses 
and strategic imbalances (Hirschman 1981; Gilpin 1981; Grieco 1988; Grieco 1993; 
Gowa 1995; Mearsheimer 1990; Mearsheimer 1994; Barbieri 1996; Liberman 1996).  
Furthermore, relative losses experienced by non-members may outweigh the potential 
gains from trade for excluded states.  That is, non-members may view whatever 
economic linkages they have with member states as sources of vulnerability or 
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dependency rather than ones of mutual gain.  In such cases, the pacifying effect of 
economic exchange may short-circuit such that conflict is less costly overall.  On the 
other hand, member states may press their new-found economic advantages on  non-
member states.  Being less vulnerable, members may make bolder demands of non-
members in conflict scenarios knowing the latter risks more through conflict.  
Paradoxically, however, greater demands implicitly narrow the range of acceptable 
solutions to both parties which, in turn, increases the likelihood of violent conflict 
(Morrow 2003).  This dynamic between members and non-members leads me to my 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of conflict between members 
and non-members of the agreement. 
3.3  A Policy Substitution Model of Coercion 
In addition to simply increasing the occurrence of conflict, however, economic 
agreements and the processes they set in motion also change the nature of conflict 
between states.  One of the posited causal mechanisms supporting the liberal peace holds 
that economic interdependence enables the use of non-violent conflict resolution 
mechanisms – particularly economic sanctions – to substitute for war (Drezner 2003; 
Garzke, Li and Boemer 2001; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Morgan, Palmer, and Miers 
2000; Verdier 2004).  Insofar as economic agreements promote commerce and 
interdependence between member states, implications can also be drawn about the type 
or conduct of conflict between states.  Indeed, members of economic agreements appear 
(on the surface) to be better suited to substituting economic sanctions for violent conflict 
given the formal nature of their agreement. 
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In evaluating the influence of economic agreements on conflict, I adopt a policy 
substitution framework in the spirit of Most and Starr (1984; 1989; 2000) and specifically 
applied to interdependence by Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001).  The essence of policy 
substitution is that states may pursue foreign policy goals using several different means.  
States possess a menu of options with which they may address foreign policy issues.  
Economic interdependence expands the options for conflict resolution by enabling the 
effective use of economic sanctions as either a tool of punishment or as a costly signal 
(Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400).   
Economic integration agreements are structural characteristics shaping the menu 
of conflict management options available to states in this framework.  Overall, states that 
enter into agreements expect increases in interaction and revisions in bilateral economic 
salience.  Agreements not only serve as vehicles to promote commercial exchange, but 
also signal commitments to particular policies and patterns of exchange.  Consequently, a 
degree of sensitivity and vulnerability is inherent within the agreement itself, but also 
increases as economic interdependence is realized (Keohane and Nye 1977).  Material 
benefits conferred by such relationships, or the perception thereof, fundamentally alter 
the decision-making calculus within states.  Within the universe of potential responses to 
conflict, particular alternatives are more attractive compared to others based on the ability 
of states to inflict harm and withstand retaliation (Starr 2000, 132; Cioffi-Revilla and 
Starr 2002, 232; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001, 400; Stein 2003, 118).  Using this 
approach, I develop a bargaining model approximating the decision-making process as a 
challenger state chooses between economic sanctions and militarized conflict to coerce 
others.  While alternative gradations of coercion are possible, this simplified framework 
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models two of the more prevalent and costly mechanisms used by states to influences 
others.   
 The general model representing the escalation of coercive tactics, depicted in 
Figure 3.2, employs two nations – “Challenger” (C) and “Defender” (D).  Nature first 
selects the Defender’s type from a distribution such that it is weak with probability  or 
strong with probability 1  .  Weak Defenders acquiesce to all the Challenger’s 
demands while strong Defenders acquiesce only to weak demands.  While the Defender 
is fully aware of its type, the Challenger has only a belief based on nature’s probability 
draw.  Strength in this general model simply refers to the ability of the defender to resist 
the coercive tactics of the initiator.  The order of play is depicted in Figure 3.2 and begins 
with the Challenger determining exactly the size of concession to demand from the 
Defender by selecting   	0,1.  Following this, the Defender either resists or 
acquiesces.  If the Defender acquiesces, the game ends with the Challenger receiving x 
and the Defender 1-x.  Should the Defender resist, however, the Challenger must decide 
to use either sanctions or war as a coercive tool.  If the Challenger attacks the Defender 
with military force, the target collapses with probability  if weak and  if strong, where 
  .  Furthermore, both states incur a non-zero cost  and  respectively reflecting 
forgone trade, investment, and economic activity associated with warfare.  If the 
Defender collapses, the Challenger receives the entirety of the good less the cost of war 
(1) while the Defender receives nothing, but suffers the cost of war ().  If the 
Defender does not collapse, however, it wins the contest and the payoffs are reversed 
such that the Challenger incurs the costs () with no positive payoffs and the Defender 
retains the good in question (1).   
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Likewise, economic sanctions carry a non-zero cost for both Challenger and 
Defender of  and   respectively reflecting the forgone gains from trade, investment, 
and other economic activity.  I assume the costs of war are strictly more severe than 
sanctions (    and    ).  Defenders fold under the weight of sanctions with 
probability  if weak and  if strong, where   	0,1 is a constant reflecting that 
economic force is strictly less likely to result in the Defender’s collapse than military 
force.  Consequently,     and   .  If the Defenders collapses, the Challenger 
receives the whole payoff less the cost of sanctions (1- ).  The Defender, in turn, 
receives the cost of sanctions - and no payoffs.  Successful Defenders, however, do not 
collapse and receive (1- ) and the Challenger only the negative cost of the sanction (-
).  Regardless of target type or mechanism employed, the game ends once the 
Challenger employs any form of coercion.   
Given this setup, in the advent of economic coercion, the Challenger’s generic 
payoff is 1  1  0       and the Defender’s 0 
1  1    1    .  The corresponding utilities for the use of military 
force for Challenger and Defender are      and 1     respectively.  Being 
uncertain of the Defender’s strength, however, the Challenger must base its decisions on 
the expected utilities of both outcomes.  The expected utilities for the Challenger are 
      1     and !"#$     1    . 
3.3.1  Equilibria 
I solve the preceding model using perfect Bayesian equilibria that assumes all 
players are sequentially rational based on their beliefs throughout the game (Morrow 
1994).  Using this process, the critical decision is the Challenger’s choice between using 
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military force and economic sanctions.  Given the utilities identified in the prior section, 
the Challenger chooses economic sanctions when the following condition (labeled ξ for 
convenience) holds:3 
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If ξ is satisfied, the Challenger prefers to use economic sanctions rather than 
military force to coerce the Defender.  If ξ is not met, meaning  breaches the threshold 
value, the Challenger prefers military force.   
 Two properties of ξ are particularly important in understanding the use of 
economic sanctions or military force.  First, the value of ξ decreases as  % .  In other 
words, if the cost of economic sanctions approaches the cost of military force, there are 
fewer values of p that warrant the Challenger using economic sanctions.  This makes 
intuitive sense, as situations in which sanctions are highly costly to the Challenger 
without improving the odds of success are unlikely to yield economic coercion.  Second, 
if λ if sufficiently low – meaning the Defender is very unlikely to collapse from 
economic sanctions – fewer values of p satisfy ξ.  This once again makes intuitive sense.  
If sanctions are very unlikely to compel policy change in the Defender, there is no value 
of p for which the Challenger will impose sanctions.   
Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates these two properties by plotting the threshold 
below which the Challenger opts for sanctions (ξ) against the sanctions effectiveness 
expressed as a percentage of the effectiveness of military force (λ).  The four lines in the 
graph are four cases of γc each expressed as percentages of θc.  As the figure indicates, 
sanctions must be at least as effective as they are costly in order to render them viable 
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 Proofs all of calculations are contained in the appendix.   
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policy alternatives for the Challenger.  As might be expected, sanctions that are generally 
ineffective (between 20% and 40%) can still be viable policy options for a Challenger if 
inexpensive (20% the cost of military force).  As the cost of sanctions grows, however, 
the Challenger is less willing to choose them given that they are less effective than 
military force.  If sanctions are highly costly (80% the cost of military force), the 
Challenger demands sanctions be relatively likely to collapse the Defender.   
There are a finite number of proposals the Challenger considers depending on the 
value of ξ.  First, if ξ≤p  indicating economic sanctions are preferred, the Challenger 
proposes either a relatively large value of , denoted &, or a relatively small value 
denoted & where & '   (  and  & '   ( respectively.  Overall, the Defender 
acquiesces to  with certainty and to  only when it is sufficiently weak.  I   ) f, 
indicating the Challenger prefers military force, the corresponding values of * and * 
are * '   ( and * '   ( respectivley. 
If the Challenger proposes either & or *, the Defender acquiesces regardless of 
type, as it can do no better by resisting.  The challenger may gamble and make a bold 
demand (& or *), however, if it believes the defender sufficiently weak.  Specifically, 
the Challenger issues the bold demand & only if it believes the Defender weak, signified 
by the equation below (labeled epˆ for convenience): 
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Likewise, the Challenger issues the bold demand * in conjunction with military 
force when the following (labeled mpˆ ) holds: 
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The equations for epˆ and mpˆ indicate an item of particular interest concerning the 
Challenger’s choice regarding which demand to make.  Both equations indicate that the 
higher the cost of conflict, the lower the values of epˆ and mpˆ .  In other words, if 
 ,  , ,  #  increase (holding    constant), fewer values of either equation justify 
the Challenger gambling by issuing a bold demand.  This makes intuitive sense, as the 
more costly the choice to coerce, the less likely the Challenger is to do so.   
Given this setup, four equilibria follow given combinations of ξ
 
and epˆ and mpˆ .  
Table 3.1 summarizes the equilibria as a function of the Defender’s strength and 
associated threshold conditions.  In the first equilibrium, the Challenger prefers economic 
sanctions to military force.  This preference may reflect several possible situations.  
Defenders may be particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions such that  % , 
meaning sanctions can be employed effectively.  Alternatively,  may be particularly 
costly, in turn encouraging the use of military force as a policy strictly more likely to 
compel the Defender to acquiescence.  The choice of sanctions in this model may also 
indicate a combination of these two factors.  Likewise, the Challenger is sufficiently 
convinced of the Defender’s strength to warrant the lesser demand &.  As with the 
choice between sanctions and military force, this may be due to several factors, the most 
straightforward of which is a relatively high likelihood that the Defender is strong and 
will resist economic sanctions.  The cost of sanctions, alternatively, may be relatively low 
such that the Defender is likely to resist the Challenger’s demand.  That is, if sanctions do 
not inflict sufficient harm on the Defender (or Challenger), they are unlikely to compel 
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the Defender to submit.  As per the setup of the model, both Defender types acquiesce if 
the Challenger issues a weak demand.  The Challenger also opts for economic sanctions 
in the second equilibrium for similar reasons.  In this situation, however, the Challenger 
believes the Defender is weak enough to issue the bold demand &.  The second 
equilibrium can result from relatively high costs for either the Challenger or Defender 
 + .  Again, per the Defender’s type, it acquiesces if weak and resists if strong in 
the second equilibrium.   
The next two equilibria reflect situations where the Challenger prefers military 
force to economic sanctions.  This may be because sanctions are either too costly or 
unlikely to succeed in collapsing the Defender.  As  % , the Challenger is more likely 
to view military force as the utility maximizing strategy given the relative cost and 
increased likelihood of collapsing the Defender.  If  - mpˆ , indicating the Challenger 
believes the Defender relatively strong, it makes the weaker demand to which both types 
acquiesce. If   mpˆ , however, the bold demand is issued that only the weak Defender 
accepts.  The intuition behind the choice of demand parallels the prior discussion on 
economic sanctions.  Relatively high costs for either Challenger or Defender  +  
reduce the incentive for the latter to resist.   
The equilibria discussed above reveal several interesting relationships relevant for 
evaluating the influence of economic agreements on interstate conflict.  First, higher costs 
of sanctions or military force for either a Challenger or Defender decreases the likelihood 
that either policy comes to fruition.  That is, the more costly a coercive action is the less 
likely the Defender is to resist demands and force the Challenger to impose sanctions or 
to use military force.  Second, the Challenger is less likely to use economic sanctions as 
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 % .  Consequently, as the cost of sanctions approaches the cost of war – as might be 
expected in highly interdependent relationships – Challengers prefer military force.  
Third, Challengers are more likely to use economic sanctions as they increase in 
effectiveness (i.e., as λ increases).   
Understanding the empirical implications of the model is therefore directly related 
to the cost of sanctions, their effectiveness, and the relationship between the two 
parameters.  The cost and effectiveness of sanctions, in turn, is a direct reflection of a 
state’s ability to meaningfully disrupt trade flows with others while limiting self-imposed 
damage (Hirschman 1981; Wallensteen 1968; Baldwin 1985; Drezner 1999; Drezner 
2003; Allen 2008; Jing, Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2003).  This suggests important aspects 
of the relationship between the cost and effectiveness of sanctions – or the relative 
relationship between ,  and .  The cost of sanctions is directly related to the 
economic harm the Challenger can inflict upon the Defender.  In order for harm to befall 
the Defender, however, a meaningful trade relationship must exist between the states 
such that both will be hurt if action is taken.  In turn, it may be possible (or likely) that  
and  vary in tandem.  However, while  and  may move in the same direction, it 
does not follow logically that the rate of movement is identical between the two.  While 
the cost of sanctions may increase between Challenger and Defender with the degree of 
trade, either party may be more vulnerable to disruption.  One state may be more 
vulnerable if it is more reliant on the other for imports or exports as a proportion of their 
total economy or has relatively few trade alternatives (Hirschman 1981; Crescenzi 2003a; 
Crescenzi 2003b).  Such may be the case when sanctions are imposed by large economies 
on relatively small one, as the former is better able to reorient production and trade to 
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account for losses (Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot 2007).  Likewise, trade in sensitive 
products may result in asymmetrical vulnerability.  Despite having a larger economy, it 
can be argued the United States was more vulnerable to disruptions levied by the 1973 oil 
embargo that other developed countries.   
The same logic suggests the effectiveness of economic sanctions is directly 
related to the Defender’s cost of sanctions.  That is, while  and  may not move in 
lockstep, it is likely that the probability of the Defender collapsing from economic 
sanctions is closely related to the cost of sanctions such that  increases (decreases) as  
increases (decreases).  Sanctions that are highly costly to the Defender are also likely to 
be highly effective in compelling policy change (Hirschman 1981; Baldwin 1985).  
Indeed, it is often the case that states involved in sanction episodes – both Challenger and 
Defender – weight the opponent’s potential costs and payoffs relatively heavily (Tsebelis 
1990).   
Given the relationships between the cost of conflict to both parties and the 
effectiveness of sanctions ( , ,  ,  .  and λ), the influence of economic 
interdependence and agreements on the type of conflict witnessed between agreement 
members is likely conditioned on the relative economic position of states involved in the 
dispute.  To help interpret these effects, Figure 3.4 plots the simulated probability of 
particular actions by the Challenger given the economic (inter)dependence of Challenger 
and Defender.4  Each panel plots the thresholds associated with particular strategies by 
                                                           
4
 These graphs were generated using simulated data.  Cost parameters and  are drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 0.5 and a mean of 0.25. and , are derived by multiplying and  
respectively by a parameter drawn from a uniform distribution, thereby creating two variables with 
exponential distributions between 0 and 0.5 with means of 0.125.  This ensures and  and correlated 
with but distinct from and  .  λ is derive in a similar fashion by multiplying  by another uniformly 
distributed variable, again ensuring correlation.  Finally,  
 72 
the Challenger according to the particular parameters of interest in calculating ξ ,
epˆ and
mpˆ .  The y-axis the probability of the Challenger adopting particular strategies, i.e. 
economic or military coercion and the associated decisions to make bold or weak 
demands.     
Consider first the top panel of Figure 3.4 that plots the use of economic sanctions 
or military force by the Challenger.  In this figure, the area above the line reflects the 
values of p for which the Challenger uses military coercion as given by ξ .  The area 
below the line, in turn, indicates values of p that lead to the use of economic coercion.  
The two key concepts necessary to understanding this calculation – the effectiveness of 
sanctions (λ) and the difference between the Challenger’s cost of war ( and sanctions 
(.  Note first that the effectiveness of sanctions, λ, has a relatively mild, but 
nonetheless significant effect on the Challenger’s decision between economic and 
military coercion.  Challengers are more likely to use economic coercion as the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions increases given positive influence of λ.  Differences 
in the cost of military and economic coercion, however, have a much stronger influence 
on the Challenger’s choice.  As     increases, the area underneath the line expands 
indicating the Challenger is more likely to prefer economic sanctions over military force.  
Intuitively, this condition could be fulfilled if either the cost of military coercion is 
sufficiently high or the cost of sanctions sufficiently low.  If military coercion is too 
costly, in other words, the Challenger may attempt “foreign policy on the cheap” by using 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  and  are drawn from uniform distributions with means of 0.25 and 0.75 respectively (standard 
deviations of 0.05).  ξ ,
epˆ and mpˆ  are then calculated according to their respective formulas.    
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economic sanctions.  Likewise, if economic sanctions are inexpensive, Challengers may 
utilize them more frequently.   
The bottom left panel depicts the Challenger’s decision to make the weak or bold 
demand once it has decided to use economic coercion.  Recall that all Defenders 
acquiesce to the weak demand &while only weak Defenders acquiesce to the bold 
demand (&.  Consequently, the Challenger’s decision to make the bold demand results 
in the possibility it will impose economic sanctions if a strong Defender resists.  The area 
above the lines in this panel reflect the range of p values for which the Challenger issues 
the bold demand & .  First, increases in the effectiveness of sanctions (λ) and their cost to 
the Defender () increases probability the Challenger issues the bold demand – and 
therefore risks imposing economic sanctions.  Of these two parameters, λ appears to be 
the stronger influence on the Challenger’s decision, although both exhibit noteworthy 
pressure on the bold/weak demand dynamic.  The logic behind both elements is relatively 
straightforward.  If sanctions are either highly costly to the defender or effective relative 
to military force, the Challenger is more confident the Defender is weak and will 
acquiesce.  Second, as the Challenger’s cost of sanctions ( increases, the probability 
the Challenger issues the bold demand decreases.  Costly economic sanctions encourage 
weak demands while inexpensive sanctions encourage bold demands.  Taking these three 
elements together, the most likely scenario whereby sanctions are used is between a 
Challenger insulated from costs and a Defender highly sensitive to the cost of sanctions.  
Likewise, sanctions are least likely to be observed between an insulated Defender and 
vulnerable Challenger. 
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Finally, the bottom right panel plots the Challenger’s decision to make the weak 
or bold demand once it has decided to use military force.  Again, all Defenders acquiesce 
to the weak demand *  while only weak Defenders acquiesce to the bold demand 
(*).  The area above the lines in this panel reflect the range of p values for which the 
Challenger issues the bold demand * and risks having to use military force.  The effect 
of both the Challenger and Defender’s cost ( and  respectively) have nearly identical 
influences on the decision between bold and weak demands.  As the cost of military force 
increases for either Challenger or Defender, the probability of the Challenger making the 
bold demand decreases.  This is to be expected with respect to the Challenger’s costs, as 
more costly actions are likely to encourage more conservative behavior.   
The impact of the Defender’s costs, however, is somewhat counterintuitive, as we 
might expect increases in cost to encourage acquiescence.  However, consider the 
bargaining scenario I lay out.  Challengers set bold demands equal to * '   ( and 
weak demands equal to * '   (.  The Defender’s cost of conflict, therefore, enters 
equally into both demands.  Differentiating the two demands is the probability the 
Defender will collapse given military force given by  if weak and  if strong (where 
  ).  Consequently, when the Defender faces high costs of conflict (and therefore 
vulnerable to coercion given my setup), the Challenger can gain nearly as much by 
making the weak as the bold demand without risking loss in conflict.  In other words, 
vulnerable Defenders who stand to suffer in conflict can be effectively leveraged without 
making bold demands.   
To further develop the implications of my model, Figure 3.5 considers the 
interplay of the model’s parameters by displaying how economic relationships and 
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interdependence influence the Challenger’s choice of coercive policies.5  The vertical 
axis represents the Challenger’s level of economic dependence (the main driver of 
 and  while the horizontal axis represents the Defender’s dependence (the main 
driver of ( and 1.  Four quadrants indicate the economic relationship between the two 
parties and the coercive strategies that are likely preferable.  Note first that 
interdependence is insufficient to determine whether the Challenger prefers economic or 
military coercion.  Rather, the choice of economic or military coercion is instead 
primarily a function of the difference in costs (1  ) as discussed previously.   
Important implications regarding the likelihood of observing military or economic 
coercion (i.e., the likelihood of the Challenger issuing bold demands) can be gleaned 
from the model, however.  Quadrant I in the top left is characterized by a relatively 
dependent Challenger and independent Defender.  In this scenario, the Challenger lacks 
the economic leverage to make sanctions effective as it is commercially dependent on the 
Defender.  Consequently, economic sanctions are least likely in this case while military 
force is possible.  Contrast this with quadrant IV in the bottom right.  Here the Defender 
is dependent on the Challenger and possesses a high cost of conflict.  The Challenger, 
however, is relatively autonomous with a low cost of conflict.  Given the disparity in 
cost, sanctions are likely more effective and relatively less costly for the Challenger, 
overall increasing the likelihood they will be employed.  Military force, however, is still 
possible in this dynamic.   
Quadrant II reflects two states that are economically interdependent.  As such, 
both experience high costs from conflict.  As Figure 3.5 demonstrates, increases in both 
the Challenger and Defender’s cost of war discourage the use of military force.  Hence, if 
                                                           
5
 The implications in Figure 6 are based off the same calculations that derived Figure 5.   
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both states are economically vulnerable, military force is least likely between 
interdependent states.  Economic sanctions, while possible, are no more or less likely to 
be imposed than in other scenarios.  Finally, quadrant III compliments quadrant II by 
considering two states with little economic interdependence.  Military force is more 
likely to be used in this scenario given the relative independence of states.  Defenders 
cannot be economically leveraged given their insulation.  Challengers, on the other hand, 
suffer relatively little from engaging in military coercion.  Again, sanctions are no more 
nor less likely to be imposed per the results of the formal model. 
3.3.2  Implications 
In applying this to economic agreements, consider first the relationship between 
two states in the same agreement.  Economic agreements tend to promote trade and 
investment between members, signal long-term commitments to liberal economic 
policies, and otherwise draw member states together such that economic interdependence 
increases.  It is likely the case, as a result, that both economic sanctions (γ) and military 
force (θ) prove more costly for Challengers and Defenders.  As a result, disputes between 
agreement members are likely to result in acquiescence by the Defender given the 
potential cost to both parties.  Or putting this in the language of my model, increased 
interdependence reduces the range of values for epˆ
 
or mpˆ for which the Challenger is 
willing to gamble by issuing a bold demand.  This lends additional weight to Hypothesis 
1 discussed in the previous section. 
That said, this suggests a more nuanced approach to conflict by the parties 
involved rather than a wholesale rejection of conflict between members of economic 
agreements.  The economic interactions fostered by economic agreements may promote 
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either interdependence or simple dependence between member states.  Dependence and 
asymmetrical commercial relations can manifest through several possible mechanisms.  
First, some agreements (notably shallow ones) are often particularistic in the sense they 
do not fully liberalize trade relations.  Partial scope agreements in particular may not be 
reciprocal in that they often require more opening measures by a subset of states in the 
agreement.  Very often these agreements are designed to improve market access for less 
developed countries.  For example, the African, Caribbean, Pacific – European 
Community agreement (APC-EC) signed in 1963 and expanded in 1975 provides 
seventy-nine developing states with market access to European Community states for 
certain goods.  The United States and Australia hold similar agreements within their 
respective spheres of influence (Whalley 1996, 5-6).   
Second, even if agreements are reciprocal in nature, asymmetries may develop as 
certain states accrue a disproportionate share of benefits.  Relatively economically strong 
states in agreements are often able to leverage their influence to the perceived detriment 
of the other members (Fernandez 1996).  For example, Kenya proved the dominant state 
in the East African Community (which also contained Uganda and Tanzania) for most of 
its history.  Given its port access and relatively developed infrastructure, Kenya was able 
to shift community policies to advantage its own firms through foreign direct investment 
and preferential trade terms (Nye 1963; Stock 2004, 445; Shilling 2005).  Consequently, 
economic agreements can entrench the commercially central state and augment its 
economic leverage. 
If economic agreements promote asymmetrical commercial relations, the 
implication for the type of conflict initiated by the dominant state is a tendency towards 
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sanctions.  Asymmetrical relations between agreement members push the dominant and 
peripheral states in opposite directions in Figure 3.5.  The dominant state tends towards 
quadrant IV, where the cost of sanctions is relatively low but the potential effectiveness 
high.  Consequently, economically dominant agreement members are better positioned to 
use economic sanctions as a first-best coercive policy, leading to a third hypothesis: 
H3: Less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use economic 
sanctions against other members as a tool of coercion.   
More economically dependent agreement members, however, are pushed towards 
quadrant I.  Sanctions are both costly and ineffective given their weaker commercial 
position.  The cost of sanctions encourages dependent states to pursue other tactics as a 
first-best option.  This is likely for two reasons.  First, the more dependent state in the 
dyad cannot credibly use sanctions to compel the less dependent one due to its vulnerable 
position.  Any economic punishment the dependent state visits on the less dependent state 
can be trumped by more forceful sanctions from the latter.  Sanctions, therefore, are less 
likely to succeed when used by the more dependent state.  This effect is likely 
compounded by the less dependent state’s greater ability to use the trade network fostered 
by the agreement to divert trade lost through sanctions to other agreement members.  As a 
result, dependent states may pursue military force as a first-best – or only – option to 
coerce other agreement members.   
 Second, the relative economic vulnerability of states in agreements may 
encourage them to frame exchange in terms of relative gains.  Any relative gains that the 
dominant state accrues, furthermore, may be used against the dependent state in the form 
of military power.  The codified nature of agreements compounds this problem by 
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signaling the persistence of relative losses.  More dependent states, therefore, may view 
trade with less dependent states in a more negative light and attach less significance to it 
if sacrificed.  Vulnerable states, therefore, face both higher costs from imposing sanctions 
given their relative dependency while simultaneously perceiving reduced costs of military 
action given relative gains concerns.  Likewise, sanctions employed against more 
dependent members by those less dependent may be less likely to succeed given the 
negative influence of relative gains.  Consequently, the relative difference in cost 
between military and economic coercion (1  ) is likely lower for dependent 
agreement members vis-à-vis less dependent ones.  As a result, dependent agreement 
members are more likely to use military force as a coercive tool: 
H4: More economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use military 
force against other members as a tool of coercion.   
Agreements that promote symmetric commercial relations between members 
likely reside in quadrant II in Figure 3.5.  Commercial exchange between member states 
increases interdependence in that both states derive benefits from their relationship.  It is, 
therefore, more likely that any form of coercion is costly for both states.  The effect of 
interdependence between symmetric agreement members on economic sanctions is 
ambiguous, as the Challenger and Defender’s cost of sanctions (γ2 and γ3 work in 
opposition.  With respect to military force, however, increases in the cost of military 
force ( and ) both reduce the likelihood of observing military force.  Given this, an 
additional hypothesis is stated as: 
H5: Symmetrically dependent agreement members are less likely to use military force 
against other members as a tool of coercion than asymmetrically dependent members.   
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Consider now relations between members and non-members of economic 
agreements.  Recall that economic agreements marginalize the salience of member state 
ties with the external world as they tend to rely on intra-agreement trade for higher 
potions of their trade portfolio and economic activity.   This is compounded to the extent 
trade diversion takes place, as it represents a direct and material shift in trade patterns 
away from non-members.  Membership in an economic agreement is a signal of intent to 
pursue closer ties with particular states, which in turn may reduce the long-term salience 
of member/non-member relations.  Consequently, states likely grow less interdependent 
as a result of economic agreements.   
The broad implication of marginalization is to push members and non-members 
towards quadrant III in Figure 3.5.  Interdependence is reduced to the extent trade ties are 
marginalized by the economic agreement.  Economic agreements may also give risk to 
relative gains concerns and strategic vulnerabilities between members and non-members 
in ways that encourage states to view extant trade ties negatively, thereby reducing the 
overall cost of conflict further.  While sanctions are likely low-cost, a lack of 
interdependence between Challenger and Defender limits the ability of economic 
sanctions to compel policy change.  Economic agreements, by either materially affecting 
trade or altering the context within which it occurs, limits interdependence between 
members and non-members of agreements.  Economic sanctions, when used between 
members and non-members of agreements, may fail to convey either the punishment or 
costly signal required to be successful.  When engaging in conflict, therefore, the more 
effective option for states on opposing sides of an economic agreement may be the use of 
military force.  Given this dynamic, my final hypothesis is stated as: 
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H6: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between 
members and non-members. 
The hypotheses I have discussed in this chapter concern both the initiation of 
conflict and the method by which states engage in it.  While initiation and means of 
conflict are not codetermined, they are certainly related phenomenon that requires careful 
treatment.  In the remaining chapters, I present and implement a research design that 
attempts to account for the strategic interaction of initiation and type of conflict, as well 
as several other empirical necessities.   
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Table 3.1: Summary of Equilibria 
 
Conditions Challenger Strategy Weak Defender Strategy Strong Defender Strategy 
 - ) 
 - ̌& 
Economic Sanctions 
Sets x  x6 
Acquiesce Acquiesce 
 - ) 
  ̌& 
Economic Sanctions 
Sets   & 
Acquiesce Resist                     (Sanctions Imposed) 
  ) 
 - ̌* 
Military Force 
Sets   * 
Acquiesce Acquiesce 
  )
 
  ̌* 
Military Force 
Sets   * 
Acquiesce Resist                        (Military Force Employed) 
Note: p is the Challenger’s belief the Defender is weak, ξ is the threshold value of p above which the Challenger uses military 
force, and epˆ and mpˆ are threshold values above which the Defender prefers to resist the actions of the Challenger. The 
Defender’s strategies are determined by its type and are presented in this table for reference. 
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Figure 3.1: An Illustration of Trade Diversion 
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High Cost of Conflict 
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IV. Defender dependent,      
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Figure 3.5: Interdependence and Coercive Instruments 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN: MODELING THE INFLUENCE OF  
AGREEMENTS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICT 
 
My argument as outlined in the previous chapter requires a modeling strategy that 
addresses not only the onset of conflict, but also the type of strategy used by states in 
conflict.  Furthermore, my formal model makes explicit the strategic interplay between 
the onset and strategies used in conflict.  Hence, my empirical strategy involves a series 
of large-N statistical tests of all non-directed dyad-years from 1970 to 2001 evaluating 
the relationship between economic agreements and both the onset and strategies of 
conflict in a multifaceted approach.  In particular, I propose to evaluate my hypotheses 
using military force and economic sanctions as primary dependent variables.  To be sure, 
other types of conflict are possible between states – e.g., diplomatic disputes, economic 
inducements, and covert actions.  The prevalence and assumed substitutability of military 
force and sanctions, however, make them ideal candidates for a first-cut study.   
In this chapter I first outline the dependent variables I use in my analysis.  
Following this, I describe in detail my primary explanatory variables, including economic 
agreements, measures of trade (inter)dependence, and trade diversion.  I then briefly 
discuss additional control variables necessary for sound statistical analysis.  After 
discussing the variables, I outline my estimation strategies and consider how they capture 
the concept of foreign policy substitutability.  In the final section I consider factors that 
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may potentially confound my empirical analysis, including missing data and spatial 
dependence, and how I address these issues.   
4.1  Dependent Variables: Military Force and Economic Sanctions 
In the most general sense, my analysis is concerned with the initiation and method 
of resolving conflicts between states.  While numerous strategies are possible between 
states, it is often posited that economic sanctions may be substituted from military force 
as a means of coercing states (Hufbauer 1998; Schott 1998; Schwebach 2000; Garzke, Li 
and Boemer 2001).  Consequently, I focus my empirical analysis on these two concepts 
as the primary mechanisms of interstate conflict.  I hope to address additional forms of 
conflict and coercion in future work. 
There are two key variables necessary for my analysis.  First, I am generally 
concerned with both the occurrence of conflict and the strategies use by states when it 
does take place.  As such, I consider a broad conception of military force that include 
threats as well as the use of force.  It is common practice in conflict literature to limit the 
operationalization of military force to incidents where fatalities occur, as participants in 
many low-level disputes never intend their escalation to actual violence.  My analysis is 
as much concerned with the choice of coercive instrument as the use of said instrument, 
however.  While states may never intend for disputes to escalate beyond the threat of 
military force stage, I contend that a choice is implicit in the threat of using military force 
instead of economic sanctions.  Alternatively stated, restricting my dependent variable to 
disputes where force is used eliminates useful information about the decision-making 
process that led to the threat of military instead of economic force.  Consequently, I 
operationalize military force using participation in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) 
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within the dyad to include the threat, display, or use of force.  I code this variable 1 if 
dispute occurs between states in the dyad year and 0 otherwise.  I obtain data for this 
variable from the Maoz dyadic MID dataset (Maoz 2005).   
Second, I consider economic sanctions in a similar manner by including both 
threats and imposition.  My conceptualization of economic sanctions falls in line with 
Drezner’s (2003, 643), who defines it as “the threat or act by a sender government or 
governments to disrupt economic exchange with the target state, unless the target 
acquiesces to an articulated demand.”  Because I am interested in the substitutability of 
military force and sanctions, I only include politically motivated sanctions in our 
analysis.  The rational of this decision is simply that economic issues exclusively are 
unlikely to escalate to military force.  I code a variable 1 if economic sanctions are 
threatened or imposed for political reasons in a dyad in a given year and 0 otherwise 
using the Threats and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset (spanning from 1970 to 
2001) (Morgan, Krustev, and Bapat 2009).   
Hypotheses 1 and 2, in particular, cite “conflict” generally without reference to a 
particular instrument of coercion.  Evaluating these two hypotheses, therefore, requires an 
approach to the conflict process general enough to capture incidents beyond militarized 
disputes.  I conceptualize this broader variable – called “conflict initiation” – as the use of 
either sanctions or military force.  Consequently, I code conflict initiation 1 if either a 
sanction or a MID occurs in a given year and 0 otherwise.   
4.2  Explanatory Variables: Agreements, Interdependence, and Diversion 
My argument makes reference to many economic interactions between states.  
While economic agreements is my primary variable of interest, my theory also considers 
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the material relationships between states as an important component of their overall 
conflict behavior.  Indeed, economic agreements influence these material relationships by 
affecting trade and investment decisions between states.  As such, I specify a series of 
explanatory variables capturing the complex economic relationships between states.   
4.2.1  Economic Integration Agreements 
The unifying element across all aspects of my analysis is the conceptualization 
and operationalization of economic agreements.  In general, the concept is broadly 
similar to the conventional use of regional trade agreements.  The World Trade 
Organization defines a regional trade agreement as a territory that maintains separate 
tariffs or regulations for a “substantial part of the trade of such territory” (WTO 1994, 
Article XXIV).  In short, economic integration agreements are formal arrangements 
between states designed to lower barriers to trade.  In practice, however, the concept is 
stretched somewhat by the states that employ such agreements.  Furthermore, some 
degree of difference often exists between the stated goal of integration that is formally 
reported to the WTO and the realized degree of integration experienced by the agreement.  
This leads to a number of conceptual difficulties with respect to the level of economic 
integration between states.  First, I expand the Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) dataset 
by dividing agreements from 1950-2001 into five basic groups according to the specific 
policy measures associated with each level based largely on Bela Balassa’s (1962) 
taxonomy.  Balassa divides agreements into five levels – free trade areas, customs unions, 
common markets, economic unions, and total economic integration in order from least to 
most integration.  In creating my taxonomy, I modify two aspects of this scale.  First, I 
add a category capturing “partial scope agreements,” which cut trade barriers between 
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states but fail to do so on a “substantial part of the trade of such territory.”  Second, I 
collapse the economic union and total economic integration categories, as it is highly 
debatable whether any agreement achieves the highest degree of integration on Balassa’s 
scale.  The five levels of integration are briefly described below while Table 4.1 provides 
a simple graphic illustration of the relationship between the types of agreements: 
Partial Scope Agreements (PSA): Marginal reductions in tariffs for certain goods.   
Free Trade Area (FTA): Elimination of tariff barriers on a majority of goods. 
Customs Union (CU): Elimination of tariffs and adoption of common external tariffs. 
Common Markets (CM): A customs union and the free movement of labor and capital. 
Economic Unions (EU):  A common market and harmonization of domestic policies and 
currency.   
I also make informed judgments as to the effective level and timing of integration 
achieved by agreements vis-à-vis the stated goal of such agreements based on historical 
analysis of individual institutions.  For example, despite the initial goal creating an 
economic union, the Commonwealth of Independent States remains largely a partial 
scope agreement (CIS 2013; WTO 2013).  Judgments such as this concerning the 
effective level and timing of implementation were made following extensive research on 
agreements by the author using national, WTO, and scholarly sources.   
It is also important to note that my conceptualization and operationalization of 
economic agreements does not include the WTO as a valid agreement type.  The WTO 
requires reciprocity in trade policy for all member states.  Economic agreements, 
however, are an exception to this rule.  Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade permits states to form regional trade agreements (or simply economic 
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agreements) provided they do not raise barriers to commerce with non-agreement 
members after creation.  Consequently, economic agreements more extensively liberalize 
trade between members when compared to the WTO.  Alternatively a stated, economic 
agreement in my analysis refers to arrangements that go beyond the WTO in liberalizing 
trade between states.   
Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5 evaluate intra-agreement conflict dynamics.  
Consequently, I code a series of variables capturing the shared agreement relationship 
between states.  I specify three separate variables capturing economic agreement status.  
The first variable is an ordinal measure of agreements from 0 (no agreement) to 5 
(economic union) according to this taxonomy.  The next two variables divide agreements 
into “shallow” (PSA and FTA) and “deep” (CU, CM, and EU) arrangements.6  
Differentiation between shallow and deep is based on the degree of cooperation required.  
While trade PSAs and FTAs simply require the elimination of barriers, custom unions 
and beyond require states to change trade policy vis-à-vis all states, and hence require 
more political capital.  Alternatively stated, shallow agreements require the “negative” 
cooperation where barriers to commerce are removed.  Deep agreements, on the other 
hand, require “positive” cooperation where states must create common policies vis-à-vis 
third parties.  PSAs and FTAs only remove barriers while customs unions and beyond 
require coordinated action by definition.  Consequently, differentiating shallow and deep 
by the agreement level is a useful and appropriate course of action.   
Hypotheses 2 and 6 evaluate extra-agreement conflict dynamics between 
agreement members and non-members.  Consequently, the primary explanatory variable 
in these cases is the presence of an economic agreement within the dyad.  Because I am 
                                                           
6
 I also test my hypotheses using a pure five-tier classification system.   
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interested in how economic agreement members relate to non-members, two dyadic 
relationships are important.  First, only one state in a dyad may be a member of an 
agreement – which I will refer to as “one agreement dyads.”  Second, both states may be 
members of separate economic agreements – which I will call “opposing agreement 
dyads.”  I code a dichotomous variable for each of these groups separately.  In this way, 
dyads without agreements serve as a baseline, comparison group.   
Two items are important to note in the coding of these variables.  First, dyads 
where both states are in the same agreement (i.e., the United States and Canada in 
NAFTA) are coded 0 for both one agreement and opposing agreement variables.  
Consequently, states that share are agreement but also have other agreements they do not 
share in common are not considered one or opposing agreement dyads.  Second, not all 
agreements are threats to every state.  An agreement between Paraguay and Uruguay is 
more salient to Argentina than Thailand.  Consequently, I only consider “economically 
relevant” agreements where the non-member is either contiguous to or a top 10 trade 
partner of an agreement member.   
Figure 4.1 illustrates the two types of dyadic relationships between members and 
non-members.  Consider first one agreement dyads as depicted in the top half of the 
figure.  Argentina and Brazil are both members of Mercosur.  Peru, however, is not a 
member of any economic agreement.  In this instance, both the Argentina-Peru and 
Brazil-Peru dyads are coded as one agreement dyads, as only one state in each dyad is a 
member of any agreement.  The bottom half of the figure illustrates opposing agreement 
dyads.  Here again Argentina and Brazil are members of Mercosur.  Peru, however, has 
joined the Andean Community with Columbia and several other states.  Because they are 
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in different, non-overlapping agreements, both the Argentina-Peru and Brazil-Peru dyads 
are coded as opposing agreement dyads.   
4.2.2  Trade Interdependence and Asymmetry 
My theory hinges not only on agreements proper, but also the economic 
relationships that exist between states.  In other words, economic agreements structure 
both the material relationships between members (and non-members) and how they are 
viewed by each.  Three additional concepts are important in this regard.  First, trade 
interdependence captures the extent to which states in the dyad interact, which is 
important for traditional notions of opportunity cost.  Interdependence in terms of 
conceptualization is more than simply interactions between two states.  It instead implies 
a complex association between states where both face “costly effects,” in the words of 
Keohane and Nye (1977), and consequences are inherent in their relationship.  Key to 
understanding the role of economic interdependence in interstate conflict are capturing 
these implicit consequences for policymakers and political institutions.  The value states 
place on economic interactions, however, is unobservable, which in turn leads to a 
multitude of possible operationalizations that vary by research design and individual 
preference. 
Two major approaches exist for measuring interdependence as a concept.  The 
most popular operationalization in the literature comes from Russett and Oneal (1997; 
1999; 2001).  The authors consider trade interdependence a function of how important a 
bilateral trade link is to the overall economy of the state, given by:  
Dependencei = 
8*9:;<=>?@AB9:;<=>?
C(D>

E;F&>?
C(D>
. 
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Trade interdependence in this fashion represents the extent to which states in a 
dyad rely on each other for overall economic activity.  States with higher interdependence 
scores obtain higher amounts of goods and services from each other, thereby implying the 
trade relationship is more salient.  In subsequent empirical analysis, the authors create a 
dyadic measure of interdependence by using the “weak-link” assumption, where only the 
lowest score for the dyad is utilized.  The rationale behind this approach is simply that the 
constraining effect of interdependence is a function of the least interdependent partner.   
The second major approach is from Barbieri (1995; 1996; 1998).  Barbieri differs 
from Russett and Oneal by considering trade interdependence a function of how 
important a bilateral trade link is to the overall trade portfolio of a state.  This 
conceptualization is more in line with Hirschman (1981), who considered vulnerability a 
function of how reliant a state was on particular external partners for resources.  
Barbieri’s measures are further differentiated from Russett and Oneal’s by their dyadic 
construction.  She creates three measures to capture the economic relationship between 
states – salience, symmetry, and interdependence, given as follows: 
Trade Sharei = 
8*9:;<=>?@AB9:;<=>?
8*9:;<=>@AB9:;<=>

E;F&>?
E;F&>
. 
Salienceij = GH#+I JK#IL M H#+I JK#IN 
Symmetryij = 1  |H#+I JK#IL  H#+I JK#IN| 
Interdependenceij = H#+I J"IILN M H#+I J$!!I#$LN 
In this way, Barbieri’s measures take into account both states’ reliance on their 
trade relationship.  Salience captures the relative importance of the relationship (using the 
geometric mean) in a way that effectively captures opportunity costs.  Symmetry 
acknowledges the relative gains arguments of realism and subsequent perceptions of 
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vulnerability.  Finally, her interdependence measure considers both opportunity and 
relative costs essential to understanding a complexly interdependent relationship between 
states. 
Debate in the literature over which measures are appropriate in empirical analyses 
is heated and largely unresolved.7  In reality, both approaches have strengths, 
weaknesses, and appropriate applications.  Two key factors distinguish the measures as 
they relate to my analysis.  First, the Russett and Oneal measures excel at capturing 
sensitivity interdependence, but a more tenuous grasp on vulnerability interdependence 
(Mansfield and Pollins 2001).  That is, bilateral trade as a share of GDP implies the 
connectedness of states’ economies, but says little about the costliness of severing the 
link.  If the goods exchanged are highly substitutable by other trade partners or domestic 
sources, little vulnerability exists.  Trade as a share of GDP, therefore, may not 
appropriately capture the cost of conflict between states.  Second, Russett and Oneal’s 
approach utilizes the weak link assumption that the lowest level of interdependence is 
sufficient for identifying dyadic costs.  This is not a dyadic measure, however, and cannot 
speak to the more complex relationship between interdependence and conflict (Barbieri 
and Peters 2003).  In particular, the weak link assumption prevents insight into the 
influence of asymmetry, relative gains, and strategic vulnerabilities.   
In my analysis I adopt a hybrid of the Russett and Oneal and Barbieri measures 
suited for my particular hypotheses and questions.  Generally, I measure trade 
relationships using total dyadic, bilateral trade as a share of GDP (titled “trade 
dependence” for convenience) in accordance with Russett and Oneal, given by:  
                                                           
7
 For a thorough discussion of the debate, see Gartzke and Li 2003a and subsequent replies by Barbieri and 
Peters 2003, Oneal 2003, and their rebuttal in Gartzke and Li 2003b. 
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Dependencei = 
8*9:;<=>?@AB9:;<=>?
C(D>

E;F&>?
C(D>
. 
This approach has the advantage of capturing the sensitivity aspects of 
interdependence in a more complete way by considering trade’s impact on state 
economies.  To capture trade interdependence specifically, I use a dyadic measure in 
accordance with Barbieri’s approach achieved by generating geometric means of trade 
dependence:     
Interdependenceij = 
GH#+I PII+IIL M H#+I PII+IIN 
This represents interdependence in the dyad by taking into account both states’ 
opportunity cost of conflict.  Higher scores on this variable indicate greater 
interdependence.  To address asymmetry and relative gains, which I argue increases 
conflict between certain states, I include a measure of trade asymmetry that once again 
combines the two approaches by using the absolute difference in trade dependence 
scores:  
Asymmetryij = |H#+I PII+IIL  H#+I PII+IIN| 
Higher scores reflect greater asymmetry.  Using both the trade interdependence 
and trade asymmetry measures allows me to more fully explain the influence of 
interdependence on conflict.  All trade data comes from the Correlates of War (CoW) 
(Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008) and GDP data from the World Bank (2012).  I 
interact each of these variables with the aforementioned agreement variables to capture 
their influence within the context of economic agreements.   
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4.2.3  Intra-Agreement Trade 
 As my operationalization of economic agreements indicates, they are a highly 
heterogeneous group of arrangements.  While agreements differ in the scope of coverage 
and depth of liberalization, they also differ in the extent of membership.  That is, some 
agreements are only bilateral treaties while others are multilateral arrangements.  The 
benefit states derive from bilateral agreements is a function of commerce between the 
two members and any intangible gains associated with their bilateral relationship (i.e., 
increased investment from non-member parties).  Economic relationships and 
interdependence between states in a multilateral agreement, however, are more complex.  
Members of multilateral economic agreements benefit from reduced barriers with 
multiple states.  That is, economic agreements are a series of interconnected 
relationships.  While a member may not trade extensively with one particular partner, it is 
still connected through the structure of the agreement.   
 In turn, the institutional structures of economic agreements may be affected by 
conflict.  Disputes between two agreement members – even if they do not trade 
extensively – may threaten the existence of the entire agreement.  The multilateral 
Central American Common Market, for example, dissolved because of disputes between 
El Salvador and Honduras.  Consequently, trade between agreement members is in part 
ascribed to the agreement.  In other words, an opportunity cost or degree of 
interdependence exists between members of an economic agreement attributable to trade 
with third-party members of the agreement.  To capture this influence, I specify a 
variable capturing the total trade a state conducts with all agreement partners less 
bilateral trade as a share of GDP, given by: 
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Intra-agreement Tradeij = 
∑ L*9:;<=>R@&B9:;<=>RSL*9:;<=>?@&B9:;<=>?
T
RUV
C(D>
 
Where all k are members of the economic agreement and j is the dyadic partner of i.  In 
this way the variable captures the influence of trade with other agreement members net of 
the dyadic trade influence.  To capture the dyadic influence of intra-agreement trade, I 
calculate the geometric mean of these scores:   
Intra-agreeement Dependenceij = 
GW#  X#II!I H#+IL M W#  X#II!I H#+IN 
4.2.4  Foreign Direct Investment 
 Economic agreements are most often associated with reducing trade barriers 
between members.  Lower barriers to trade, however, has an important impact on 
corporate investment strategies as well.  Lower barriers in an economic agreement 
effectively increases the available market for goods produced in that region.  Expanding 
markets, in turn, creates opportunities for firms to capitalize on economies-of-scale by 
investing in economic agreement areas (Joumotte 2004; Chen 2009).  Foreign direct 
investment is one alternative business may employ to avoid the de facto discrimination of 
a limited economic integration agreement.  Hence, states in an economic agreement 
might be expected to benefit from increased FDI inflows.  It is important to account for 
FDI in my analysis as it may provide another benefit to agreement members that 
influences conflict behavior.   
 Capturing this effect is somewhat difficult given the complexity of the concept I 
posit.  Specifically, I am interested in investment attributable to the lower barriers of the 
economic agreement.  Of course, this is inherently unobservable and beyond the reach of 
available data or reliable approximation techniques.  Furthermore, this investment is non-
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directional in that it need not come from another agreement member to influence conflict 
behavior.  Hence, bilateral flows are inappropriate for my analysis.  Given these factors, 
the most appropriate conceptualizations and measures of FDI for my analysis is a net FDI 
inflow at the country-year level.  While not all FDI inflow is attributable to an economic 
agreement, it is likely accurate to say all FDI inflows benefit from the agreement.  
Consequently, while not all inflows are agreement-driven, they are all agreement-
benefiting, meaning they may influence conflict behavior.  I operationalize FDI 
dependence using total new inflows as a share of GDP, given by:  
FDI dependencei = 
8YZ[:\=>S]^<Z[:\=>
C(D>
 _&< `(8>
C(D>
. 
As with trade interdependence, I generate dyadic measures using the geometric mean of 
FDI dependence given by: 
FDI Interdependenceij = GaPW PII+IIL M aPW PII+IIN 
Because FDI flows can be negative, I rescale the variable by adding 1 to all observations.  
The FDI interdependence variable is also interacted with the agreement variables.  I 
obtain FDI data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (2013).   
4.2.5  Trade Diversion 
A final primary explanatory variable captures trade diversion.  A broad literature 
in economics explores the effects of agreements on bilateral trade flows using gravity 
models as a base (see Frankel 1997; Glick and Rose 2001; Rose and Wincoop 2001; 
Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Carerre 2006 for recent examples).  Differences between 
gravity model estimates, which provide a theoretical level of trade, and observed trade 
flows are attributed to the presence of an economic agreement (and therefore trade 
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diversion).  I therefore estimated a gravity model of trade that estimates the (logged) 
bilateral trade between states in a dyad.8  To account for zero trade flows, I use a 
Heckman selection model with the simple presence of trade in a dyad (coded 1 if trade 
occurs, 0 otherwise) as the selection criteria (Carerre 2006).  Trade diversion due to 
economic agreements is calculated as the difference between the natural log of observed 
trade and logged predicted values of the gravity model.  Higher values therefore indicate 
greater levels of trade diversion caused by membership in economic agreements.9   
I use three groups of variables to estimate the gravity model.  Table 4.2 briefly 
outlines each variable and its source.  First, I use a traditional set of variables to account 
for the economic and geographic relationships of the states.  These variables include GDP 
(high and low), population (high and low), distance, contiguity, whether the two states 
are in the same geographic region (as defined by the World Bank), individual variables 
for each state’s region, and whether the two states share a common language.  Second, I 
expand on the gravity model by including a series of political variables.  In this way I 
better approximate the influence of economic agreements by accounting for other 
potentially confounding influences on trade.  These variables include regime type (high 
and low), political affinity, alliances, major power status (total number in the dyad), and 
WTO membership.  Finally, a third set of variables accounts for conflict between states.  
Conflict variables include militarized interstate disputes (cumulative total initiated since 
1950), fatal militarized disputes (cumulative total initiated since 1950), a spatial lag of 
                                                           
8
 I add $100 to all observations of trade to avoid problems with taking the log of zero.   
9
 While I am interested in trade diversion, I do not limit this variable to only diversion (positive values in 
my variable).  In this way, I permit economic agreements to create trade for excluded states.  This may 
theoretically occur if economic agreements increase demand for materials with the agreement which are 
then sourced by neighboring states.  Consequently, observed values on this variable run from negative 
(trade creation) to positive (trade diversion).    
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disputes using alliances to connect (detail provided in a later section), a spatial lag of 
disputes using contiguity to connect, and years since the last militarized dispute.   
Table 4.3 contains the results of the gravity model estimation.  Rather than 
discuss the results of individual variables, which is not the focus of my analysis, I focus 
on the trade amounts predicted by the gravity model and subsequent estimation of trade 
diversion.  Figure 4.2 compares the gravity model estimations with actual trade values.  
Overall, the gravity model tends to predict lower, more uniform trade values than actually 
occur.  The gravity model also underestimates zero trade values noticeably.  Accuracy 
with respect to actual trade values is not the goal of the gravity model, however, as the 
presence of trade diversion is dependent on the gravity model being unable to explain 
100% of trade values. 
Turning to the actual measure, the manufactured trade diversion variable is 
roughly normally distributed with very long tails.  To provide a useful depiction of the 
variable, I rescaled the variable to eliminate negative values by adding the lowest 
observed value to all observations.  This transformation is only to display the variable 
and will not be used in subsequent analysis.  Figure 4.3 plots the distribution of trade 
diversion between the 5th and 95th percentile (to, once again, aid in displaying the variable 
by eliminating very long tails).  The majority of dyads witness relatively small amounts 
of trade diversion given the cluster around the vertical line referencing “zero trade 
diversion.”  The area to the right of this line indicates dyads for which trade diversion 
occurs.  The area to the left, in contrast, indicates dyads with trade creation.  Overall, 
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approximately 47.8% of dyads experience trade diversion, 41.1% experience trade 
creation, and 11.1% experience neither creation nor diversion.10   
To more fully capture the impact of trade diversion, I reference with respect to 
GDP.  The foundation of my trade diversion variable is thus given by, 
Trade Diversionj = 
D;&L<& E;F&>?Sb1<^F[ E;F&>?
C(D>

(Lc&;=L:Y>?
C(D>
. 
 As with my other economic variables, I generate dyadic measures using the 
geometric mean of trade diversion given by: 
Dyadic Trade Diversionij = 
GTrade DiversionL M Trade DiversionN 
My statistical tests and subsequent diagnostic analysis in Chapter 6 revealed a 
polynomial relationship between trade diversion and conflict.  Consequently, I include a 
squared dyadic trade diversion term in Chapter 6 to appropriately evaluate the influence 
of this variable. 
4.2.6  Control Variables 
I also use a number of control variables to account for competing explanations of 
conflict between states.  Four control variables – congruity, major powers, alliances, and 
capabilities – control for realist arguments of conflict.  Contiguous states and major 
powers are more likely to fight due to greater opportunities for conflict (Most and Starr 
1989).  Allies, on the other hand, engage in combat less frequently given shared security 
goals (Bremer 1992).  I code these variables dichotomously if states are contiguous (or 
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 Those experiencing neither trade creation nor diversion are dyads that have zero trade in a given year.   
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separated by 150 miles of water or less), if either state is a major power, or if allied 
respectively.  My control for capabilities is a relative measure using composite index of 
national capabilities (CINC) scores from the Correlates of War dataset.  The measure is 
calculated as a (logged) dyadic ratio of the smaller CINC score over the larger.  I obtain 
data for all three of these measures from the Alliances and Direct Contiguity datasets 
housed at the Correlates of War Project (Singer 1972; Gibler 2009; Stinnett et al 2002).   
Four additional controls – democracy, GDP, IGOs, and WTO membership– 
account for liberal theories of interstate conflict.  First, in accordance with the democratic 
peace literature, I control for regime type using composite scores from the Polity IV 
dataset scaled -10 to 10 from authoritarian to democratic (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 
2007).11  I use the geometric mean of scores in the dyad to measure democracy.  Second, 
the sizes of states’ economies are likely to influence both the degree to which they are 
involved in international affairs and their ability to use certain policy instruments.  To 
this end, I control for GDP using the aforementioned Gleditsch figures.  Because GDP is 
highly skewed, it is logged for statistical analysis.  Additionally, I use the geometric 
mean of scores in the dyad.  Third, since many economic integration agreements are also 
international organizations proper, it is important to ensure the various integration 
variables are not simply reflecting the broader pacifying effect of IGO membership 
(Russett and Oneal 2001).  I include a variable controlling for joint organization 
membership to control for this possibility.  Data comes from the International 
                                                           
11
 I use the Polity 2 variable from this dataset.  The Polity 2 variable differs from the basic Polity variable in 
the authors’ dataset by adjusting several problematic variables for using statistical analysis.  For example, 
the authors code periods of anarchy -77 on the Polity variable.  To facilitate time-series analysis, the 
authors of the POLITY IV dataset recoded anarchy to a neutral score of 0, which they believe the 
appropriate classification for these cases.  For more information, see the POLITY IV Project coding manual 
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011).   
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Governmental Organization dataset housed at the Correlates of War Project (Pevehouse, 
Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004).  Finally, in a similar way it is important to control for 
membership in the WTO as the most all-encompassing economic institution in the world.  
I code this variable 1 if both states are members of the WTO and 0 otherwise.   
4.2.7  Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 include descriptive statistics for all the variables used in 
my analysis.  Recall that my unit of analysis is non-directed country dyad years from 
1970 to 2001.  In total, approximately 16% of dyads share membership in a shallow or 
deep economic agreement.  Likewise, 20% of all observations are either one agreement 
or opposing agreement dyads.  Consider first statistics for my dependent variables, which 
I have broken down by economic agreement type.  First, note the relative rarity of both 
dependent variables.  Militarized disputes and economic sanctions generally occur in less 
than 1% of dyads.  Second, on the whole, military force is more often observed than 
economic sanctions.  While the relative popularity of economic sanctions is not 
necessarily within the scope of this paper, their comparative unpopularity may reflect the 
difficulty of using sanctions, the inability of some states to effectively employ them, or 
different data collection procedures.  Third, note the extreme infrequence of economic 
sanctions between shallow and deep agreement members.  Indeed, no two states in a deep 
economic agreement (customs union, common market, or economic union) have 
threatened or imposed sanctions on each other in the temporal scope of my study.  I will 
return to this point in the next chapter when discussing intra-agreement conflict. 
Turning to my primary explanatory variables in Table 4.5, I have once again 
broken the variables down by dyadic agreement type.  Note first the relationship between 
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shallow and deep agreement types in terms of economic relationships.  Overall, deep 
agreements tend to foster more interdependence, intra-agreement trade, FDI dependence, 
and asymmetry between members.  Several of these factors might be expected, save for 
the asymmetry.  This may reflect on forces creating economic agreements as much as the 
impact of agreements, however, as strong states may forge agreements to solidify trade 
blocs to their advantage.12  The second item of interest in Table 4.5 is the distribution of 
the trade diversion variables.  Overall, dyads with opposing agreements – i.e., where both 
states are in different economic agreements – appear to experience more erratic patterns 
of trade diversion given the mean and maximum observed values.  For brevity, I omit 
discussion of Table 4.6 regarding control variables.   
4.3  Estimation Techniques 
I specifically argue that the initiation of conflict and the tactics states use are 
connected.  That is, the use of sanctions and military force are both possible outcomes of 
the same decision-making process.  Accounting for this may be important to properly 
assay the influence of economic agreements on the conflict process broadly.   To this end 
I employ several estimation strategies to address the connected nature of conflict and the 
tactics utilized by states.13  First, I specify two logit models treating sanctions and 
military force as separate dependent variables with the same set of explanatory variables.  
This approach treats both events as outcomes of independent processes.  Second, I 
estimate a bivariate probit model that addresses the potential connection between 
sanctions and military force as joint outcomes of the same process.  Again, because I am 
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 I employ several robustness checks accounting for the potentially endogenous nature of economic 
agreement creation and interstate conflict.  Results are reported in subsequent chapters. 
13
 I also conducted several robustness checks omitted here for space.  These include rare events logit design to account 
for dependent variables coded 1 less than 1% of observations, multinomial logit using imputed data, sample sets limited 
to politically relevant dyads, and simultaneous equations accounting for endogeneity using a variety of instruments.   
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using a derived predictor for trade diversion, I account for uncertainty in these estimates 
using Murphy-Topel corrections in my statistical models (Murphy and Topel 1985; 
Hardin 2000; Hole 2006).   
While the logit and bivariate probit models are reliable and easily interpreted 
estimation techniques, they are not well-suited to evaluating the strategic nature of 
hypotheses derived from my formal model.  It is possible the decision to initiate any form 
of conflict – sanction or military force – is related to the effectiveness of using either 
coercive instrument, hence my use of a formal bargaining model.  In other words, states 
are unlikely to initiate conflict if they cannot effectively employ either sanctions or 
military force.  Likewise, a defending state may be more likely to give in to demands if it 
anticipates the use of one or the other.  To address this, I specify a strategic probit model 
(using STRAT software (Signorino 2001)), that allows the decision to initiate conflict in 
part to derive from the expectation of either military force or economic sanctions being 
used.  The potential outcomes of interest in the strategic model are 1) no conflict 
initiation (either a sanction or a MID) 2) the use of economic sanctions and 3) the use of 
military force.  Exact specifications for the strategic probit models will be provided in 
subsequent empirical chapters.  Given the challenges in estimating this complex model, I 
limit my sample to dyads that are contiguous, major powers, or where at least one state is 
a top ten trade partner of the other (and hence highly economically salient) and eliminate 
the major powers and WTO membership variables .14   
For comparison and simplicity, I subset my analysis on agreement type in all 
models.  For intra-agreement conflict, I separate shallow and deep agreements into two 
separate regressions with “no agreement” dyads serving as the comparison category.  
                                                           
14 Limiting the logit and bivariate probit models to this subset of dyads does not change the results. 
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This allows me to evaluate the impact of economic agreements as an institution.  For 
extra-agreement conflict between members and non-members, I separate the one 
agreement and opposing agreement dyads into separate estimations with “no agreement” 
dyads again serving as the comparison category.  I lag all independent variables one year 
to help control for endogeneity and protect the temporal integrity of the analysis.  Given 
the rarity of conflict and the possibility events are not truly temporally independent, I 
include a cubic polynomial variable capturing the number of years between either a 
sanction or MID to account for potential temporal dependence (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 
1998; Carter and Signiorino 2010).   
4.4  Threats to Internal Validity 
No statistical analysis is without complications stemming from the structure of 
data or other potential problems with causal inference.  In my analysis, I am particularly 
aware of two potentially confounding factors.  First, my dataset contains a relatively large 
proportion of missing data on important variables for my analysis.  Second, observations 
in my dataset may not be temporally or spatially independent, thus potentially biasing my 
results.  I address these two issues statistically using imputations and temporal/spatial 
lags.   
4.4.1  Missing Data and Multiple Imputation 
The total number of dyad-years in my analysis is 437,250 running from 1970 to 
2001.  In total, however, approximately 60% of dyad-years are missing values on at least 
one independent variable.  This reduces the amount of usable observations to 173,618.  
While more than enough for conventional statistical analysis, missingness of this 
magnitude is a potential problem in my analysis.  The most common means of handling 
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missing data is simply omitting the observations from statistical analysis.  Excluding 
observations for which a portion of the relevant data is missing, however, poses several 
potential problems.  The least obtrusive problem is simply the loss of potentially useful 
information.  In extreme cases, however, omitting missing data can result in severe 
selection bias (King et al 2001).  Consequently, missingness is a statistical issue to be 
taken seriously in my analysis.   
The source of most missing observations in my dataset is trade.  Approximately 
27% of my observations do not possess valid trade values.  Missing trade data is 
compounded by the numerous dyadic measures created using observed trade values.  In 
total, approximately 37% of dyads are missing trade data for at least one state, resulting 
in more missing values for my constructed measures of interdependence and asymmetry.  
Second to trade in missingness is FDI, for which 34% of observations are missing data.  
Two additional variables are particularly noteworthy in his regard.  Democracy values are 
missing for approximately 23% of data and GDP is missing for 16% of observations.     
Of particular concern for my analysis is trade data given its position in my 
theoretical argument and the subsequent conceptualization and operationalization of 
variables using trade.  Furthermore, missingness in trade data is problematic given the 
nature of politics in the global economy.  The omission of trade data from national 
statistics is often not an issue of oversight or resources, but of political conditions and 
influence (Barbieri, and Keshk 2009; 2011).  In other words, rather than a random 
process, trade data is often missing because of political factors included in my statistical 
analysis (Barbieri 1995; Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009; Gleditsch 2010).  As trade is 
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also one of my primary explanatory variables, it is important to address potential bias 
stemming from missing data. 
Several studies have used multiple imputation to address missing trade data.  
First, Gleditsch (2002) creates a trade dataset using a series of procedures, including 
using either export or import figures for one country if the other is missing, using a series 
of lags or leads to cover gaps in data, some interpolation, and coding observations 0 if 
trade between states is unlikely.  These methods allow Gleditsch to eliminate missing 
values in his dataset.  Gelpi and Grieco (2008) use multiple imputation to fill in missing 
trade values and evaluate the connection between interdependence and conflict.  The 
authors use both the Russett and Oneal and Barbieri datasets in their analysis.  
Unfortunately, the authors do not offer a systematic evaluation of their dataset in order to 
evaluate the potential appropriateness of imputation for trade data.  Finally, Boehmer, 
Jungblut, and Stoll (2011) evaluate the use of constructed data in the analysis of 
interdependence and conflict.  The authors replicate Russett and Oneal (2001) using 
Gleditsch (2002) and Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) data by considering first only 
observations with actual trade data.  They then add in imputed for missing data at 5% 
intervals to evaluate the effect on the interdependence-conflict dynamic.  Ultimately the 
authors find imputed data tends to inflate the effect of trade in conflict models.  Again, 
the authors do not systematically evaluate the constructed data in reference to observed 
data.   
While these studies use statistical techniques to fill in missing trade data, Barbieri, 
Keshk, and Pollins (2009), identify potential problems in deriving trade data outside of 
official government reports.  Several assumptions are required to derive data, many of 
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which are tenuous or unfounded.  Assuming zero trade between states based on various 
dyadic characteristics is generally unsound in this era of globalization.  Furthermore, 
missing data is often missing for political reasons.  Data may be misreported to over or 
understate trade relationships, for example.  Likewise, conflict can impact trade between 
states.  Given this inherent difficulty in imputing trade data, I first tested the quality of 
imputed trade values against available data.  A full description of the procedures and 
analysis of the results is available in Appendix A.  In short, I evaluate the quality of trade 
values imputed using the procedure and software (Amelia II) developed by King et al 
(2001) by randomly voiding 20% of known, non-missing trade values.  I then evaluate 
the real versus imputed trade statistics for accuracy and potential problems.   
Based on this analysis, two factors are important in the determination of accurate 
trade statistics.  The first is whether the observation is missing a GDP score for either 
state in the dyad.  This is relatively innocuous, however, as only 6.1% of dyads are 
missing both trade and GDP.  Inaccuracy on 6.1% of observations, while certainly not 
optimal, is unlikely to drastically harm my analysis.  Furthermore, I can perform two 
different statistical analyses that include and exclude the imputed values for observations 
missing GDP to evaluate the influence of the 6.1%.  The second, however, is the imputed 
model’s inaccuracy with respect to predicting zero trade relationships.  This is slightly 
more problematic given approximately 30% of recorded bilateral trade relationships are 
zero.  Assuming an identical proportion of dyads missing trade data are in fact zero, 
approximately 8% of my total dataset will be affected.  My strategy here is to perform 
two statistical analyses – one excluding observations that are missing trade data and one 
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using the imputed trade values.  If results differ, I will explore more carefully the imputed 
values and their validity in my statistical analysis. 
4.4.2  Temporal and Spatial Dependence 
My statistical analysis also requires adjustments to account for potential 
dependencies in the data.  First, given the rarity of conflict and the possibility events are 
not truly temporally independent, I include a cubic polynomial variable capturing the 
number of years between either a sanction or MID to account for the recurrence of 
conflict over time (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010).   
Second, the policies and actions of states on the international stage are in part 
dependent on the policies and actions of other states with which they share a connection.  
As I have noted in a previous chapter, the proliferation of economic agreements is in part 
fueled by states observing agreements between third parties and subsequently forming 
agreements of their own.  Likewise, incidents of conflict may exhibit some degree of 
spatial dependence if wars are prone to spilling across borders or drawing in third parties.  
I take into account potential spatial dependency between dyads involved in conflict using 
two spatial lag variables capturing an aggregated, lagged value of the dependent variable 
(Neumayer and Plumper 2010).  The first variable is weighted by geographic continuity 
under the assumption a state is more likely to experience conflict when a neighbor is 
already embroiled in conflict.  The second variable is weighted by alliance ties, as a state 
may be more likely to act when an ally is experiencing a conflict.  I construct spatial lags 
for both militarized interstate disputes and sanctions.  Summary statistics for these 
constructed variables are available in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.1: Levels of Economic Integration 
 
   
Partial Scope 
Agreement 
Free Trade   
Area 
Customs     
Union 
Common 
Market 
Economic 
Union 
(PSA)  (FTA)  (CU)  (CM)  (EU)  
Reduction in Trade Barriers X  X  X  X  X  
Elimination of Trade Barriers 
   X  X  X  X  
Creation of a Common External 
Trade Policy       X  X  X  
Free Movement of Labor and 
Capital          X  X  
Coordination of Domestic 
Economic Policies             X  
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Table 4.2: Gravity Model Variables 
 
Variable Measure Source 
Dependent Variable 
Total Bilateral Trade Imports + exports in a dyad in a given year (logged) Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2008 
Traditional Gravity Model 
GDPHigh Highest GDP score in the dyad (logged) Penn World Tables 2012 
GDPLow Lowest GDP score in the dyad (logged) Penn World Tables 2012 
PopulationLow Highest population in the dyad (logged) Penn World Tables 2012 
PopulationHigh Lowest population in the dyad (logged) Penn World Tables 2012 
Distance Distance between capitals in miles Gleditsch 2012 
Contiguity Coded 1 if states share a border or less than 150 miles of water Small and Singer (1982) 
Region Dichotomous, coded 1 if states in a dyad are the same region  Author 
Common Language Dichotomous, coded 1 if states share a common language Mayer and Zignago 2011 
Political Variables 
DemocracyHigh Highest POLITY IV score in the dyad (using Polity 2 variable) POLITY IV 
DemocracyLow Lowest POLITY IV score in the dyad (using Polity 2 variable) POLITY IV 
Affinity Reflects similarity in policies according to UN voting behavior Gartzke 2008 
Allies Dichotomous, coded 1 if states in a dyad are allies Gibler and Sarkees 2004 
Major PowerSum Sum of major powers in the dyad (0, 1, or 2 values) Small and Singer 1982 
WTO Membership Dichotomous, coded 1 if states are both members of the WTO Author 
Militarized DisputesSum Sum of all militarized disputes in a dyad from 1950 to 2001 Maoz 2004 
Fatal Militarized 
DisputesSum 
Sum of all fatal militarized disputes in a dyad from 1950 to 
2001 Maoz 2004 
Spatial LagAlliances Spatial lag for MID initiation using alliances as connector Author 
Spatial LagContiguity Spatial lag for MID initiation using contiguity as connector Author 
Peace Years Years since a militarized dispute between states in a dyad Author 
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Table 4.3: Gravity Model Estimates 
 
Extant Trade 
Relationship (Selection) 
Total Bilateral Trade 
(Outcome) 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Traditional Gravity Model 
GDPHigh 0.270*** 0.003 0.735*** 0.004 
GDPLow 0.261*** 0.004 0.800*** 0.004 
PopulationHigh -0.029*** 0.006 0.068*** 0.005 
PopulationLow -0.057 0.031  0.099* 0.005 
Distance -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
Contiguity 0.809*** 0.028 1.399*** 0.025 
Region 0.283*** 0.014 0.057*** 0.018 
Common Language 0.243*** 0.012 0.548*** 0.016 
Political Variables 
DemocracyHigh 0.014*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.001 
DemocracyLow 0.005*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 
Affinity -0.065*** 0.013 -0.639*** 0.015 
Allies 0.370*** 0.018 0.553*** 0.020 
Major PowerSum 0.312*** 0.023 0.586*** 0.017 
WTO Membership 0.296*** 0.007 0.208*** 0.010 
Conflict Variables 
Militarized DisputesSum -0.132*** 0.009 -0.143*** 0.007 
Fatal Militarized DisputesSum -0.044 0.032 0.104 0.034 
Spatial LagAlliances -0.910 0.760 9.369*** 0.848 
Spatial LagContiguity 7.285*** 0.712 14.395*** 0.926 
Peace Years -0.005*** 0.000 -0.024*** 0.000 
Constant 
Constant -12.114*** 0.113 -20.248*** 0.155 
N 261,981 
Censored 71,183 
Uncensored 190,798 
λ
2
 206,576.89*** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -491,020.00 
ρ 0.073*** 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics - Dependent Variables 
 
All and No Agreement Dyads 
  
  All Dyads No Agreement 
    
0 
(None) 
1 
(Initiated) 0 (None) 1 (Initiated) 
MIDs 
Frequency 182,126  631 153,382  431  
Percentage 99.65% 0.35% 99.72% 0.28% 
            
  
  All Dyads No Agreement 
    
0 
(None) 
1 
(Initiated) 0 (None) 1 (Initiated) 
Economic Sanctions Frequency 182,533  224 153,628 185  
Percentage 99.88% 0.12% 99.88% 0.12% 
  
Intra-Agreement Conflict 
  
  Shallow Agreements Deep Agreements 
    
0 
(None) 
1 
(Initiated) 0 (None) 1 (Initiated) 
MIDs 
Frequency 26,112  168 2,632  32  
Percentage 99.36% 0.64% 98.80% 1.20% 
        
    
  
  Shallow Agreements Deep Agreements 
    
0 
(None) 
1 
(Initiated) 0 (None) 1 (Initiated) 
Economic Sanctions Frequency 26,241  39 2,664  0  
Percentage 99.85% 0.15% 100.00% 0.00% 
  
Exra-Agreement Conflict 
  
  One Agreement Opposing Agreements  
    
0 
(None) 
1 
(Initiated) 0 (None) 1 (Initiated) 
MIDs 
Frequency 15,725  143 20,056 194 
Percentage 99.10% 0.90% 99.04% 0.96% 
        
    
  
  One Agreement Opposing Agreements  
    
0 
(None) 
1 
(Initiated) 0 (None) 1 (Initiated) 
Economic Sanctions Frequency 15,807  61 20,163 87 
Percentage 99.62% 0.38% 99.57% 0.43% 
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics - Primary Explanatory Variables 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
All Dyads         
Asymmetry 0.008 0.032 0.000 0.907 
Interdependence 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.197 
FDI Dependence* 1.017 0.033 0.395 1.616 
No Agreement Dyads         
Asymmetry 0.006 0.027 0.0000 0.907 
Interdependence 0.001 0.004 0.0000 0.197 
FDI Dependence* 1.017 0.033 0.395 1.616 
Shallow Agreements         
Asymmetry 0.020 0.048 0.000 0.700 
Interdependence 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.163 
Intra-Agreement Trade 0.007 0.018 0.000 0.363 
FDI Dependence* 1.017 0.038 0.414 1.426 
Deep Agreements         
Asymmetry 0.025 0.047 0.000 0.461 
Interdependence 0.014 0.017 0.000 0.112 
Intra-Agreement Trade 0.056 0.075 0.000 0.408 
FDI Dependence* 1.020 0.032 0.837 1.418 
One Agreement Dyads         
Asymmetry 0.022 0.048 0.000 0.851 
Interdependence 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.151 
Trade DiversionHigh 0.003 0.023 -0.059 0.526 
Trade DiversionLow -0.016 0.040 -0.855 0.037 
Opposing Agreement Dyads         
Asymmetry 0.018 0.044 0.000 0.998 
Interdependence 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.171 
Trade DiversionHigh 0.003 0.016 -0.077 0.318 
Trade DiversionLow -0.012 0.039 -0.964 0.195 
*In order to generate geometric means, I rescaled the FDI dependence variable to eliminate negative 
values by adding 1 to all observations.   
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics - Control Variables 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Continuous Variables         
Capabilities (logged) -2.022 1.503 -9.654 -0.001 
Democracy 8.945 6.144 0 20 
GDP (logged) 23.358 1.479 18.453 29.552 
IGO 28.735 11.254 0 107 
Spatial MID LagAlliances 0.003 0.004 0 0.127 
Spatial MID LagContiguity 0.003 0.004 0 0.091 
Spatial Sanctions LagAlliances 0.001 0.003 0 0.109 
Spatial Sanctions LagContiguity 0.001 0.003 0 0.074 
Peace Years 24.212 12.361 0 50 
Dichotomous Variables         
  Frequency Percentage     
Allies 164,869  90.17%   
  17,977  9.83%   
Contiguity 176,281  96.41%   
  6,565  3.59%   
Major Power 165,190  90.34%   
  17,656  9.66%   
WTO Membership 91,338  49.95%   
  91,508  50.05%   
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Figure 4.1: Types of Member/Non-Member Dyads 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTRA-AGREEMENT CONFLICT 
 
In Chapter 3, I argued that economic agreements confer tangible benefits on 
member states by increasing commerce and fostering robust trade networks.  The benefits 
members gain from economic agreement in turn promotes interdependence between 
states.  Increased exchange between members encourages reliance on intra-agreement ties 
for resources and markets.  Overall, members of economic agreements are likely more 
vulnerable and sensitive to disruptions in trade with other agreements members.  Conflict 
behavior between members of the same economic agreement should also be affected by 
increased commercial exchange and interdependence.  First, the opportunity cost of 
conflict increases in tandem with economic exchange.  Conflict between agreement 
members likely sacrifices tariff revenue for governments, increases risk for business, and 
jeopardizes profits for externally oriented actors.  Consequently, economic agreements 
should decrease the likelihood of conflict between member states.  Second, the strategies 
used by agreement members in disputes should also shift as a result of increased 
interdependence.  The less economically dependent state in the dyad, given its relatively 
more autonomous position, is better poised to use economic sanctions as a tool of 
coercion.  More dependent states, in contrast, cannot effectively use sanctions, and 
thereby are more likely to use military force in disputes. 
This chapter tests this argument with non-directed dyads from 1970 to 2001 using 
the procedures and data outlined in the previous chapter.  In the first section I revisit the 
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relationship between economic agreements and sanctions in light of my deductive theory.  
In short, and in spite of my theory, economic agreement members appear less likely to 
use economic sanctions than those without an agreement.  Following this, I statistically 
evaluate the influence of economic agreements on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs).  
Ultimately I find that agreements can decrease the probability of militarized conflict if 
trade relations are asymmetric and intra-agreement trade is high.  Shallow agreements, 
however, can increase conflict if trade interdependence and FDI dependence are high.  
The next section discusses these results and associated implications for my theory.  The 
fourth section of this chapter presents an alternative statistical test that considers the 
potentially endogenous relationship between agreements and conflict.  Finally, I provide 
a short illustration of my theory and empirical results by analyzing relations between 
Uganda and Kenya since achieving independence.   
5.1  Revisiting Economic Agreements and Conflict Between Members 
One of the key insights from the formal model detailed in Chapter 3 is the 
substitution of economic sanctions for military force in conflict scenarios.  Given the 
setup of my model, sanctions are possible regardless of interdependence and the cost of 
conflict.  They are particularly likely, however, if the challenger is relatively autonomous 
and the defender relatively dependent.  Sanctions are less likely if the challenger is 
dependent and the defender autonomous.  Asymmetric trade relations are therefore the 
most likely to result in economic sanctions.  Military force is possible in all scenarios, but 
more likely in dyads with relatively little interdependence.  Highly interdependent dyads 
are less likely to use military force against each other.   
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The results of my formal model translate to economic agreements in a relatively 
straightforward fashion.  Given economic agreements tend to generate commercial 
exchange between states and serve as commitments to future interaction, interdependence 
between members is relatively high.  Conflict should be less likely overall, but if it does 
occur, different strategies should be discernible according to the relative economic 
position of members.  Relatively dependent agreement members are predisposed to 
military force while relatively autonomous members are prone to using economic 
sanctions per the implications of my formal model.  Likewise, symmetrical economic 
relations are less likely to encourage military force given the interdependence of 
members and presumably muted concerns about relative gains. 
A preliminary look at the data, however, suggest some interesting patterns 
between members of the same economic agreement and the strategies they employ when 
engage in disputes.  Figure 5.1 displays the frequency with which states employ any 
coercive strategy (sanctions or military force), economic sanctions, and military force 
distributed by agreement type.  Consider first the all dyads sample in the left panel of 
Figure 5.1.  Looking at coercion, which is the use of either a sanction or a MID, 
agreement members appear if anything more likely to coerce other agreement members 
than dyads without an economic agreement.  Approximately 0.40% of dyad years without 
an agreement experienced either a MID or economic sanction between 1970 and 2001.  
In contrast, 0.79% of dyads with a shallow agreement and 1.20% of deep agreement 
dyads experienced a MID or sanction.   
The disparities between dyads with and without an agreement apply to the 
strategies used in conflict as well.  Dyads without an economic agreement tend to use 
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military force 2.3 times the rate of economic sanctions.  Approximately 0.28% of no 
agreement dyads experienced a MID while 0.12% experienced an economic sanction.  
The corresponding rate for shallow agreements, however, is approximately 4.3 MIDs for 
every economic sanction.  MIDs have occurred in over 0.64% of shallow agreement 
dyads while only 0.15% have experienced sanctions.  Of the 39 sanctions used by 
shallow agreement members, 32 are between partial scope agreement members at the 
lowest levels of integration.  Hence, military force is more frequently used by economic 
agreement members compared to states that do not share membership in the same 
agreement.  Likewise, while agreement members use sanctions at about the same rate as 
those without an agreement (0.15% versus 0.12% respectively), they use military force at 
much higher rates (0.64% versus 0.28%).   
An analysis of deep economic integration reveals an even more lopsided 
comparison.  Indeed, between 1970 and 2001 – the time period of the TIES dataset – no 
state in a customs union, common market, or economic union have used economic 
sanctions against a fellow member.  Agreement members, however, are not so 
constrained vis-à-vis the use of military force.  Indeed, if anything, agreement members 
are more likely to use military force against fellow members (0.28% for dyads without 
agreements and 1.20% for deep agreements).  Consequently, deep agreement members 
appear more prone to both the overall use of conflict and military force as a strategy in 
conflict.   
To be sure, the states most likely to engage in conflict are also the most likely to 
engage in cooperation as both require international interests and/or geographic proximity.  
I take this into account by comparing coercion again using only politically relevant 
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dyads.  The right panel of Figure 5.1 shows frequencies for politically relevant dyads 
(where one state is a major power or the states are contiguous).  First, shallow agreement 
members are still more likely to engage in conflict compared to no agreement dyads 
(4.18% of dyads and 2.83% of dyads respectively).  Second, the ratio of military force to 
economic sanctions for shallow agreement members is 11.3 uses of military force for 
every sanction.  The corresponding rate for no agreement dyads is 2.3.  Third, while the 
overall incidence of conflict between deep agreement members is more muted in the 
politically relevant dyads sample (2.35% of dyads experiencing conflict compared to 
2.83% for no agreement dyads), it remains wholly militarized in nature.   
This analysis brings evidence to bear on several of my hypotheses.  First, 
Hypothesis 1 states economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between 
member states.  This does not appear to be the case given the use of coercion (particularly 
military force) between shallow and deep agreement members.15  Moreover, this effect 
appears to grow stronger as the level of integration deepens.  Consequently, I find 
evidence against my first hypothesis.  It is not conclusive, however, as it does not identify 
the conditions under which militarized conflict occurs.  Second, the results are also 
suggestive for Hypothesis 5 concerning the symmetry of economic relations and use of 
sanctions or militarized force.  The relative infrequency with which agreement members 
use economic sanctions indicates agreements, if anything, strongly bias members to use 
military force.  Hence, I find evidence against Hypothesis 5 stating that symmetrically 
dependent agreement members are less likely to use military force against other members 
                                                           
15
 To evaluate this statement more fully, I conducted tests pooling sanctions and MIDs as the dependent 
variable (coded 1 if either a sanction or a MID occurred, 0 otherwise).  As might be expected given the 
paucity of sanctions, the results are nearly identical to the reported statistical tests using only MIDs.  This 
suggests economic agreements can either decrease or increase conflict under certain economic conditions. 
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as a tool of coercion than asymmetrically dependent members.   Despite these findings, it 
is still important to evaluate the structure of trade in economic agreement members’ 
decision to use military force, which is the subject of Hypotheses 3 and 4.  Given the 
paucity of sanctions episodes between members, however, I restrict my statistical 
analysis to evaluating agreement member’s tendencies to use military force.   
5.2  Statistical Results 
Chapter 4 describes in detail the procedure I use for statistically analyzing intra-
agreement conflict.  To briefly recap, however, this section uses data covering the period 
1970 to 2001 for all non-directed dyads.  My dependent variable is the onset of a 
militarized interstate dispute (MID) in a given year.  I employ several primary 
explanatory variables capturing agreement structures and associated economic 
relationships.  The two agreement types I model are shallow and deep agreements.  The 
former comprise partial scope agreements and free trade agreements.  The latter include 
customs unions, common markets, and economic unions.  To fully capture bilateral 
economic relationships between states I interact trade interdependence and trade 
asymmetry with the agreement variable.  I also use national FDI dependence (interacted 
with the agreement variable) and intra-agreement trade (the sum of all trade a state 
conducts with other agreement members beside their dyadic partner) to capture economic 
relationships more fully.  I then use logistic regression to analyze both simple and 
imputed data.16   
                                                           
16
 I also performed several robustness checks of the results presented here.  These include rare-events logit 
account for the rarity of observed sanctions/MIDs, models with transformations of primary variables, 
alternative specifications of the primary variables, models pooling sanctions and MIDs into one dependent 
variable, simultaneous equation models accounting for endogeneity, models with only politically relevant 
dyads, and the use of only fatal MIDs.  The results are identical to those presented here with the exception 
of fatal MIDs, which are discussed in the appendix.     
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5.2.1  Basic Logit Results 
Table 5.1 contains the results of the logit models estimating the influence of 
shallow agreements on conflict between member states.  Consider first the basic logit 
model that only uses observed data (i.e., no imputed values).  Overall, the results for the 
shallow agreement model suggest a strong role of agreements in militarized disputes 
conditioned by the structure of economic relations between member states.  The shallow 
agreement variable, indicating two states share membership in this type of agreement, is 
negative and statistically significant.  Two states that share membership in a partial scope 
agreement or free trade area are therefore less likely to engage in conflict simply due to 
the existence of the institution and not necessarily its economic consequences.  The 
pacifying influence of the institution itself may reflect intangible benefits accruing to 
member states, such as increased international bargaining power in multilateral 
negotiations, the value of signaling commitments to economic openness, or even the 
anticipation of future economic gains.  This finding is in line with my argument that 
economic agreement members tend to engage in less conflict than those without joint 
economic agreement membership. 
Beyond the agreement variable, two key additional terms are also negative and 
statistically significant.  First, the intra-agreement trade variable is negative and 
statistically significant.  Consequently, the more states benefit from membership in the 
agreement by trading with all agreement partners, the less likely they are to engage in 
military disputes.  This result is in line with my overall theory arguing that economic 
agreements reduce the occurrence of conflict.  Second, the interaction between 
asymmetry and shallow agreements indicates disparate reliance on bilateral trade tends to 
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reduce the occurrence of militarized conflict.  Dyads where one state is relatively more 
dependent on the other for trade as a share of its overall economy are less likely to 
engage in militarized conflict.  By implication, more symmetric trade relations between 
agreement members are relatively more conflict prone.  This is a somewhat puzzling 
finding given my theory argues asymmetric trade relations are more likely to result in 
militarized disputes.  The results of the standalone, non-interacted asymmetry variable – 
which is positive and statistically significant – make these results all the more puzzling.  
Dyads without an economic agreement and asymmetric trade relations are therefore more 
likely to engage in military conflict.  Hence, while asymmetry increases conflict between 
states without an agreement, it may reduce it once an agreement is introduced.  This 
brings evidence to bear against Hypothesis 5. 
Some aspects of shallow economic agreements also encourage conflict.  First, the 
interaction between shallow agreements and interdependence is positive and statistically 
significant.  States sharing joint membership in a shallow economic agreement are more 
prone to militarized conflict the more they rely on each other for trade.  This is again 
somewhat of a puzzling finding given the bulk of literature of interdependence and 
conflict.  Indeed, it contradicts my theory arguing that interdependence between 
agreement members should both decrease the likelihood of overall disputes and shift 
strategies away from militarized conflict.  It is important to note that the standalone, non-
interacted interdependence variable is negative and significant, indicating dyads without 
an economic agreement are indeed less likely to engage in militarized conflict as 
interdependence increases.  Second, the interaction of FDI dependence and shallow 
agreements is also positive with confidence bounds independent of zero.  Shallow 
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economic agreement members who rely on FDI for increasingly large shares of their 
economy are more likely to engage in conflict than those with less FDI reliance.  Once 
again, the non-interacted FDI dependence variable is negative and statistically significant.  
In absence of a shallow economic agreement, FDI pacifies state relations.  This suggests 
some aspect of shallow agreements alters the normal functioning of FDI with respect of 
conflict.  Both findings suggest certain economic relationships encourage conflict, 
thereby highlighting the conditional nature of Hypothesis 1.   
Before discussing the imputed logit results, consider the results of the deep 
agreement model.  Table 5.2 contains the results of the logit models estimating the 
influence of deep agreements on conflict between member states.  Only two primary 
variables achieve statistical significance in the deep agreement model.  First, intra-
agreement trade is negative and statistically significant.  As with the shallow agreement 
model, a greater proportion of trade occurring with third-party agreement members tends 
to pacify bilateral relations.  Second, the interaction between asymmetry and deep 
agreements is negative and statistically significant.  This result for deep agreements is in 
line with those for shallow agreements.  Consequently, asymmetric trade relations reduce 
the probability of conflict between economic agreement members regardless of the depth 
or scope of integration.  Unlike the shallow agreement model, however, the non-
interacted asymmetry variable does not achieve statistical significance in the deep 
agreement model.17  The interactions between deep agreements and, individually, 
                                                           
17
 To test the baseline impact of interdependence, asymmetry, and FDI without economic agreements, I 
specified a model using only dyads that do not share membership in the same economic agreement.  The 
results indicate that interdependence and FDI dependence reduce conflict between states (i.e., negative and 
statistically significant coefficients).  Asymmetry increases conflict (a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient).  This is identical to the results of the shallow agreement model, which in subsequent 
discussions I will refer to when making comparisons between dyads with and without joint membership in 
an agreement.   
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interdependence and FDI dependence do not achieve statistical significance, thereby 
suggesting they do not impact militarized conflict in this context. 
The remaining variables in the shallow and deep agreement models exhibit 
relatively similar patterns.  Many variables achieve statistical significance across all 
model specifications.  The two variables capturing opportunities for conflict – contiguity 
and major power status – are positive and significant across all models (basic and 
imputed logit, shallow and deep agreements).  Two states sharing a border or with at least 
one major power are more likely to engage in militarized disputes.  This is likely due to 
the increased opportunities for conflict presented to neighbors and highly involved major 
powers.   Likewise, power parity appears to increase the probability of conflict between 
states given the positive and significant capabilities variable.  The intuition behind this 
finding is straightforward.  States only engage in militarized conflict if there is a 
possibility of prevailing, which in turn is given by relatively similar capabilities.   
Larger economies, indicated by the GDP variable, are also more likely to engage 
in conflict, once again owing to the opportunity large states have to project military 
power.  Interestingly, the more IGOs states share membership in, the more likely they are 
to engage in conflict.  This may suggest the propensity for IGOs to raise issues of 
disagreement between member states or highlight differences in policy.  In line with the 
robust literature on the democratic peace, democratic states are less likely to experience 
conflict.  Finally, the spatial lag variable for contiguity is positive and significant across 
all models.  States with conflicts on their borders are therefore more likely to be 
embroiled in conflicts as well.  Of the remaining three variables, only alliances achieve 
statistical significance in any of the models.  Allies are more likely to engage in 
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militarized conflict, but only in the basic logit models without imputed data.  Neither 
joint WTO membership nor the spatial lag based on alliances achieves statistical 
significance in any of the models.   
5.2.2  Imputed Data Statistical Results and Discussion 
The results of the logit model using imputed data, contained in the right two 
columns of Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, present less clear results concerning economic 
agreements and conflict.  Of my primary explanatory variables in the shallow agreement 
model, only the interaction between shallow agreements and asymmetry achieves 
statistical significance.  It enters into the equation negatively, suggesting once again that 
asymmetric trade relations reduce conflict while symmetric relations are more conflict 
prone.  In the deep agreement model, only intra-agreement trade is statistically 
significant.  It is also negative such that higher degrees of trade with third-party 
agreement members reduce dyadic conflict.  The remaining variables in both models fail 
to achieve statistical significance.   
Differences in the basic and imputed logit specifications warrant here a more 
detailed discussion.  Overall, the basic and imputed logit models differ in statistical 
significance on a number of my key explanatory variables.  All of my primary 
explanatory variables achieve statistical significance in the basic logit shallow agreement 
model.  While the corresponding variables for the imputed logit model are of similar 
signage, only one achieves statistical significance.  In the deep agreements model, two 
primary explanatory variables are statistically significant in the basic logit compared to 
one in the imputed logit.  Perhaps more disconcertingly, however, is that none of the 
economic variables – interdependence, asymmetry, or FDI dependence – achieve 
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statistical significance in either model.  Indeed, the economic variables do not gain 
statistical significance in tests where agreements and all interaction variables are 
removed.  Economic relations, therefore, have little to do with conflict according to my 
imputed dataset. 
There are several possible explanations for these findings.  First, and perhaps 
most basically, is that economic relations do not truly have an effect on interstate conflict.  
In other words, the imputed data may be the more accurate reflection of reality.  While 
this may be the case, several other studies using imputed data find economic relations do 
indeed influence conflict (Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll 2011).  
My analysis incorporates more economic variables than previous studies, but that does 
not explain a prior the lack of statistical significance on all variables.  Second, the sheer 
amount of missingness in my dataset – most of which is a consequence of the economic 
variables mentioned – may complicate statistical analysis.  Using imputed data allows me 
to increase the number of observations by 90% from approximately 183,000 to 347,000.  
This amount of constructed data may unduly bias against finding results on my primary 
explanatory variables.  Indeed, Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll (2011) use Monte Carlo 
simulations to find that statistical analysis of trade data is meaningfully impacted as the 
proportion of missing data increases.  Given the nearly 1:1 ratio of observed to missing 
data, it is not unreasonable to think my results biased by the scale of missingness. 
Third, to return to a point Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) have made, missing 
data is often missing for political reasons.  Periods of conflict or tense relations may 
result in missing trade data, for example.  Certain types of states are also less likely to 
supply trade statistics.  Boehmer, Jungblut, and Stoll (2011) find that states with missing 
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trade data are less democratic, less developed, and materially weaker than those that 
supply statistics.  I replicated and expanded their analysis with my dataset to analyze 
missing data, as well.  In addition to the aforementioned factors, geographic distance, 
lack of participation in international organizations, and conflicts in neighboring countries 
also increase missingness of both trade and FDI data.  While I have taken care to model 
these factors into generating my imputed data, the results may still be inaccurate.  In 
particular, as Appendix A illustrates, the imputation model does poorly at predicting zero 
trade values.  Several of the factors predicting missingness also predict zero trade flows, 
including distance, power disparities, and conflicts in neighboring countries.  It is 
reasonable to believe inaccuracies in the imputed trade data stems from the tendency of 
statistical models (and researchers) to specify trade values where none may exist.  Hence, 
the nature of missingness in trade data may stymie my efforts to develop accurately 
imputed data. 
As for its overall impact on my analysis, the results of the imputed logit model are 
to be taken seriously.  I am less confident in them, however, the validity and usefulness 
of imputed trade data based on the factors I mention in this section.  I believe it important 
to report this alternative finding, however, in the interest of those who may look upon the 
basic logic results skeptically because of missing data.  I believe it also important to 
provide more rather than less analysis in the case that my suspicious of imputed trade 
data are warranted.  Consequently, my empirical analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 will favor 
the basic over the imputed logit for purposes of interpretation and discussion.  
Furthermore, this can be observed as the more conservative route from the perspective of 
the literature and policy.  I doubt many scholars will dismiss the findings of the trade and 
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conflict literature based on the imputed dataset I propose.  Likewise, the riskier route for 
policymakers is to dismiss the impact of trade on conflict given I find it can both assuage 
and exacerbate tensions.  Consequently, I believe the results of the basic logit model are 
worth reporting and interpreting.   
5.2.3  Substantive Interpretation 
Before discussing the theoretical implications of my results, it is important to 
consider the substantive impact of my variables of interest.  First, recall the shallow 
agreement variable is negative and statistically significant.  Given this is a simple 
dichotomous variable, I estimate the change in the predicted probability of a MID by 
shifting the shallow agreement variable from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables at 
their mean or modal values using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).  The 
baseline probability of a MID given all variables are held at their mean or modal values is 
0.071%.  Two states sharing membership in a shallow economic agreement have a MID 
probability of 0.064% for a total decrease of 8.88%.  By way of comparison, this is 
roughly equivalent to an increase of two units on the dyadic democracy score generated 
using Polity IV.  Forming a shallow economic agreement therefore results in a small, but 
noteworthy, decline in the probability of militarized conflict.   
I use a series of graphs to interpret my remaining primary explanatory variables.  
Figure 5.2 plots the out-of-sample predicted probabilities for the primary explanatory 
variables in the shallow agreements model.  All probabilities were calculated by 
manipulating the variable of interest while holding all other variables at their mean or 
modal values.  The solid line indicates probabilities for shallow agreements while the 
dashed line plots dyads without any agreement for comparison.  The band and spike plots 
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around the lines are the 95% confidence intervals for shallow and no agreement dyads 
respectively.  Finally, note also the different scaling between the top and bottom two 
quadrants.  This is done for convenience of presentation given the disparities in predicted 
probabilities and directionality of the variables.   
The two top plots of Figure 5.2 are for trade asymmetry and intra-agreement 
trade, both of which reduce the probability of militarized conflict.  The baseline 
probability of a MID is approximately 0.07% for sates in a shallow agreement.  As one 
shallow agreement member in the dyad develops a more dependent economic 
relationship, meaning it relies on its dyadic partner for a relatively larger portion of trade 
and economic activity, the probability of a MID decreases.  At relatively asymmetry 
levels approaching 8% of GDP, the probability of a MID is only approximately 0.03%.  
This contrasts with dyads that do not share membership in an agreement.  The probability 
of a MID increases from approximately 0.06% to 0.09% as asymmetry rises from 0% to 
8% of GDP.  It is also important to note that a clear distinction between shallow and no 
agreement dyads cannot be made until approximately 6% of GDP, where the two 
confidence intervals diverge.  This is a relatively high threshold with values that only 
approximately 25% of politically relevant dyads reach.  Consequently, the majority of 
shallow agreement dyads exhibit similar behavior to no agreement dyads vis-à-vis trade 
asymmetry.  Intra-agreement trade exhibits a similar pattern.  As the states in the dyad 
rely more on other agreement partners for trade, and therefore experience relatively 
higher costs of conflict, the probability of conflict declines from 0.07% when no third-
party trade occurs (as with bilateral trade agreements) to 0.01% if the geometric mean of 
intra-agreement trade approaches 20%.   
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The bottom two panels of Figure 5.2 plot FDI dependence and interdependence, 
both of which increase the probability of militarized conflict between shallow agreement 
members.  In absence of a shallow agreement, FDI dependence reduces the probability of 
a MID between states from approximately 0.07% to 0.02% at geometric mean values of 
10%.  In contrast, shallow agreement members actually experience an increase in conflict 
due to FDI dependence.  This probability increases to approximately 0.2% at 10% FDP 
dependence.  Note two additional points concerning the comparison of shallow and no 
agreement dyads.  First, if FDI dependence is negative, indicating a net outflow of 
capital, the probability of a MID is lower for shallow agreement members compared to 
no agreement dyads.  Second, the confidence intervals for shallow and no agreement 
dyads again diverge at approximately 5% of GDP.  Consequently, if FDI dependence is 
between approximately 0% and 5%, its effect for shallow and no agreement members is 
almost indistinguishable.  FDI dependence greater than 5%, however, results in a higher 
probability of MID initiation for shallow agreement dyads than no agreement dyads.  
Overall, approximately 10% of shallow agreement dyads experience FDI dependence 
above this threshold.   
Trade interdependence, show in the bottom right plot of Figure 5.2, also increases 
the probability of conflict.  As shallow agreement members rely more on each other for 
trade, the probability of experiencing a MID increases from 0.07% with 0% trade to 
approximately 0.15% probability at geometric mean values of 4%.  Dyads without an 
agreement, in contrast, experience less conflict as trade interdependence increases.  
Furthermore, the confidence intervals between shallow and no agreement dyads begin to 
diverge around approximately 2%, after which the effect of shallow agreements is 
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statistically discernible from states without an agreement.  Again, approximately 10% of 
shallow agreement members breech this threshold.   
Turning to the deep agreement model, consider first what might be considered a 
typical case.  When holding all variables constant at mean or modal values, dyads without 
an agreement have a 0.064% chance of a MID.  Keep all variables again at mean or 
modal values, but shifting the deep agreement variable from 0 to 1, the probability of a 
MID decreases approximately 70% to 0.019%.  Given what might be considered the most 
typical case, consequently, deep agreements reduce conflict.  Figure 5.3 plots predicted 
probabilities to evaluate the influence of specific variables.  Both trade asymmetry and 
intra-agreement trade reduce conflict between deep agreement members.  First, as trade 
asymmetry increases, the probability of a MID decreases from approximately 0.06% to 
0.01% if asymmetry reaches a geometric mean of 4% in the dyad.  Unlike asymmetry’s 
effect in shallow agreements, however, deep agreement members are more sensitive to 
asymmetry.  Confidence intervals for deep and no agreement dyads diverge at 
approximately 1.2%, a value over 50% of deep agreement dyads achieve.  Consequently, 
asymmetry tends to pacify the majority of deep agreement members.  The effect of intra-
agreement trade is more muted for deep agreement members.  While the effect is 
statistically significant, it is relatively mild.  MID probability decreases from 0.03% to 
approximately 0.01% at geometric mean values of 20%, values approximately 22% of 
deep agreement members achieve.   
5.3  Discussion of Statistical Results 
The results of my statistical analysis provide mixed evidence for my hypotheses 
concerning intra-agreement conflict.  Hypothesis 1 states that economic agreements 
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decrease the likelihood of conflict between member states.  The cross-tabulations 
presented at the outset of this chapter indicate economic agreements may actually be 
more conflict prone than dyads without agreements.  However, statistical analysis 
indicates that economic agreements can reduce conflict under certain circumstances.  In 
particular, dyads with asymmetric trade relations and high levels of trade with third-party 
agreement members experience less overall conflict.18  This holds true for both shallow 
and deep agreements.  High levels of dyadic trade interdependence and FDI dependence, 
however, tend to exacerbate conflict between members of shallow agreements.  Overall, 
holding all other variables constant, shallow agreement members are 8.8% less likely to 
experience a MID while deep agreement members are 70% less likely.  If mean and 
modal values are taken to be the typical case, it appears economic agreements on the 
whole reduce conflict, providing partial support for hypothesis 1.   
The remaining hypotheses are generally not supported, however.  Hypothesis 3 
states that less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use 
economic sanctions against other members as a tool of coercion.  Given the extreme 
infrequency with which economic agreement members use sanctions, however, no 
support is available for this hypothesis.  Hypothesis 4 states that more economically 
dependent agreement members are more likely to use military force against other 
members as a tool of coercion.  It is difficult to evaluate this hypothesis without sanctions 
as a reference.  However, asymmetry appears to actually reduce the likelihood of MID 
initiation according to my statistical models.  No support therefore exists for this 
hypothesis.  Likewise, Hypothesis 5, which states that symmetrically dependent 
                                                           
18
 Recall footnote 1, which outlines my tests pooling sanctions and MIDs as the dependent variable (coded 
1 if either a sanction or a MID occurred, 0 otherwise), the results of which were identical to those reported 
in the MIDs table.   
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agreement members are less likely to use military force against other members as a tool 
of coercion than asymmetrically dependent members, is unsubstantiated by the results of 
my tests. 
These results raise several questions and puzzles in light of my theory.  Perhaps 
the most pressing of which is that some of the implications from my formal model 
suggest economic agreement members are the most likely to utilize economic sanctions 
as an alternative strategy to military force.  Agreements tend to foster interdependence 
between members by increasing trade, investment, and intangible benefits.  Furthermore, 
they possess ready-made institutional mechanisms that allow for the coordinated 
economic action sanctions require (Martin 1992).  However, the findings in this chapter 
indicate that economic agreement members are actually much less likely to use sanctions.  
One possibility is that the institutional structure of economic agreements may prevent or 
severely restrict the use of economic sanctions.  First, the legal framework of agreements 
may prohibit their use.  If economic sanctions are indeed foreign policy “on the cheap,” 
we might expect agreements that do indeed restrict the use of sanctions to all but 
eliminate them as a low-cost, low-risk coercive strategy.  Only serious disputes that 
warrant militarization are therefore observed as conflicts at the international level.   
Second, a state that uses an economic sanction against another member may face 
a coordinated response from other states in the agreement.  In other words, agreements 
may practice “collective economic security” by responding to sanctioning states with 
coordinated, “overwhelming” economic force.  Hence, sanctions are unlikely to succeed 
on their own.  Military force, however, may actually work by raising the stakes of 
conflict and demonstrating more clearly the resolve of aggrieved parties.  Finally, as 
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Bearce and Bearce and Omori (2005) argue, economic agreements may provide conflict 
resolution forums that obviate the need for any type of coercion.  Regular meetings of 
leaders within the framework of economic agreements, for example, provide an 
opportunity to resolve issues before coercion is needed.  Again, the only disputes that 
therefore reach the coercion stage are those worthy of being militarized. 
Third, economic sanctions may not be substitutes for military force.  This is not to 
say sanctions can never be, or never are, used to the same ends as military force.  What it 
suggests instead is that the range of issues for which both economic sanctions and 
military force can be useful may be limited.  Sanctions may be employed for one set of 
issues while military force is reserved for more serious disagreements.  Economic 
agreements may obviate the need for sanctions to address this set of issues due to conflict 
resolution mechanisms.  Likewise, sanctions and military force may not be substitutes for 
all states equally.  Weak or isolated economies, for example, may not be able to use 
sanctions and instead use military force as a first-best strategy.  Economic agreement 
members, in turn, may not possess the characteristics that allow for the use of sanctions.  
Alternatively, sanctions and military force may be used concurrently such that they are 
compliments rather than substitutes.  Sanctions would not necessarily be observed in such 
cases, as they are often coupled with military force when uses as a coercive policy.   
A second major puzzle raised by my results is the conflict inducing tendencies of 
trade interdependence and FDI interdependence between members of shallow economic 
agreements.  This finding goes against many arguments in the broader liberal peace, but 
can possibly be explained by several forces.  Economic agreements may highlight the 
policy differences or security issues between member states, thereby increasing the 
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likelihood of conflict.  Integration may increase economic tensions between member 
states by bringing business into direct competition for markets and resources (Viner 
1950).  Intense competition between members agreement members, which might be 
expected when the share of trade between states is relatively high, may encourage states 
to view economic linkages in terms of relative gains and losses.  Even complementary 
trade can promote this view if states are concerned about their terms-of-trade or 
overreliance on partners for certain resources.  Commercial and political competitions are 
often linked insomuch as wealth is a means to power and vice versa (Viner 1948; 
Hirschman 1980; Gilpin 1987).  Concerns about the equitable distribution of gains and its 
impact on power relations, therefore, can arise if commercial competition is sufficiently 
intense.  The codified nature of agreements compounds this problem by institutionalizing 
trade relationships and competition through formal structures.  Furthermore, foreign 
direct investment may flow from outside the agreement to particular agreement members 
and not others, thereby advantaging one state over others.  FDI disparities may once 
again encourage relative gains concerns insomuch as investment increases the industrial 
and latent military capacity of the receiving state.  The substantive results of FDI 
dependence displayed in Figure 5.2 lend credence to this argument.  Shallow economic 
agreements tend to encourage conflict when FDI dependence is relatively high, which 
presumably is when competition for investment is also relatively high.  Hence, economic 
agreements may increase competition over finite resources and expose the vulnerabilities 
of both states and firms.   
Indeed, while economic agreements can embolden internationally invested 
constituencies, it can also foster reactionary elements opposed to openness (Panagariya 
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and Findlay 1994; Krugman 1999, 384-385; Schiff and Winters 2003, 72).  While this is 
unlikely to actively foster conflict, it may be enough to enable it by short-circuiting the 
pacifying influence of domestic constituencies.  In other words, if conflict is possible 
between two agreement members, a business elite losing to foreign competition may not 
be as vocal in stopping the conflict.  As an example, Honduran workers witnessing 
inflows of Salvadorians and the corresponding increase in job competition resulting from 
the Central American Common Market triggered protests and sporadic violence in the 
state (Cable 1969).  This likely contributed to the 1969 Football War between the two 
agreement members.  Economic agreements further exacerbate or solidify tensions by 
imposing some degree of binding structure on commercial relations through a codified 
structure (Whalley 1996; Schiff and Winters 1998).  Consequently, rather than fostering 
interdependence, shallow economic agreements may simply highlight dependence and 
strategic vulnerability between agreement members.   
A third puzzle is the influence of trade asymmetry on conflict.  I argue that 
asymmetry is likely to increase militarized conflict while symmetry reduces it.  My 
statistical results indicate the opposite, however, for both shallow and deep agreements.  
One possible explanation is that trade asymmetry is also indicative of general power 
asymmetries.  In particular, both power and trade asymmetries likely exist between 
economically large and small states.  The more dependent state in the power/trade 
asymmetry may be unable to either use or resist threats.  Consequently, it complies with 
demands before coercion is used.  Only issues on which both states are greatly resolved 
reach the coercion stage.  Lending credence to this argument is that some agreements 
tend to reflect asymmetrical relationships between states.  For example, the African, 
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Caribbean, Pacific – European Community agreement (APC-EC) signed in 1963 and 
expanded in 1975 provides seventy-nine developing states with market access to 
European Community states for certain goods.  The United States and Australia hold 
similar agreements within their respective spheres of influence (Whalley 1996).  Deep 
agreements may also foster asymmetry, as they might be attempts by economically 
dominant states to solidify or entrench privileged economic access to smaller markets.  
Asymmetry may therefore foster capitulation by the dependent state rather than resistance 
and coercion.   
One particularly interesting finding in my analysis is the role of intra-agreement 
trade on conflict.  The pacifying influence of intra-agreement trade suggests an 
interesting causal process at work.  In particular, Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) 
argue the influence of dyadic and systemic trade relations work in opposite directions.  
Robust bilateral trade relations tend to reduce conflict between any given two states.  
Greater multilateral openness, however, tends to reduce the cost of conflict in ways that 
may actually promote (or at least fail to restrict) militarized conflict.  Relations between 
economic agreement members, which might be considered regionally focused, are 
situated between dyadic and systemic dynamics.  Opportunity costs of conflict should be 
lower between agreement members in the logic of Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008), 
thereby leading to an increase in the probability of conflict if anything. Finding that intra-
agreement trade actually reduces conflict suggests an important role for the structure and 
pseudo-formality of agreements in restraining conflict.  That is, the codified framework 
of trade relations established by economic agreements and the inherent excludability of 
benefits in the advent of conflict may in fact increase opportunity costs in ways that 
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reduce conflict.  Multilateral openness, in other words, may reduce conflict if 
appropriately structured and defined.   
5.4  An Alternative Statistical Consideration 
The results presented in previous sections suggest economic agreements do 
indeed have an influence on interstate conflict, even if it only offers qualified support for 
my hypotheses.  It is important to consider more carefully, however, the complex 
relationship between economic agreements and interstate conflict.  In particular, it can be 
argued that an endogenous relationship exists between agreements and conflict.  On one 
hand, states that share relatively robust economic ties may be less likely to engage in 
conflict given the opportunity cost associated with fighting.  By the same token, however, 
states with a propensity for conflict are unlikely to form relatively complex cooperative 
arrangements as economic agreements.   
Accounting for this endogenous relationship is somewhat difficult given the 
number of key factors inherent in economic integration.  It is possible, however, to 
incorporate the formation of an economic agreement into the analysis of conflict 
initiation using a Heckman selection model.  Specifying membership in either a shallow 
or a deep agreement as the selection criteria, with initiation of a MID as the outcome 
variable, allows me to account for states’ selection into cooperative agreements when 
analyzing conflict.  In other words, this specification can aid in controlling for the 
proclivity of states to only enter into agreements with states they view as peaceful.  One 
drawback of this approach is that selecting on agreement membership precludes inference 
into how agreement specifically influences conflict.  However, I can still identify how my 
primary economic variables (asymmetry, interdependence, FDI dependence, and intra-
 147 
 
agreement trade) influence conflict between agreement members, as the outcome 
equation is limited to a sample of only shallow or deep agreement members per the 
selection criteria.   
In specifying the selection equation of this alternative statistical approach, I use 
membership in a shallow or deep economic agreement separately as the selection criteria.  
To predict membership in an economic agreement, I use many of the variables used in the 
prediction of MIDs.  Specifically, interdependence, asymmetry, FDI dependence, 
alliances, contiguity, democracy, GDP, major power status, peace years and WTO 
membership are all included in both the selection and outcome equations.19  The 
Heckman model depends in large part on the availability of exclusion criteria in the 
selection equation.  Consequently, I include inter-capital distance, whether states share a 
common language, the geometric mean of logged population, political affinity based on 
UN vote similarity (Gartzke 2008), and the cumulative total of dyadic MIDs since 1950 
in the selection equation only.  Finally, to the outcome equation, I add capabilities, IGO 
membership, and spatial lag variables as with my basic logit specifications.   
Table 5.3 contains the results of the Heckman selection model.  The top half of 
the table displays the estimates for militarized interstate disputes as the outcome variable 
divided by shallow (left columns) and deep (right columns) agreements.  Because the 
selection criterion is membership in either agreement, the outcome equation contains only 
dyads in either a shallow or deep agreement.  In other words, the coefficient estimates 
reflect the variable’s impact on states sharing membership in that particular agreement.  
Consider first the shallow agreement results.  As with the basic logit model, asymmetry 
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 Contiguity and major power status are excluded from the deep agreement model outcome equation, as 
the combination with the selection equation perfectly predicts peace.   
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and intra-agreement trade reduce the likelihood of conflict between states sharing 
membership in a shallow economic agreement.  FDI dependence, in turn, increases the 
probability of conflict.  One change from the basic logit is that interdependence is 
statistically insignificant in the Heckman specification.  The results of the deep 
agreement model are also remarkably similar to the basic logit specification.  Both trade 
asymmetry and intra-agreement trade tend to reduce the occurrence of MIDs between 
deep agreement members.  Overall, therefore, the Heckman and basic logit specifications 
are nearly identical for my primary explanatory variables in both the shallow and deep 
agreement models. 
While it is not the primary reason for estimating the Heckman model, some 
insights can be gleaned from the selection equation as well.  Several variables increase 
the probability of forming either a shallow or deep economic agreement.  Dyads with a 
major power are more likely to form either agreement.  This is presumably due to the far 
reaching economic interests of major powers.  Allies, WTO members, and states with 
high affinity are more likely to form either agreement, which is most likely a reflection of 
common political or security goals.  Two gravity model variables – distance and common 
language – influence both agreement types, albeit in different ways.  Not surprisingly, 
distance reduces the likelihood of forming agreements while sharing a common language 
increases it.  Both are likely consequences of the opportunities for cooperation.   
The remaining variables are less clear-cut with respect to agreement formation.  
Contiguity, for example, positively influences deep agreements but negatively influences 
shallow ones.  This may indicate geographically proximate states are more likely to form 
deep instead of shallow agreements, thereby suggesting a substitution mechanism.  
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Likewise, large economies tend to form deep agreements over shallow ones given the 
positive and significant sign on the former and negative on the latter.  The opposite effect 
is witnessed for population, where more populous states tend to form shallow instead of 
deep agreements.  High degrees of trade interdependence tend to result in deep instead of 
shallow agreements in contrast.  This suggests states with robust trade tend to form either 
deep agreements or no agreements.  Intuitively, this might make sense, as shallow 
agreements may be a tool to jumpstart rather than lock-in trade.  Trade asymmetry and 
FDI dependence reduce the probability of forming deep agreements but have no affect on 
shallow ones.  Likewise, democracies are more likely to form deep agreements.  Finally, 
the sum of dyadic MIDs does not influence agreement formation. 
Overall, the results of Heckman selection models largely support the previously 
discussed logit models.  While this does not completely rule out the potential for 
endogeneity, it does help guard against it by accounting for selection into agreements as 
part of the conflict dynamic.20  It also strengthens previous results by demonstrating the 
economic variables influence agreement member conflict behavior even when the sample 
is limited to only agreement members.     
5.5  Uganda-Kenya, an Illustration of Economic Agreements and Conflict 
The results of my statistical analysis provide some support for my argument that 
economic agreements reduce conflict but little support that they encourage the use of 
sanctions.  Some of the more interesting findings to emerge from my analysis, however, 
concern the role of particular economic forces in the conflict process.  In particular, both 
FDI and interdependence are found to increase conflict between shallow agreement 
                                                           
20
 I also specified a series of granger causality tests with various lag structures.  All tests indicated both 
shallow and deep agreement granger cause MIDs.   
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members while failing to restrain conflict in deep agreements.  To help make sense of 
these findings, I offer a brief example illustrating the potential conflict inducing 
tendencies of trade interdependence and FDI dependence between agreement members.   
In this section, I consider the case of Uganda and Kenya since independence.  Uganda’s 
relationship with Kenya in context of several commercial agreements and more than three 
decades of competition illustrates how economic integration can fall prey to security 
dynamics.  Economic circumstances helped condition tensions between the two which, in 
turn, influenced conflict behavior in four general periods.  In total, Uganda initiated four 
militarized disputes in 1973, 1976, 1987, and 1989, the latter two of which were fatal.  
All four disputes occurred during periods of integration, while periods without economic 
agreements did not witness conflict initiation.    
My intention in this section is not necessarily to offer a detailed, systematic case 
study analysis of my theory.  I am instead interested in leveraging the advantages of 
qualitative research in identifying and fleshing-out causal processes as a complement to 
my statistical analysis (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004).  Indeed, given the somewhat 
counterintuitive findings in my statistical models, this example can serve as both an 
illustration of how causal mechanisms work and a “sanity check” of sort ensuring the 
processes my models suggest are actually plausible (Granato and Scioli 2004; Bennett 
and Elman 2006; 2007).  In addition, given my theory and portions of results specifically 
reference non-events (i.e., the absence of conflict), this qualitative assessment can help 
highlight some the causal processes quantitative techniques may not capture (Maoz 
2002).   
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Consequently, in this section, I use process tracing techniques to help illuminate 
the underlying mechanisms of conflict and subsequent “story” inherent in the quantitative 
models.  This approach has particular advantages.  By connecting pieces of the policy 
process across time, process tracing can more easily identify the reasons for outcomes 
and non-outcomes critical to my theory (Tarrow 2004, 173-174).  Furthermore, by 
inherently analyzing a broad temporal domain, process tracing is possible and effective in 
analyzing a single dyadic interaction.  In turn, I select the Uganda-Kenya case primarily 
because it exhibits extensive variation in both the dependent and independent variables of 
military force and economic agreements respectively.  Given my approach and intentions, 
I believe this illustration a useful component of my analysis and subsequent theoretical 
implications. 
5.4.1  Rivalry Development and the East African Community (1967-1977) 
Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania operated semi-autonomously while under British 
Colonial rule and achieved independence as separate states in the 1960s.   Strong, well-
grounded economic and institutional ties, including a customs union, developed during 
the colonial era that carried over after interdependence.  The region’s first attempt at 
economic integration as independent states was the East African Community (EAC), 
initially called the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO), and lasted 
from 1961 to 1977.  The EAC sought deeper integration than achieved under colonialism 
by way of a common market that achieved the relatively free movement of labor and 
capital (Gladden 1963).  In addition, it created a robust administrative network to manage 
common assets and economic coordination between the states.  The heads of government 
for each state shared membership in the East African Central Assembly, which served as 
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the highest authority in the organization.  Shared services included transportation 
(notably rail and air), communication, and income taxation (Gladden 1963).  Common 
assets accounted for 21,000 jobs and 8% of the region’s GDP (Nye 1963).   
 Simultaneous with early economic integration was the development of security 
concerns between Uganda and Kenya.  First, tensions developed as Ugandan leadership 
turned increasingly nationalist and radical after independence.  Growth in the military’s 
influence under Milton Obote and his decision to restrict, then ban, Kenyan workers from 
Uganda peaked concern in the mid-1960s (Mutibwa 1992, 67).  Second, ideological 
differences emerged as Kenya developed a relatively open capitalist system while 
Uganda tended towards more socialist policies.  Finally, instability in Uganda allowed for 
the continuation of security concerns through subsequent decades.  Radicalization of 
Ugandan policy notably heightened after Idi Amin gained power in the 1970s.  Strategic 
rivalry persisted in the 1980s due in large part to instability in Uganda fueling suspicion 
of Kenyan influence in the region and numerous incidences of conflict (Byrnes 1990).   
In addition to political issues, economic integration contributed to deteriorating 
relations between Uganda and Kenya under the EAC.  Although significant cooperation 
was achieved, Kenya accrued disproportionate gains due in part to the agreement.  Kenya 
possessed the majority of manufacturing capacity in the region.  The agreed upon 
common external tariffs, erected to spur industrial development region-wide, primarily 
benefited Kenyan firms (Nye 1963; Stock 2004, 445).  One way in which this advantage 
manifested was intense commercial competition.  Figure 5.4 sketches the economic 
relationship between Uganda and Kenya from 1970 to 2000.  The top panel plots trade 
dependence (bilateral trade as a share of GDP) while the bottom plots FDI dependence 
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(total inward FDI).  Bilateral trade over time constitutes a significant portion of the 
economies of both states.  Furthermore, the relationship is relatively symmetric for most 
of the time period, save for a period between 1978 and 1984 which I will discuss.  Kenya 
also attracted the majority of foreign investment in the region due to both its more 
developed industry and port access (Nye 1963; Stock 2004).  Until the 1990s, Uganda 
oscillated between years of very modest inflows and occasional outflows in absolute 
terms and relative to GDP.  Kenya, on the other hand, maintained robust capital inflows, 
particularly compared to Uganda.  Perhaps most importantly, however, is that Uganda 
and Tanzania perceived their economic relationship with Kenya as highly competitive 
and zero-sum.  Beliefs that Kenya’s success came at the cost of Uganda and Tanzania 
were the norm in both states (Fellows 1966).  One Tanzanian official stated “we do not 
appreciate our people being exploited for the benefit of industries in Kenya” (Quoted in 
Nye 1963, 486).   
At several points in time the Uganda-Kenya rivalry erupted into bouts of deadly 
militarized conflict, all initiated by Uganda, stemming in part from tenuous economic 
relations.21  Outbreaks of violence during the 1970s were aided by perceptions of 
economic dependency and the proliferation of contentious issues.  Leading to the first set 
of conflicts in the 1970s, it is clear that Uganda was simultaneous concerned with their 
economic position vis-à-vis Kenya and constrained by membership in the EAC.  Uganda 
embarked on a series of self-sufficiency programs in the late 1960s designed to wean the 
economy of Kenya dependence.  On January 27, 1967, The New York Times documented 
extensive Ugandan policy changes promoting foreign investment, diversifying exports, 
                                                           
21
 Between 1970 and 2004, Kenya initiated three militarized conflicts against Uganda (1975, 1995, and 
1997).  None of the conflicts initiated by Kenya resulted in fatalities.   
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and stemming the tide of imports without upsetting the tenets of the EAC.  Membership 
in the EAC, however, prevented the government from raising tariff barriers to address 
strategic concerns.  Uganda’s trade balance with Kenya deteriorated further during the 
1970s as Amin’s policies wreaked havoc on industry (Kasozi 1994).  Tensions further 
escalated in 1972-1973 when Amin vetoed a 1972 financing bill for EAC common 
services, effectively putting them on life-support and challenging legitimacy of EAC 
administrative bodies (Mohr 1972).  The following year, Uganda again challenged 
several common services, including the common tax regime and the harbor commission 
and the EAC (Shilling 2005, 378).   
Relations reached a low in 1973 partially as a result of economic tensions 
between the two states.  Despite efforts at self-sufficiency, Ugandan competition with 
Kenya businesses increased.  The deterioration of Ugandan industry both opened the door 
to Kenyan exports and afforded them additional leverage in service negotiations 
(Jorgensen 1981, 297-298).  Imports from Kenya increased 8% and 49% in 1972 and 
1973 respectively while exports to Kenya decreased 10% and 38%.  Kenya was also able 
to negotiate advantageous terms for the transport of goods as a result of Ugandan 
economic weakness (Kasozi 1994, 120).  Then, as noted in the New York Times of 
February 4, 1973, Kenya suspended shipments of dairy products to Uganda in retaliation 
for the latter party’s refusal to make payments on previous Kenyan exports.  Uganda, in 
turn, accused Kenya of exploiting common institutions – notably railroads and harbors – 
for their own gain (Shilling 2005, 378).  Uganda’s vulnerability combined with long-
standing security concerns and fears that Kenya sought to destabilize Uganda to further 
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increase tension.  Ultimately, in context these issues, Uganda threatened Kenya with 
military force as relations reached new lows.   
Relations continued to deteriorate under Amin leading to military action and the 
dissolution of the EAC.  Although Uganda’s trade dependency on Kenya lessened in 
1975, it grew again in 1976 as imports surged to record highs.  Disagreements continued 
over the distribution of commonly administered assets in the organization.  During this 
period, Uganda refused to remit payments to Kenya for the administration of the common 
railway and airline and once again accused Kenya of abusing the EAC (Hughes 1977; 
Shilling 2005).  Under the strain of the economic situation, Amin laid claim to portions of 
Kenya and hinted at claiming it by force in February of 1976 (Hughes 1977; Lewis 
1976).  The Kenyan government responded with a series of administrative measures that 
included demanding cash payments for the transit of all Uganda goods and a fuel 
embargo (Darnton 1976).  Uganda retaliated by cutting electricity supplies to Kenya 
affecting between 10% and 25% of the population (Hughes 1977; Kasozi 1994, 38).  
Uganda ultimately launched a series of cross-border raids into Kenyan territory both in 
retaliation and as a signal to domestic constituencies of the threat Kenyan posed (Kasozi 
1994, 38-39; US State Department 1976).  The EAC effectively ceased functioning in 
1977 as a result of the economic and political turmoil (Hughes 1977; Stock 2004).  
5.4.2  Ugandan Instability and Interregnum in Integration (1978-1982) 
The interregnum between the dissolution of the EAC and establishment of the 
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa in 1982 did not witness 
militarized conflict between Kenya and Uganda.  This period of relative calm in the 
rivalry is likely attributable to several factors.  First, Tanzania surpassed Kenya as 
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Uganda’s primary security concern in the late 1970s as the two states waged war.  An 
unintended consequence of the conflict was a lull in Uganda’s otherwise tense 
relationship with Kenya.  Second, the removal of Amin from power in 1979 ushered in a 
period of instability as government forces battled the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) for power from 1981 until the latter party prevailed in 1985 (Byrnes 1990).  
Domestic security concerns preoccupied the interest of Ugandan government during this 
period.   
Two economic factors likely played into the lull in relations as well.  First, the 
dissolution of the EAC removed some contentious issues from the table, including 
charges that Kenya manipulated institutions for its own benefit.  Second, the Ugandan 
economy essentially collapsed from years of mismanagement and political instability 
(Kasozi 1994).  As a consequence, the nature of the Uganda-Kenya trade tie changed as 
well.  Ugandan trade dependence on Kenya spiked sharply during this period.  This 
effectively created an asymmetric relationship where Uganda clearly dependent more on 
Kenya than Kenya on Uganda.  In the first three years after the collapse of the EAC 
(1978 – 1980), exports to Kenya, overwhelmingly comprised of coffee, tea, and tobacco, 
experienced a surge to an average of $3.6 million from a low of $1.0 million in 1977 
(Morrissey and Rudaheranwa 1998).  Likewise, economic reform in Uganda, part of 
which included commitments to a new economic agreement, revived imports that 
particularly benefited Kenyan comparative advantages in manufactured goods and 
transportation (Musila 2004).   
5.4.3  Renewed Tensions and the New Wave of Integration (1983-1989) 
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 Economic cooperation revived six years after the collapse of the EAC in form of 
the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA-ESA).  Created in 
1982, the agreement brought Uganda, Kenya, and over a dozen other African states 
together in a loose-fitting trade agreement.  Despite its modest goals of reducing, not 
eliminating, trade barriers, the agreement created a relatively elaborate administrative 
structure.  Shared institutions created by the agreement include a payments clearing 
house (1984), a development bank (1985), an association of commercial banks (1987), 
and provisions for meetings of political elites (Asante 1997, 51-55).  In 1994, the PTA-
ESA was recast as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 
accordance with goals of deeper integration.   
Disparate patterns of trade emerge in the new organization as Uganda and Kenya 
relied on intra-agreement trade to differing degrees.  Figure 5.5 plots the total intra-
agreement trade (i.e., total trade with other agreement members) for the two states.  Not 
surprisingly given its advantageous economic and geographic position, Kenya relied on 
economic agreements much more heavily than Uganda for trade and economic activity.  
During the period of the PTA-ESA, Kenya averaged 3.11% of its GDP in trade with other 
agreement members compared to 0.27% for Uganda.  Intra-agreement trade, therefore, 
appear to be a much stronger force in Kenya than Uganda.   
Conflict between Uganda and Kenya flared again in the late-1980s in part from 
economic tensions.  Particularly important during this period were concerns about 
relative gains and the influence of domestic constituencies.  Although the PTA-ESA 
involved more players and called for less integration than the EAC, Kenya clearly 
emerged as one of the central states in the agreement (Asante 1997, 49).  Distribution of 
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gains from the preferential trade area arose once again as an important issue between 
Uganda and Kenya and one of the defining elements of agreement (Asante 1997, 71; 
Rule 1984).  Uganda responded with attempts to develop alternative trading partners, 
including deals with Libya exchanging goods for oil, but remained highly competitive 
with Kenya for the majority of trade goods (Harden 1987b).   
Tensions boiled over in 1987 sparked in part by conflict over coffee transport.  In 
the 1980s, coffee was the largest foreign exchange earner for Uganda and comprised the 
majority of its exports (Buckoke 1988; Morrissey and Rudaheranwa 1998).  Shipments of 
coffee, furthermore, flowed almost exclusively through the port of Mombasa in Kenya.  
Consequently, it was both of supreme strategic importance for Uganda and vulnerable to 
disruptions.  The strategic importance of coffee also afforded those connected with the 
industry strong influence in the Ugandan government (Forrest 1988, 426).  In 1987, the 
key entity responsible for purchasing wholesale coffee in Uganda, he Coffee Marketing 
Board (CMB), encouraged the government to reconsider current shipping arrangements.  
The CMB and government agreed, first, that transit by road to Mombasa was costlier than 
rail and, second, diverting some cargo to Dar el Salaam in Tanzania might defray costs 
(Byrnes 1990; Kasozi 1994).  Uganda thus moved away from road transport through 
Kenya for coffee shipments by imposing duties of Kenya trucks (Buckoke 1988).   
Uganda’s move clearly countered Kenyan interests.  Trucking lobbies in Kenya, 
being well connected with the government, lobbied for retaliation over the lost business 
(Buckoke 1988; Kasozi 1994).  In an effort to coerce Uganda into using road transport, 
the government severed communication lines, halted all shipments out of Uganda, and 
cut fuel supplies (Harden 1987b; Kasozi 1994).  Uganda, once again suspended power 
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supplies to Kenya (Buckoke 1988).  Broader security issues enveloped the trade issue 
with both states accusing the other of attempting to destabilize the government and 
harboring rebel groups (Harden 1987a).  With little ability to coerce the stronger Kenya 
economically, Uganda resorted to militarized conflict.  Initially, troops harassed Kenyan 
truck drivers which resulted in at least eight killings on Ugandan soil (Harden 1987b).  
Uganda troops then launched raids into Kenya for three days in December, 1987, 
resulting in numerous fatalities, as both states prepared for war (Harden 1987a; Rule 
1987).  The states reached a tenuous agreement in general favor of Uganda just short of 
war that allowed Uganda to ship coffee via rail to Mombasa (Byrnes 1990; Kasozi 1994).  
Despite the agreement, acrimonious relations between the rivals continued through 1989 
as economic and security issues clashed repeatedly.  Sporadic fighting occurred that year 
on the border in response to a Ugandan attack on Kenyan fishing vessels in Lake Victoria 
and harassment of Ugandan vehicles shipping goods through Kenya (Byrnes 1990; 
Kasozi 1994).   
5.4.4  Easing Tensions and Economic Convergence (1990-1997) 
 Relations improved notably during the 1990s leading to the effective end of 
heightened tensions.  Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania also agreed to pursue deeper 
economic integration and revitalized the East African Community in 1994.  Several 
factors led to this turn of events.  First, despite Ugandan attempts to the contrary, its 
dependence on Kenya grew in the 1990s.  Indeed, trade asymmetry between Uganda and 
Kenya averaged 2.3% in the decade of the 1990s.  This is more than double any other 
period save for the early 1980s.  In other words, Uganda grew increasingly dependent 
Kenya without the corresponding dependence of the latter.  Second, relative levels of FDI 
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shifted from Kenyan to Ugandan favor.  FDI inflows into Uganda and Kenya totaled 
$720 million and $210 million respectively during the 1990s, a mirror image of the 
previous two decades.  More important than absolute flows of FDI, however, is the nature 
of FDI composition shifted.  Uganda shifted strategies away from attempts to lure export-
oriented manufacturing and instead courted manufactures for the local market, export 
agriculture, and food processing (UIA 2013; Riddervold 2011).  Kenyan FDI was 
comprised of export-oriented manufactures (such as textiles and apparel), services (call 
centers), and tourism (MIGA 2007).  Hence, FDI competition diminished during this 
period despite increases in total inward FDI. Indeed, FDI flows may have increased 
precisely because competition gave way to Uganda seeking comparative advantages.  
Finally, acutely aware of the possibility of economic domination and vulnerability, the 
revitalized East African Community treaty stresses the equitable distribution of gains as 
one of the core objectives and principles of the community.  Per the new treaty, articles 
6e, 6f, and 7f clearly state the objective of the EAC as the “equitable distribution of 
benefits” and “co-operation for mutual benefit.”  
5.4.5  Summary of Trends in the Uganda-Kenya Relationship 
Uganda and Kenya have experienced a tumultuous relationship since achieving 
independence in the 1960s.  Some of these tensions are the result of economic relations 
between the two.  By way of summary, consider the influence of economic factors on 
conflict between the two states.  First, as Figure 5.4 aptly displays, periods of conflict 
where associated with relatively symmetric trade relationships and high degrees of 
competition between the two.  The average asymmetry score for the year prior to and 
including MIDs between Uganda and Kenya is 0.94%.  Periods of asymmetry, however, 
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are associated with the absence of conflict.  Indeed, the average asymmetry score 
excluding years prior to and including MIDs is 2.44%.  Consequently, it is during periods 
when trade dependence is relatively high and asymmetry relatively low that conflict 
manifested.  It is difficult to pinpoint situations where Uganda or Kenya altered their 
behavior because of asymmetry or symmetry specifically.  To be sure, however, Uganda 
viewed integration with Kenya as a zero- or even negative-sum game (Hazlewood 1985, 
184).  Statements by Ugandan leaders highlighted through this illustration suggest they 
were more concerned with their absolute dependence (a factor captured by my trade 
interdependence variable) than their relative dependence (a factor captured by the 
asymmetry variable) on Kenya.  The distinction is subtle but important.  Uganda leaders 
were concerned about their vulnerabilities more than the possibility Kenya was 
mobilizing gains from trade into military advantages.  Furthermore, domestic 
constituencies with seemingly complementary aims – notably coffee in Uganda and 
trucking in Kenya – aided in the securitization of economic issues and enabled violent 
responses during the 1980s.   This suggests dependence and not asymmetry drove 
Ugandan aggression. 
Second, FDI dependence appears to be an important component of conflict 
between Uganda and Kenya.  Kenya attracted the majority of high-quality FDI for the 
first three decades after interdependence.  This statistic belies the fact that Uganda 
actively and aggressively courted manufacturing and export-oriented FDI after 
independence as a means to counter Kenyan advantages in the EAC.  Consequently, 
competition between the two for investment was relatively intensive if lopsided.  Only 
when Uganda shifted strategies to attract industries for which it possessed comparative 
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advantages did tensions ease.  FDI was also a factor for Ugandans in what they perceived 
as a dependent economic relationship.  FDI into Kenyan was indicative of their 
manufacturing and services prowess.  In other words, FDI into Kenya in no small part 
generated exports to Uganda, thereby perpetuating the dependent relationship. 
Third, intra-agreement trade may also have played a role in the conflict dynamic 
of Uganda and Kenya.  Overall, as Figure 5.5 indicates, Kenya relied to a much greater 
extent on the economic agreement for trade than did Uganda.  To the extent intra-
agreement trade constrains state behavior, as my statistical models indicate, Kenya is the 
party more likely to be influenced.  It is therefore interesting to note that Uganda initiated 
nearly all conflicts between the two states.  This is of course correlation and not 
causation, and it is difficult to point to instances of non-action with attribution to 
particular factors, but it is suggestive of underlying economic and political processes.   
Finally, this illustration provides some insight into the comparative use of 
economic and military coercion.  It is debatable whether the economic measures 
employed by either Kenya or Uganda in disputes – such as cutting power or stopping 
payments – truly meet the definition of “economic sanctions.”  After all, it is not clear 
what either party intended to achieve in terms of policy outcomes.  Indeed, several of the 
measures appear purely commercial in scope.  However, both states’ attempts at using 
economic tools failed to prevent escalating the conflict.  The ineffectiveness of economic 
tools in some ways forced Uganda to escalate conflicts to violence or the threat thereof to 
achieve palatable outcomes.   While this does not provide satisfactory evidence 
concerning the avoidance of sanctions by agreement members, it is suggestive of broader 
processes at work that might provide avenues for future study.   
 163 
 
Overall, this example is presented not necessarily as evidence supporting my 
statistical results so much as an illustration for the plausibility of several interesting 
findings in my analysis.  It is difficult to believe, on the surface, that FDI and trade flows 
may exacerbate conflict given the bulk of literature finding the just the opposite.  What I 
hope this case has demonstrated is simply the possibility that economic relationships can 
both pacify and enflame tensions between states, particularly those sharing membership 
in economic agreements.    
5.5  Conclusion: Economic Agreements and Interstate Conflict 
My theoretical argument in Chapter 3 draws hypotheses concerning the influence 
of economic agreements on intra-agreement conflict.  The first, reproduced below, 
addresses broad conflict dynamics between states that share membership in an economic 
agreement:  
H1: Economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between member 
states. 
 I evaluate this hypothesis using a large-N statistical analysis of dyad years from 
1970 to 2001.  Ultimately, I find conditional support for this hypothesis.  Shallow and 
deep economic agreements tend to reduce conflict – overall and particularly militarized – 
between states with asymmetric trade relations and high shares of trade with third-party 
agreement members.  In contrast, relatively interdependent and FDI dependent dyads 
tend to experience more conflict, but only if they share membership in a shallow 
economic agreement.  These results are seemingly counterintuitive given the broader 
literature on interdependence and conflict.  To illustrate the plausibility of FDI and 
interdependence leading to conflict, however, I provide an example using relations 
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between Uganda and Kenya.  The illustration shows that the economic relations I model 
did indeed influence conflict behavior in this particular case.  While this example may 
fall short of a systematic case study, it does demonstrate the plausibility of my findings.   
 The remaining three hypotheses that are the topic of this chapter concern the 
substitution of economic sanctions for military force: 
H3: Less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use 
economic sanctions against other members as a tool of coercion.   
H4: More economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use 
military force against other members as a tool of coercion.   
H5: Symmetrically dependent agreement members are less likely to use military 
force against other members as a tool of coercion than asymmetrically dependent 
members.   
 Ultimately I find little to no support for these hypotheses.  I first analyzed the 
frequency with which shallow and deep agreement members use both economic sanctions 
and military force.  Shallow agreement members use sanctions are much lower raters than 
no agreement dyads.  Furthermore, an economic sanction has yet to occur between two 
states in a deep economic agreement.  Consequently, substitution does not appear to be 
taking place between agreement members.  Likewise, symmetrical relationships between 
agreement members appear to be the most prone to militarized conflict.  These findings 
may be a consequence of the structure of economic agreements, power asymmetries, or 
alternative conflict resolution mechanisms.  Additional theoretical and empirical work is 
needed to fully understand these findings.   
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Table 5.1: Shallow Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict 
 
  
Basic Logit Imputed Logit 
Shallow Agreements         
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Shallow Agreement -14.935*** 2.710     -2.450 2.142 
Shallow*Asymmetry -13.14*** 3.359 -9.599*** 2.966 
Shallow *Interdependence   25.676* 10.194      4.936 9.356 
Shallow *FDI 14.902*** 2.667      2.734 2.096 
Intra-Agreement Trade -8.842*** 1.882     -2.190 1.963 
Asymmetry      2.627** 0.986      2.466 1.315 
Interdependence   -17.307** 6.251     -7.997 8.174 
FDI -5.126*** 0.921      0.135 0.513 
Alliance    0.243* 0.115      0.193 0.107 
Contiguity 3.111*** 0.130 3.018*** 0.109 
Capabilities 0.125*** 0.038 0.205*** 0.029 
Democracy -0.053*** 0.010 -0.076*** 0.008 
GDP 0.183*** 0.040 0.280*** 0.035 
IGOs 0.018*** 0.005          0.013** 0.004 
Major Power 1.366*** 0.156          1.276** 0.123 
WTO -0.126 0.109      0.164 0.099 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)   -9.41 15.676      7.107 5.416 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity) 34.655*** 8.185 20.719*** 6.342 
Constant -3.715*** 1.132 -11.001*** 0.977 
N 182,708 347,734 
λ
2
 3,811.54*** ------------- 
Pseudo-R2 0.3457 ------------- 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2752.54 ------------- 
The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID).  Shallow agreements 
include Partial scope agreements (PSAs) and free trade areas (FTAs) Temporal control variables (peace 
years3) omitted for space.  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 5.2: Deep Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict 
 
  
Basic Logit Imputed Logit 
Deep Agreements         
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement -3.827 3.870    0.640 2.874 
Agreement*Asymmetry   -56.429** 21.632 -13.309 14.792 
Agreement*Interdependence   6.802 16.515 -22.455 19.271 
Agreement*FDI       4.020 3.783    0.270 2.820 
Intra-Agreement Trade      -4.384* 2.061 -12.211*** 5.038 
Asymmetry       1.494 1.368    2.642 1.401 
Interdependence  -17.557** 6.187   -9.345 8.972 
FDI       0.208 2.626    0.169 0.522 
Alliance  0.249* 0.115    0.166 0.131 
Contiguity   3.121*** 0.130 3.042*** 0.122 
Capabilities 0.126*** 0.038 0.206*** 0.032 
Democracy -0.052*** 0.010 -0.072*** 0.009 
GDP 0.175*** 0.042 0.306*** 0.038 
IGOs 0.019*** 0.005       0.014** 0.005 
Major Power 1.329*** 0.159 1.152*** 0.134 
WTO     -0.117 0.109     0.141 0.113 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)     -9.773 15.727    7.924 5.450 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity) 35.200*** 8.036 23.121*** 6.530 
Constant -8.934*** 2.739 -11.712*** 1.065 
N 182,708 332,376 
λ
2
 
3,884.23*** ------------- 
Pseudo-R2 0.342 ------------- 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2768.06 ------------- 
The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID).  Deep agreements 
include customs unions (CUs), common markets (CMs), and economic unions (EUs).  Temporal control 
variables (peace years3) omitted for space.  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 5.3: Selection Model Results of Intra-Agreement Conflict 
 
  Shallow Agreements Deep Agreements 
Militarized Interstate Disputes  
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Intra-Agreement Trade  -2.126* 0.892     -4.851* 2.270 
Asymmetry    -4.019** 1.546 -27.293** 10.661 
Interdependence  6.908 4.270    10.651 9.269 
FDI       3.144*** 0.955    -0.913 2.317 
Alliance 0.013 0.121     -0.444* 0.212 
Contiguity      1.010*** 0.173 ---- ---- 
Capabilities        -0.046 0.042    0.249 0.158 
Democracy        -0.002 0.008       0.043* 0.021 
GDP 0.029 0.035    -0.031 0.073 
IGOs 0.002 0.005    -0.005 0.010 
Major Power  0.363* 0.188 ---- ---- 
WTO -0.209* 0.093     -0.506* 0.240 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)       -12.205 17.802    -5.769 17.912 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity) 13.438* 6.980     7.991 22.866 
Constant     -5.210*** 1.407     2.964 2.719 
Formation of an Economic Agreement  
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Asymmetry     -0.011 0.181    -0.735** 0.251 
Interdependence        -2.340** 0.911 3.652*** 0.786 
FDI     -0.064 0.158   -0.930* 0.401 
Affinity 0.346*** 0.027 0.840*** 0.073 
Alliance 0.407*** 0.015 0.562*** 0.025 
Contiguity -0.333*** 0.024 0.325*** 0.041 
Democracy      0.001 0.001 0.016*** 0.002 
Distance -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
GDP       -0.014* 0.006 0.040*** 0.010 
Language 0.302*** 0.015 0.143*** 0.027 
Major Power 0.122*** 0.026 0.970*** 0.048 
Population 0.091*** 0.007 -0.388*** 0.016 
Total Dyadic MIDs     -0.004 0.005  0.017 0.009 
WTO 0.342*** 0.012 1.163*** 0.040 
Constant -1.877*** 0.217 2.152*** 0.491 
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Table 5.3: Continued 
 
N 196,017 197,424 
Censored 182,782 194,991 
Uncensored 13,235 2,433 
λ
2
 266.56*** 193.28*** 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -30986.2 -6646.41 
ρ -0.350 -0.542** 
The dependent variable is Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) initiation.  The selection criterion is 
joint membership in either a shallow or deep economic agreement.  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Figure 5.1: Intra-Agreement Conflict 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXTRA-AGREEMENT CONFLICT 
The previous chapter evaluates the influence of economic agreements on conflict 
when two states share membership in the same agreement.  In this chapter, I consider the 
influence of agreements on member state relations with the external world.  Economic 
agreements do not exist in a vacuum.  Rather, they can affect trade relationships between 
members and non-members of agreements as profoundly as intra-agreement, member-to-
member relationships.  First, lowering trade barriers may reduce the salience of a member 
state’s trade ties with the external world by simply increasing overall trade between 
agreement members.  By relying more heavily on other agreement partners for markets 
and resources, agreement members are less connected to states outside the agreement.  
Second, economic agreements may actually generate trade diversion, a process where 
increased intra-agreement trade comes at the expense of trade with the external world.  
This not only reduces the members’ salience of external trade ties, but also can generate 
relative gains for members and losses for non-members.   
The overall impact of these forces on conflict, I argue, is to increase tensions and 
encourage disputes.  Reducing the salience of trade ties lowers the cost of conflict 
between members and non-members of agreements.  The process of trade diversion, 
furthermore, encourages states to view trade relations in terms of relative gains and 
losses.  As diversion represents a direct relative gain to members and loss to non-
members, it likely increases perceptions of dependence and strategic vulnerability.  
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Consequently, Hypothesis 2 holds that economic agreements increase conflict between 
members and non-members of agreements.  In addition to the overall use of conflict, I 
also argue the dynamics of agreements encourage a shift in coercive strategies away from 
economic to military measures.  Reduced interdependence renders sanctions less 
effective between members and non-members of agreements, thereby discouraging their 
use as tools to resolve disputes.  Given this, Hypothesis 6 states that economic 
agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between members and non-
members.   
This chapter thus builds on my previous empirical tests using non-directed dyads 
from 1970 to 2001 with the procedures and data outlined in the previous chapter.  Section 
1 of this chapter presents the results of my logit, bivariate probit, and imputed logit 
models and substantive interpretations.   Following this, in the second section, I outline 
and conduct a statistical test using a strategic probit estimation that more directly tests my 
formal model.  Ultimately, the results of these statistical tests suggest dyads where two 
states are in different economic agreements (opposing agreement dyads) are more 
sensitive to economic conditions than dyads without any agreements.  In particular, 
extreme values of trade diversion and trade creation tend to reduce conflict.  Dyads that 
have a relatively neutral impact with respect to diversion, however, appear the most 
conflict prone with respect to military force.  The final section of this chapter discusses 
the results with respect to the theory I develop in Chapter 3.   
6.1  Statistical Results 
Recall that Chapter 4 describes in detail the procedure I use for statistically 
analyzing conflict between members and non-members of agreements.  To briefly recap, 
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however, this section uses data covering the period 1970 to 2001 for all non-directed 
dyads.  My dependent variables are the onset of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) or 
threat or imposition of an economic sanction in a given year.  I employ several primary 
explanatory variables capturing agreement structures and associated economic 
relationships.  The two agreement types I model are one agreement dyads, where only 
one state in the dyad is a member of an agreement, and opposing agreement dyads, where 
both states in the dyad are in different economic agreements.   Dyads without any 
economic agreements serve as a baseline for comparison.  States that share membership 
in an economic agreement are excluded from this analysis.   
I also use a series of economic variables to more fully capture commercial 
relationships between members and non-members.  In addition to trade interdependence 
and trade asymmetry variables, which were utilized in the previous chapter, I add a 
measure of trade diversion.  To calculate trade diversion, I specified a gravity model of 
trade to estimate a baseline value of trade between states.  Trade diversion due to 
economic agreements is calculated as the difference between the predicted values of the 
gravity model and observed trade such that higher values indicate trade diversion.  All 
economic variables are interacted with the aforementioned one agreement and opposing 
agreement variables.  I use several different statistical tests to evaluate my hypothesis, 
including basic logit (with Murphy-Topel corrections to account for uncertainty in the 
trade diversion estimates), imputed logit, and bivariate probit.22     
                                                           
22
 I also performed several robustness checks of the results presented here.  These include rare-events logit 
accounting for the rarity of observed sanctions/MIDs, models with transformations of primary variables, 
alternative specifications of the primary variables, simultaneous equation models accounting for 
endogeneity, models with only politically relevant dyads, heckman selection models to account for 
selection into different economic agreements, and the use of only fatal MIDs.  The results are very similar 
to those presented here with the exception of fatal MIDs, which are discussed in the appendix.   
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6.1.1  Statistical Results – Basic Logit and Bivariate Probit 
Table 6.1 contains the results of the logit models estimating the influence of one 
agreement dyads on MID initiation between member and non-members.  In this section, I 
focus my attention to the results of the basic logit and bivariate probit models.  I will 
return to the imputed logit results, appropriateness of the bivariate probit, and a 
comparison of the three models in the next section.  In Table 6.1, note first that the results 
of the basic logit and bivariate probit are nearly identical in sign and significance.  
Overall, the results indicate the presence of only one economic agreement in a dyad has 
little influence on the initiation of a MID.  None of the terms interacting one agreement 
dyads with various economic variables achieve statistical significance at conventional 
levels.  In contrast, the standalone, non-interacted interdependence variable is negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that dyads without any economic agreements 
experience less militarized conflict as trade between them increases.  Hence, while dyads 
with one agreement may not increase conflict between members and non-members, they 
do appear to arrest the pacifying influence of interdependence on militarized conflict.  
The results of the trade diversion variables indicate a polynomial relationship in dyads 
without an economic agreement.  As trade diversion increases, the likelihood of MID 
initiation also increases.  At some point, however, the influence of trade diversion 
reverses and decreases the likelihood of MID initiation.  The least conflict prone dyads 
with respect to diversion, consequently, experience either high trade creation or high 
trade diversion.  Again, the lack of significance in the interacted variables indicates one 
agreement dyads short-circuit the influence of trade diversion.   
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Table 6.2 estimates the influence of one agreement dyads on economic sanctions.  
Again note the basic logit and bivariate probit models, with the exception of 
interdependence, are generally similar in sign and significance.  Unlike the MIDs model, 
however, one agreement dyads appear to influence the threat or imposition of economic 
sanctions.  First, the agreement variable, which captures dyads where only one state is in 
an agreement, is negative and statistically significant.  The fact that only one state is in a 
dyad reduces the likelihood of an economic sanction occurring, suggesting intangible 
aspects of this institutional arrangement influence sanctions behavior.  Of my primary 
explanatory variables, the only interaction terms to achieve statistical significance in both 
models are the trade diversion variables.  The simple trade diversion variable is positive 
while the polynomial term is negative, again indicating a curvilinear relationship.  The 
one agreement dyads least likely to experience sanctions, therefore, are again at high 
levels of trade creation or high levels of trade diversion.  It is important to note the 
interaction between one agreement dyads and interdependence is positive and significant 
in the bivariate probit model.  Dyads with one agreement are more likely to experience an 
economic sanction as interdependence between states increases.   
Of the non-interacted economic variables, only asymmetry is statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, it is positive, indicating dyads without an economic agreement 
are more likely to experience an economic sanction.  Economic agreements do therefore 
appear to be influencing economic sanctions.  On one hand, it is only when one state is in 
an agreement does trade diversion affect economic sanctions.  On the other, one 
agreement dyads disrupt the influence of trade asymmetry.  Hence, one agreement dyads 
appear to influence interstate conflict by interrupting some pacifying mechanisms with 
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respect to MID initiation and directly impacting the use of economic sanctions.  The 
combined results of the MIDs and sanctions models suggest some limited support for 
Hypothesis 6, as dyads with one agreement are neutral on the former and may decrease 
the use of the latter. 
Turning to opposing agreement dyads, where both states in the dyad are in 
different economic agreements, Table 6.3 includes the results of MID initiation.  The 
results of the basic logit and bivariate probit models, with the expectation of the 
interaction between opposing agreements and interdependence, are very similar.  First, 
the opposing agreement variable which indicates simply that both states are in different 
agreements is negative and significant.  With all other factors held constant, opposing 
agreement dyads are less likely to engage in militarized conflict.  Second, the trade 
diversion variables achieve statistical significance.  As with prior models, the simple 
trade diversion variable is positive while the polynomial term is negative, again 
indicating a curvilinear relationship.  The opposing agreement dyads least likely to 
experience MIDs, therefore, are again at high levels of trade creation or high levels of 
trade diversion.  Finally, the interaction between opposing agreements and 
interdependence is negative and significant, indicating opposing agreement dyads 
experience fewer MIDs as trade interdependence increases.   
The results of the non-interacted economic variables provide some interesting 
insight into the dynamics of economic agreements as well.  Unlike the one agreement 
model, where the interacted and non-interacted variables differed in significance, the 
non-interacted interdependence and trade diversion variables are of similar sign and 
significance as their interactions with opposing agreements.  The non-interacted 
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interdependence variable is negative and significant such that dyads without an 
agreement experience less conflict as trade interdependence grows.  Trade diversion is 
positive and significant on the simple variable and negative and significant on the 
polynomial term.  Hence, while one agreement dyads appear to arrest the influence of 
economic factors between states, opposing agreement dyads appear to heighten the 
influence of these variables with respect to MID initiation.   
Consider finally Table 6.4 showing the influence of opposing agreements on 
economic sanctions.  Here again the results of the basic logit and bivariate probit models 
are nearly identical.  Interestingly, none of my primary explanatory variables achieve 
statistical significance.  Indeed, the only economic variable that influences economic 
sanctions in the opposing agreement model is the standalone asymmetry variable.  The 
likelihood of experiencing an economic sanction increases in tandem with trade 
asymmetry.  Consequently, while asymmetry increases the use of sanctions in dyads 
without an agreement, no such influence takes place in opposing agreement dyads.  These 
results provide some limited support for Hypothesis 6, given opposing agreements have a 
neutral effect on sanctions and may increase MID initation. 
Before turning to an evaluation of the logit, bivariate probit, and imputed models, 
consider the control variables across the logit and bivariate probit specifications.  Overall, 
there is general agreement between the four models estimating MID initiation.  
Contiguity and major power status, which capture opportunities for conflict, are positive 
and significant all models (basic and imputed logit, one and opposing agreements).  This 
is unsurprising given the immediate and far-reaching political interests of contiguous 
states and major powers respectively.  Power parity also appears to increase the 
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probability of conflict, as only states with valid opportunities to prevail in conflict are 
likely to risk it.  GDP and IGO membership are also positive and significant such that 
militarized conflict increases when these variables also increase.  GDP is relatively 
intuitive, as larger economies are likely better able to project power.  IGO membership is 
somewhat of a puzzle, however.  One possibility is that IGOs may simply create or 
highlight issues over which states have disagreement.  As might be expected, 
democracies are less likely to engage in militarized conflict given the negative and 
significant coefficient.  The spatial lag using contiguity as a connector is positive and 
significant in all but the opposing agreement basic logit model.  The plurality of evidence 
therefore indicates that conflicts are prone to spilling over.  Finally, allies may be more 
likely to engage in militarized conflict, but only according to the basic logit models.  
WTO membership and the spatial lag with alliances fail to achieve statistical 
significance. 
With respect to economic sanctions, general agreement is once again observed, 
albeit with less consistency.  Four variables consistently and positively predict the 
occurrence of economic sanctions –  GDP, major power status, WTO membership, and 
the spatial lag of sanctions based on contiguity.  The first two variables, GDP and major 
powers, again make intuitive sense.  Large economies and major powers have both the 
opportunity and ability to use economic sanctions as tools of coercive policy.  That is, 
they can both afford the cost of sanctions and can reasonably disrupt others’ trade when 
employed.  WTO members are more likely to sanction each other, which is somewhat 
interesting.  The institutional structure of the WTO, it might be argued, discourages the 
use of economic instruments for political aims.  It may also, however, provide a ready-
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made sanction by simply suspending preferential trade status conferred by the WTO.  The 
spatial lag of sanctions is positive and significant, indicating that states are more likely to 
experience sanctions if they are geographically close to other sanctions. 
The remaining variables are less consistent in the sanctions models.  First, IGO 
membership is negative and significant in all but the opposing agreement basic logit 
model.  Combined with the positive coefficients in the MIDs model, this suggests states 
sharing more memberships in IGOs substitute military force for economic sanctions.  
This is somewhat puzzling given the literature on organizations.  One possible 
explanation is the IGOs carried in the IGO variable are more security focused, while my 
agreement variables have siphoned off the influence of economic organizations.  The 
effect of organizations on sanctions might therefore wash out.  Allies are more likely to 
use sanctions, but only in the one agreement model.  In contrast, democracies are less 
likely to use sanctions, but only in the opposing agreement model.  The stakes of disputes 
for allies, even low-level ones that advantage sanctions, might be high enough such that 
low-level conflicts are more likely.  Democracies, on the other hand, may be less likely to 
use sanctions for normative or institutional reasons akin to the democratic peace. 
6.1.2  Imputed Data, Statistical Results, and Model Evaluation 
In the previous chapter I noted differences between logit estimations using 
observed and imputed data with respect to intra-agreement conflict.  The results of this 
chapter dealing with extra-agreement conflict exhibit a similar outcome.  The results of 
the logit model using imputed data, contained in the right two columns of Tables 6.1 
through 6.4, in many ways conflict with the basic logit and bivariate probit models.  In 
total across all models (one/opposing agreements, MIDs/sanctions), there are 36 primary 
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variables of interest, defined as the agreement variable, its interaction terms, and non-
interacted economic variables.  The basic and imputed logit disagree in significance for 
18 (50%) of these variables.  More disconcertingly, perhaps, is that the basic and imputed 
logit also disagree on the sign of 19 (53%) of those variables.  For comparison, there are 
a total of 40 control variable coefficients.  The basic and imputed logit disagree in 
significance for only 10 (25%) of these coefficients, however.  There are only 7 (18%) 
disagreements in terms of sign for the control variables.  Consequently, the majority of 
variation in coefficients between the imputed and observed data is the result of economic 
variables. 
As with the intra-agreement trade model, differences are to be taken seriously 
between the observed and imputed data.  It is interesting that the imputed data reports 
generally similar results for all but the economic variables.  This may reflect two general 
possibilities.  First, imputed data is a more accurate reflection of actual trade patterns than 
only observed data.  If this is indeed the case, the degree of difference between my basic 
and imputed logit models suggests missingness drastically biases results when trade 
and/or FDI measures are included in international relations analyses.   Second, my 
imputed data is highly inaccurate due to my estimation procedures or inherent difficulties 
in estimating trade/FDI data.   
The previous chapter discusses in some detail potential pitfalls with my imputed 
data.  To those comments, all of which apply to the results here, I might add a few points.  
First, the analysis in this chapter may be more sensitive to imputed data given my use of 
the trade diversion variables.  Trade diversion is effectively a constructed measure using 
gravity model estimates of trade.  Imputed trade values are effectively constructed 
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measures using an expanded gravity model.  When creating the imputed dataset for 
statistical analysis, I reconstructed the trade diversion variable using a gravity model 
estimate of imputed trade scores.  Hence, I constructed a measure of trade diversion 
based on a constructed measure of trade.23  The inherent uncertainty in imputation 
estimates combined with the uncertainty of trade diversion may seriously bias this 
measure and subsequent data.  Consequently, my analysis of extra-agreement conflict 
may be more prone to errors in imputed data than the intra-agreement conflict models. 
In considering the overall impact of imputed data in this chapter, the differences 
in results are again to be taken seriously.  My skeptical view of imputed trade data 
nurtured in the previous chapter again applies here.  I still believe it important to provide 
more rather than less analysis in the case that my suspicious of imputed trade data are 
warranted.  Consequently, my empirical analyses will favor the basic over the imputed 
logit for purposes of interpretation and discussion.   
Beyond the differences in analysis using observed and imputed data, the results of 
the basic logit and bivariate probit are very similar.  It is worth noting the ρ statistic for 
the bivariate probit models is statistically significant.  This indicates that residuals from 
the economic sanctions and military force models are correlated.  That is, economic 
sanctions and military force are affected by the same factors and in some fashion jointly 
determined.  In practical terms, however, the results for my primary variables of interest 
are similar enough to suggest the simpler logit specification is preferable. 
6.1.3  Substantive Interpretations 
                                                           
23
 I also created a dataset that excluded trade diversion when creating an imputed dataset.  The results were 
identical to those reported here.  Also, excluding trade diversion from the logit estimates using imputed 
data does not change the results.   
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The substantive impact of economic agreements on conflict between members 
and non-members is based on the basic logit results in Tables 6.1 through 6.4.  In a basic 
sense, the one and opposing agreement results are mirror images, as one agreement dyads 
tend to influence economic sanctions while opposing agreements impact MID initiation.  
Consider first the impact of one agreement dyads on economic sanctions.  Given this is a 
dichotomous variable, I estimate the change in the predicted probability of a sanction by 
shifting the one agreement variable from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables at their 
mean or modal values.  The baseline probability of a sanction is 0.013% for dyads 
without an economic agreement.  For dyads with only one agreement and holding all 
other variables at their mean and modal value, the probability of a sanction decreases a 
modest 8% to a total probability of 0.012%.  For comparison, this is equivalent to 
increasing the number of shared IGO with which states share membership by 3 from 
approximately 29 to 32 in total.   
Figure 6.1 plots the predicted probabilities of an economic sanction based on the 
trade diversion variable, as it is the only statistically significant primary explanatory 
variable in my one agreement models.  These out-of-sample probabilities were calculated 
by manipulating the variable of interest while holding all other variables at their mean or 
modal values.  The solid line indicates probabilities for one agreement dyads while the 
dashed line plots dyads without any agreements for comparison.  The band and spike 
plots around the lines are the 95% confidence intervals for one and no agreement dyads 
respectively.   
When considering Figure 6.1, note first the curvilinear relationship between trade 
diversion and the probability of sanctions.  The probability of a one agreement dyad 
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experiencing sanctions increases as the variable moves from trade creation (values less 
than 1) to approximately neutral values indicating neither creation nor diversion.  Once 
trade diversion occurs, however, the probability of sanctions decreases, although remains 
higher than most trade creation values for the relevant range of observed diversion scores.  
Consequently, as the economic agreement in the dyad moves from promoting trade 
between members and non-members to actually diverting (or siphoning) it away from 
non-members, the probability of sanctions grows.  Interestingly, however, once the trade 
diversion begins in earnest, the probability of sanctions declines.  Equally as important, 
however, the one agreement is only truly independent of the no agreement curve between 
diversion values of approximately 0.975 and 1.25.  Consequently, it is only in this range 
that the effect of economic agreements is statistically discernible.  This range contains the 
peak of the diversion curve, however, indicating that one agreement dyads do appear to 
encourage the use of economic sanctions compared to no agreement dyads. 
Moving to the substantive results of the opposing agreement model, consider first 
the influence of the institutions themselves.  The baseline probability of a MID occurring 
between two states without an economic agreement is 0.068%.  When each state forms an 
economic agreement independent of the other, holding all other variables constant, the 
probability decreases 56.1% to 0.043% total.  This decrease, however, belies the true 
influence of opposing economic agreements.  Specifically, states in different economic 
agreements exhibit different economic patterns than those without agreements.  To gain a 
more accurate picture, instead of keeping the economic variables at their global means, I 
adjusted them to the average for opposing agreement dyads.  That is, I set the means of 
interdependence, asymmetry, and trade diversion equal to the average for two states in 
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different economic agreements.  In this way we can more accurately judge the most 
typically observed case of a no agreement dyad and opposing agreement dyad.  In this 
case the probability of a MID between two states without an agreement is again 0.043%, 
but the corresponding probability for opposing agreement dyads is  0.067%, or an 
increase of 54.7%.  The typical opposing agreement member is thus actually more likely 
to experience a MID than no agreement members, providing conditional support for 
Hypotheses 2 and 6.   
Figure 6.2 plots the influence of trade diversion and interdependence on MID 
initiation between opposing agreement members.  First, concerning trade diversion in the 
left panel, note a curvilinear relationship that is similar to the one agreement sanctions 
model.  As trade creation declines, the probability of a MID increases to approximately 
0.1% at the inflection point of 0.975.  After this, the probably of a MID decreases to 
almost 0 at very high levels of trade diversion.  Interestingly, the only portion of the 
opposing agreement curve that achieves statistical independence from the no agreement 
curve exists between approximately 0.975 and 1.01.  Hence it is mild values of trade 
creation that tends to spur conflict between members and non-members of opposing 
agreements.  This is somewhat counterintuitive given my argument about diversion and 
relative gains.  I return to this point in the discussion section.    
The right panel of Figure 6.2 shows predicted probabilities assessing the influence 
of trade interdependence on MID initiation.  Overall, most of the interdependence range 
is statistically indistinguishable between the opposing and no agreement dyads.  Near the 
intercept at 0, however, interdependence between states with opposing agreements is 
distinct.  Small increases near zero, consequently, decrease the probability of two states 
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in different agreements engaging in militarized conflict.  While trade interdependence 
does reduce conflict between states, increasing trade beyond a relatively low threshold 
garners opposing agreement members an almost identical result as no agreement 
members. 
6.2  Strategic Probit Estimation and Interpretation 
As I discuss in Chapter 4 outlining my research design, logit and bivariate probit 
models may not be optimal in evaluating the strategic nature of hypotheses derived from 
my formal model.  My use of the formal model specifically stems from my argument that 
initiating a dispute – be it sanction or military force – is related to the effectiveness of 
using either coercive instrument.  To capture the strategic elements of my formal model, I 
specify a strategic probit model (using STRAT software (Signorino 2001)), that allows 
the decision to initiate conflict in part to derive from the expectation of either military 
force or economic sanctions being used.   
Before detailing my specification of the strategic probit, an important clarification 
is necessary.  My formal model places agency on the Challenger to choose the instrument 
and potential escalation of conflict.  The Defender in the model does not “choose” to 
acquiesce or resist, as this decision is given by its type (strong versus weak).  In other 
words, the Defender does not possess agency and the observation of conflict is an 
inherent assumption of my formal model.  I am limited in testing my formal model, 
however, by the availability software and programs to estimate complex strategic 
interactions.   Specifically, the most appropriate empirical setup for my formal model is a 
two-stage game testing the decision to issue a weak or bold demand and choice of 
sanctions or military force as stages respectively.  Unfortunately, the two-step game setup 
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in STRAT requires placing agency on the Defender in the first stage as a built-in 
requirement of the software.  This setup is akin to giving the Defender the choice to 
acquiesce or resist the Challenger’s demands.  In the strictest sense this is inaccurate, as 
the Defender does not possess agency.  However, it can also be viewed as an observable 
implication of the Challenger’s decision to issue weak or bold demands.  Resistance will 
only be observable if the bold demand is issued.  Consequently, sanctions or military 
force (i.e., resistance) will only be viewed if the Challenger chooses the bold demand.  
Again, while not strictly correct, this approach is defensible on these grounds.  
Furthermore, as my regressors are dyadic in nature, the values of variables are identical 
for Defender and Challenger.  If an alternative setup were available, the estimation 
procedure is unlikely to change as a result.   
Strategic probit estimation, due to the relatively heavy computational burden, 
requires a more parsimonious and careful specification.  Recall the potential outcomes of 
interest; 1) no conflict initiation (either a sanction or a MID) 2) threat or use of economic 
sanctions 3) the threat or use of military force.  With this in mind, Figure 6.3 depicts the 
relevant portion of the game tree presented in Chapter 3 with associated regressors.  Note 
that it begins with the Defender resisting or acquiescing to the Challenger’s demand, 
which as noted is an implication of the weak or bold demand, as this is the first earnest 
and empirically observable decision in the game.  The immediately observable outcome 
of this first-stage decision is no conflict initiation.  To model this effect, I place the 
following regressors capturing whether the dispute ends without conflict or escalates to 
the use of a coercive strategy: One agreement and opposing agreement dyads (in separate 
models), asymmetry, interdependence, trade diversion, trade diversion2, contiguity, 
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capabilities ratio, democracy, and interactions between the agreement variable and 
asymmetry/interdependence/trade diversion/trade diversion2.  Hence, in comparison to 
the logit and bivariate probit models, I exclude alliances, GDP, IGOs, major powers, 
WTO membership, spatial lags, and temporal controls.24   
The next decision point is the Challenger’s choice between economic sanctions 
and military force.  The decision as I have modeled it requires input from the Challenger 
exclusively.  Consequently, I only place a constant term on the sanctions outcome for the 
Defender.  For the Challenger, however, I take into account predictors of both sanctions 
and military force, or perhaps more importantly, differences in utility functions between 
them.  To be sure, the majority of variables in my research design and subsequent results 
from the logit/bivariate probit estimations suggest a stronger influence on military force 
than economic sanctions.  I do, however, place the democracy regressor on the 
Challenger’s utility for economic sanctions.  The logic underlying this decision is that, 
given the structure of the game, the choice at this node is between military force and 
sanctions.  Democracies are less likely to use military force against each other, but do not 
appear as inhibited with economic sanctions.  Consequently, regime type is likely as 
much or more associated with sanctions than military force in this setup.   
To round out the strategic probit model, I place the following regressors on the 
war or military force outcome in Figure 6.3:  One agreement and opposing agreement 
dyads (in separate models), asymmetry, interdependence, trade diversion, contiguity, 
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 I conducted several tests using multiple combinations of variables used in the basic logit and bivariate 
probit estimations.  In addition, I placed the regressors on several different decision points as robustness 
checks.  Overall, the results of alternative specifications are very close to those presented here.  Two 
caveats are important to mention, however.  First, some variables when included (notably the spatial lags) 
prevented the model from converging, thereby forcing their exclusion in the interest of obtaining actual 
results.  Second, adding additional variables to the relatively parsimonious model presented here reduced 
the stability of results.  While statistical significance did not change with the inclusion of most additional 
controls, the coefficient estimates and subsequent predicted probabilities exhibited erratic behavior.   
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capabilities ratio, democracy, and interactions between agreement variables and 
asymmetry/interdependence/trade diversion.  Note that the polynomial trade diversion 
term is eliminated in the Challenger’s utility structure, as my analysis indicates a 
curvilinear relationship is only present in conflict initiation and not the selection of 
sanctions or military force.  Also, to reiterate a portion of the research design from 
Chapter 4, I limit my sample to politically relevant dyads where states are contiguous or 
contain at least one major power.  This is necessary for computational efficiency and to 
achieve stable convergence of the strategic probit model.   
6.2.1  Strategic Probit Results 
The results of the strategic probit model are contained in Table 6.5.  Consider first 
the top portion of the table that models if the Defender resists or acquiesces to the 
Challenger’s demands.  In effect this models the initiation of conflict (defined as use of 
either a sanction or a MID).  STRAT requires this variable be coded 1 if no conflict 
initiation takes place and 0 if either a sanction or MID occurs.  Consequently, positive 
and coefficients indicate a reduced likelihood of conflict initiation.  Negative coefficients 
indicate a greater probability of conflict initiation.  Looking at the one agreement model, 
only the interaction between one agreement dyads and asymmetry achieves statistical 
significance.  Furthermore, it is positive, indicating dyads with one economic agreement 
experience less overall conflict as trade relations become more asymmetric.  
Interestingly, the non-interacted interdependence term is positive and significant such 
that dyads without an agreement experience less conflict as trade interdependence 
increases.  By implication, dyads with one agreement do not share the pacifying influence 
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of asymmetry.  Dyads with one agreement, however, do not generally appear more 
conflict prone given the strategic probit estimates, lending evidence against Hypothesis 2. 
In the opposing agreements model, however, several key variables achieve 
statistical significance.  The agreement variable is positive, suggesting dyads where both 
states are in different agreements are overall less likely to have disputes.  This is 
mitigated, however, by the influence of trade asymmetry.  The negative and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term indicates dyads with separate economic agreements are 
more likely to experience conflict as trade relations become more asymmetric.  The non-
interacted asymmetry term is also negative and significance, signifying that dyads 
without agreements also experience less conflict with trade asymmetry.  The effect of 
opposing agreements, therefore, is to heighten the effect of asymmetry.  The trade 
diversion variables are both significant, but the differing signs suggest a curvilinear 
relationship with conflict.  Specifically, the negative simple term and positive polynomial 
term indicate the opposing agreement dyads least likely to experience conflict are those 
with extremes of trade creation and diversion.  The standalone trade diversion terms show 
identical sign and significance, once again suggesting opposing agreements heighten the 
influence of these variables.  Finally, while the interaction between opposing agreements 
and interdependence does not achieve statistical significance, the non-interacted term 
does.  This suggests opposing agreements short-circuit the pacifying influence of 
interdependence.  Overall, the results of this model suggest opposing agreement dyads 
can encourage conflict in certain circumstances. 
Consider now the bottom half of Table 6.5 showing the results of Challenger’s 
choice between economic sanctions and military force.  For my primary explanatory 
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variables, positive coefficients indicate a tendency for military force while negative 
indicates increased likelihood of economic sanctions.  In the one agreement model, only 
the interaction between agreements and asymmetry achieves statistical significance.  
Hence, dyads with one agreement are more likely to use military force instead of 
economic sanctions as trade asymmetry increases.  The remaining economic variables, 
interacted and otherwise, fail to achieve statistical significance.  Overall, members and 
non-members of one agreement dyads appear more likely to use military force if trade 
asymmetry grows, lending support to Hypothesis 6.   
The opposing agreements model presents some interesting results.  First, the 
agreement variable itself is positive and significant.  Dyads in opposing agreements are 
therefore more likely to use military force (and less likely to use economic sanctions) by 
simply being in different agreements.  This effect is reduced by the effects of asymmetry 
and trade diversion, however.  Both interaction terms are negative and significant such 
that opposing agreement dyads with high levels of asymmetry and/or trade diversion 
prefer economic sanctions to military force.  Consequently, the results of the agreement 
variable and interaction terms present conflicting evidence with respect to Hypothesis 6.   
Looking briefly at the three control variables, the one and opposing agreement 
models disagree slightly.25  Geographic contiguity paradoxically decreases the likelihood 
of conflict, but only the one agreement model.  Both indicate contiguity advantages the 
use of military force over economic sanctions, however.  Power parity as measured by 
capabilities ratio is more important in the initiation of conflict given the negative and 
significant coefficients in the Defender’s utility structure.  According to the opposing 
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 I also tested a separate analysis that used only control variables.  The results of this model, while not 
reported, are more in line with the opposing agreement model.   
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agreement model, furthermore, power parity encourages military force and discourages 
economic sanctions.  Finally, more democratic dyads are paradoxically more likely to 
engage in conflict according to the one agreement model.  When in conflict, however, 
they prefer economic sanctions to military force per the opposing agreement model.   
6.2.2  Interpretation 
The computational limitation of the strategic probit model renders interpretation 
somewhat more difficult than with basic logits.  This is particularly true given the number 
and nature of interaction terms in my model.  The most useful means of interpretation is 
calculating the change in predicted probabilities by shifting the variable of interest from 
minimum to mean values (holding all others constant).  While this is suboptimal given 
my interaction and polynomial terms, it is still useful and suggestive of how impactful 
economic relationships are between economic agreement members.  Hence, Table 6.6 
contains predicted probabilities based on the strategic probit model. 
In the one agreement model, only the interaction between one agreements and 
asymmetry achieves statistical significance.  Overall, the baseline probability of a conflict 
in this model is 5.27%.  As asymmetry moves from its minimum to mean value, however, 
this probability decreases 20.4% to a 4.2% probability of conflict.  Preferences regarding 
the strategies used in disputes also shifts with asymmetry between states in one 
agreement dyads.  The probability of observing a MID increases 40.3% while the 
probability of a sanction decreases 21.4%.  This suggests a substitution effect is in place 
for one agreement dyads between military force and economic sanctions given certain 
levels of asymmetry.   
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The opposing agreements model presents some interesting results.  First, when 
compared to no agreement dyads, dyads with two states in different agreements are 99% 
less likely to experience any type of conflict.  Certain economic relationships between 
opposing agreement members, however, limit this pacifying effect.  Asymmetry in 
opposing agreement dyads, for example, increases the probability of conflict 13% as it 
moves from minimum to mean values.  Likewise, trade diversion increases the likelihood 
of conflict by 137.5%.  Hence, as trade creation (negative values of the trade diversion 
variable) diminishes and approaches trade diversion (positive values on the variable), 
conflict becomes more probable.  At a point, however, trade diversion reduces conflict, 
specifically by 99% as the polynomial term shifts from minimum to mean values.  While 
the available interpretation techniques limit my ability to pinpoint the inflection point of 
trade diversion, these results indicate once again that the most peaceful opposing 
agreement dyads have high levels of trade creation or trade diversion.  Overall, the results 
of the opposing agreement model suggest that two states in different economic 
agreements that also do not interact economically have almost no chance of a conflict.  
As asymmetric trade and certain diversion patterns occur, however, conflict becomes 
more probable.   
The tradeoff between economic sanctions and military force is evident in the 
predicted probabilities of the opposing agreement model.  First, while simply having two 
states in different agreements reduces conflict, it drastically changes preferences for 
coercive strategy.  Specifically, when compared to no agreement dyads, opposing 
agreement dyads are over 613% more likely to use military force and 48.9% less likely to 
use economic sanctions.  This is reduced, however, by asymmetry and diversion.  
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Moving from the minimum to mean of asymmetry in opposing agreement dyads reduces 
the use of military force by 15% and increases the use of sanctions by a modest 9.8%.  
Likewise, moving from the minimum of trade diversion (which is effectively high levels 
of trade creation) to the mean (effectively neither creation nor diversion) decrease 
military force by 57.6% and increases sanctions by 80.6%.  A substitution affect appears 
to be in place with respect to opposing agreements in light of these results.  The exact 
nature of the substitution, however, is ambiguous.  By themselves, opposing agreement 
dyads are more likely to use military force than economic sanctions.  Once trade 
asymmetry and diversion develop, though, this preference wanes such that economic 
sanctions become proportionally more likely. 
6.3  Discussion of Results 
The combined results of the logit and strategic probit estimations provide mixed 
and at times confusing results for my broader theory on extra-agreement conflict.  First, 
there is qualified support for the argument that members and non-members of agreements 
are more likely to engage in conflict based on the results of the strategic probit model.  
The strategic probit shows that dyads with one agreement are more likely to engage in 
conflict (initiation of either a MID or sanction), but only insomuch as trade asymmetry 
manifests in the dyad.  Likewise, the model indicates that dyads with opposing 
agreements are more likely to experience conflict if asymmetry manifests and trade 
diversion is at moderate levels.  It is also worth noting that while trade interdependence 
reduces conflict in dyads without an agreement, no such influence takes place between 
members and non-members of agreements given the lack of statistical significance on the 
interaction term with agreement structure.  Consequently, it does appear that conflict is 
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more likely between members and non-members of agreements provided certain 
economic conditions are met.  This provides qualified support for Hypothesis 2.   
Second, qualified and limited support is also found for the argument that the 
preferred strategy in disputes between members and non-members is military force.  The 
logit specification indicates that states with membership in different economic 
agreements are more likely to experience a MID at relatively modest levels of trade 
creation.  This is mitigated, however, to the extent trade interdependence is high.  Given 
the characteristics of the typical opposing agreement, however, MIDs are generally more 
likely when compared to no agreement dyads.  The picture is muddied somewhat by the 
results of the strategic probit.  These results show opposing agreement dyads are 
generally more likely to experience militarized disputes, but trade diversion and 
interdependence discourage militarization in favor of economic responses.    
As for one agreement dyads, the results of the logit and strategic probit provide 
somewhat contradictory results.  Dyads with only one state in an agreement are neither 
more nor less likely to experience MID according to the logit results.  Indeed, if anything, 
they are more apt to use economic sanctions provided trade diversion is modest.  The 
strategic probit, however, indicates one agreement dyads substitute militarized for 
economic coercion as asymmetry between the states increases.  I believe the more 
accurate assessment of conflict dynamics is given by the strategic probit, as it more 
directly models the connection between conflict initiation and strategies.  Consequently, I 
find limited support for Hypothesis 6.   
The combined results and less than overwhelming support for my argument raise 
a number of issues to address.  First, the strategic probit and logit models provide slightly 
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different perspectives on the conflict process.  Overall, opposing agreement dyads 
influence militarized conflict, but not economic sanctions, according to the logit 
specification.  The strategic probit suggests opposing agreements affect conflict initiation 
and both coercive strategies.  As for one agreement dyads, the logit points to little 
influence on militarized conflict and negative influences on sanctions.  The strategic 
probit shows one agreement dyads are less likely to engage in conflict and have 
discernible influences on sanctions and military force.  Differences between the two 
models are not necessarily inconsistent, as the two methods model the conflict process 
differently.  My use of logit and bivariate probit to test the use of military force and 
economic sanctions essentially permits the two instruments to be compliments.  That is, 
rather than substitutes, the basic logit models permit both economic sanctions and 
military force to be used more or less frequently.  This is possibly the case given the 
inability of the logits to rule out either coercive instrument in favor of the other.  Hence, 
the logits model a decision-making process that permits complementary process in 
coercive strategies. 
Strategic probits, in contrast, model more closely a substitution effect by pitting 
sanctions against military force directly.  The two-stage approach allows the 
sanctions/military force decision to follow the initiation of conflict broadly.  In other 
words, the decision-making process modeled by the strategic probit captures an either-or, 
true substitution effect.  It is as if decision-makers first decide to initiate conflict and 
subsequently determine, given the decision to initiate, the means by which they will 
coerce.  The validity of the strategic choice model appears to hinge on the 
appropriateness of modeling the conflict process as a two-stage, conflict-then-coercive-
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tactic game.  Such an assumption may impose too strict logic on the conflict process, 
however, leading to the different results.  What is likely more valid is that economic 
sanctions and military force are both complements and substitutes in different 
circumstances and times.  The assumption of complements or substitution is a critical in 
my model, and will be addressed in future research.   
Second, while some evidence suggests conflict may increase between members 
and non-members of agreements, several of my causal mechanisms fail to perform as 
expected.  In particular, I anticipate trade diversion, which I argue is a more or less direct 
assessment of relative gains and losses, to increase both overall and militarized conflict.  
My results indicate that if diversion has any relationships with conflict, it is to encourage 
it with states experiencing the least amount of diversion or even trade creation.  The 
economic agreement dyads most prone to conflict are those that may actually slightly 
benefit from the creation of economic agreements of which they are not a part.  In other 
words, mild gains experienced from neighbors in trade agreements may encourage 
conflict.   
This puzzling finding can possibly be explained by a number of factors.  Dyads 
where high levels of trade creation occur may not engage in conflict, particularly 
militarized, because it risks the substantial gains they receive from the agreement.  For 
example, it is possible that that Russia benefits from the European Union without being a 
member.  They likely benefit from unified supranational trade laws that replaced myriad 
national systems, eased transportation regulations, and possibly efficiency gains from 
exporting to a proportionally larger trade area.  Likewise, the EU might benefit from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in a similar manner.  To the extent militarized 
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conflict introduces uncertainty or otherwise disrupts trade, the gains from these 
agreements may be lost.  Consequently, it makes intuitive sense that trade creation 
reduces interstate conflict between members and non-members. 
The connection between high levels of trade diversion and a reduced likelihood of 
conflict is more complicated and tenuous, however.  One possibility is simply that should 
enough relative gains accrue to a state in the dyad, as would be the case with high degrees 
of diversion, the balance of power may shift such that the state experiencing relative 
losses acquiesces to demands without militarized coercion.  Insomuch as the gains from 
trade can be translated into coercive economic or military power (Baldwin 1985; 
Hirschman 1981; McKeown 1984; Root 1984; Gowa and Mansfield 1993), states that 
substantially benefit from their discriminatory membership in an economic agreement 
possess distinct advantages.  While I argue that such strategic imbalances result in 
conflict, they may also simply result in such imbalances that conflict is not a viable 
strategy for the weaker state.  This explanation is particularly valid for one agreement 
dyads where one state clearly gains and the other clearly loses.  It might also explain the 
curvilinear relationship between diversion and sanctions between states in one agreement 
dyads.  As for opposing agreement with states in different economic agreements, while 
the previous argument might still hold, losses from trade diversion are theoretically 
replace by trade in each states’ respective agreement.  Conflict may simply decline here 
because the states drift away economically.  That is, with less commerce taking place, 
there are fewer issues about which to fight.  The issues that do require coercion are of 
sufficiently low salience given the marginalized economic relationship to warrant low-
level coercive responses.  This might explain the simultaneous findings of the logit and 
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strategic probit model, where the formal indicates reduce likelihood of MIDs with 
diversion and the latter a higher likelihood of sanctions.   
A second possible explanation extends one made in the previous chapter.  States 
with relatively mild levels of trade creation may be the most competitive commercial 
relationships.  This is particularly true to states that form different economic agreements.  
One of the primary reasons states form economic agreements is the desire to lock-in 
access to markets and resources (Whalley 1996).  Insofar as agreements harm the profits 
of non-member exporters, additional agreement formation is spurred by excluded states 
that desire corresponding preferential access with other states (Baldwin 1993).  The end 
result can be competing trade blocs and high degrees of inter-regional competition.  
Rather than cordoning off exclusive economic zones, however, the agreements may 
provide certain exporters with sanctuary profits collected from the trade bloc.  Possessing 
a relatively safe home market might permit these exporters to more aggressively pursue 
business overseas.  Intense competition with other trade bloc exporters may result.  The 
American car manufacturing industry, for example, likely gains sanctuary profits from 
NAFTA given their comparative advantage in North America.  This in turn permits them 
to compete fiercely with Japanese and European manufacturers and vice versa.  In these 
cases, we might expect mild levels of trade creation given efficiency gains from 
agreements and the promotion of intra-industry trade between blocs.  Competition as 
reflected by trade creation may spur concerns about relative gains and losses if resources 
and markets are threatened.  These forces may translate to conflict if strategic 
vulnerabilities are fostered.   
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Alternatively, the most convincing explanation may be that dyads with mild levels 
of trade creation are simply the dyads with the least realized or potential economic 
interdependence.  States with high levels of trade creation or diversion are first and 
foremost states geography, nature, and basic political systems suggest should be highly 
interdependent.  States with trade creation may fight less due to the gains from trade.  
High diversion dyads, however, have distanced themselves economically.  The potential 
for commerce and interdependence, however, might discourage conflict if businesses 
believe relations will thaw.  Likewise, trade diversion may simply reflect high degrees of 
unrecorded or illicit trade.  That is, while the gravity model predicts relatively little 
commerce between states in the dyad, trade actually occurs outside official channels or 
through third-party states.  Illicit trade, in turn, may discourage conflict in the traditional 
opportunity cost and lobbying mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3.  States with mild 
levels of either creation or diversion are, first, dyads for which my expanded gravity 
model predicts trade well.  They may also be states that we might expect will trade 
relatively little given geography, political systems, and natural endowments of resources.  
Economic agreements for either state, consequently, might spur some trade simply by 
increasing overall economic activity and openness.  Alternatively, low levels of trade 
creation between unlikely trade partners might simply be measurement error by my 
gravity model.  Either way, if mild trade creation reflects economic odd couples with 
little interdependence, my formal models predicts a higher likelihood of militarized 
conflict.   
One final explanation of my trade diversion finding is measurement error.  The 
gravity model I specify, while carefully constructed, is a blunt instrument given the 
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nuances of international trade.  Myriad factors influence trade flows, including several 
that are likely unobservable.  My estimates may be off as a result.  Furthermore, I have 
attributed all trade creation/diversion between agreement members and non-members to 
the agreement, which may not be accurate.  Measurement error in this capacity is 
particularly problematic if it is non-random.  For example, if I estimate high trade 
diversion for dyads with certain characteristics (e.g., allies or autocracies, for example), 
the relationship between diversion and conflict will likely be biased.  From my analysis 
and diagnostics presented in Chapter 4, my gravity model poorly predicts zero-trade 
flows.  This might overstate diversion, and to the extent dyads with zero-trade flows 
share common characteristics, bias my analysis.  Unfortunately, I have incorporated 
many of the factors predicting non-zero trade flows in my gravity model, suggesting 
unobservable factors may be driving zero-trade estimates. 
Third, the differences between one and opposing agreements on conflict is 
interesting.  My argument about marginalized trade ties and relative gains concerns 
between members and non-members intuitively suggests one agreement dyads are more 
conflict prone.  While opposing agreement members derive benefits from their 
corresponding trade blocs, the excluded state in the one agreement model is isolated 
without an agreement.  Yet it appears opposing agreements are more conflict prone, and 
particularly so with militarized force.  This may reflect the aforementioned heightened 
competition between opposing agreement members.  In contrast, it may also be that 
opposing agreement members drift away economically such that interdependence is 
particularly low.  Conflict and militarization might be more common as a result.  One 
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agreement dyads, in contrast, may still possess economic relationships risked by conflict.  
Relative gains concerns may be muted or overcome by potential gains as a result.   
Fourth, according to the strategic probit models, certain economic relationships 
make economic sanctions more likely for opposing agreement members.  This is in direct 
contrast to my theory of substitution.  This may reflect a few processes at work.  Reduced 
interdependence may lower the cost of sanctions such that they are more frequently 
employed in low-level conflicts.  The low cost of sanctions between members and non-
members may increase the range of political issues decision-makers deem worthy of 
coercive action.  Alternatively stated, policy makers may be more willing to use sanctions 
to coerce – materially or symbolically – given it is unlikely to hurt the sender.  
Alternatively, in a similar vein, sanctions and military for may not be substitutable 
policies.  Sanctions may be employed for one set of issues while military force is 
reserved for more serious disagreements.  This harkens back to the need for more work 
on the assumption of substitutability regarding sanctions and military force. 
Fifth, my analysis indicates some important caveats for the broader liberal peace.  
In particular, the structure of trade relationships – and not simply the amount of trade – 
appears to influence conflict behavior.  Overall, economic agreements do appear to 
influence interstate conflict.  Furthermore, trade diversion (and to some extent trade 
asymmetry) stemming from membership in economic agreements influences conflict 
between members and non-members according to my analysis.  In turn, interdependence 
in the traditional sense is limited in its ability to constrain states from conflict when 
economic agreements are introduced per most of my models.  That is not to say, of 
course, that interdependence is not relevant to conflict between members and non-
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members.  Rather, interdependence is only one aspect of economic relationships that 
influence conflict behavior.  In other words, it is not sufficient to only identify the extent 
of commercial exchange between states to accurately understand their propensity to 
coerce.  It is important also to understand how states value their commercial relationship 
and in what context it exists.  
6.4  Conclusion: Economic Agreements and External Conflict 
My theoretical argument in Chapter 3 draws hypotheses concerning the influence 
of economic agreements on extra-agreement conflict.  The first, reproduced below, 
addresses broad conflict dynamics between members and non-members of an economic 
agreement:  
H2: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of conflict between members 
and non-members of the agreement. 
 I evaluate this hypothesis using a large-N statistical analysis of dyad years from 
1970 to 2001 using basic logit and strategic probit models.  Ultimately, I find conditional 
support for this hypothesis.  Certain economic conditions spur conflict between members 
and non-members of agreements.  Dyads with one agreement are more likely to 
experience conflict if trade asymmetry is present (per the strategic probit).  Likewise, 
dyads with opposing agreements are more likely to experience conflict if asymmetry 
manifests and trade diversion is at moderate levels.  Consequently, it does appear that 
conflict is more likely between members and non-members provided certain economic 
conditions exist.   
 The second hypothesis in this chapter addresses the substitution of economic 
sanctions for military force: 
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H6: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between 
members and non-members. 
Again, qualified and limited support is found for this argument.    While opposing 
agreement members are overall more likely to use MIDs per the logit and strategic probit 
models, it is only at modest levels of trade diversion.  Furthermore, trade asymmetry may 
favor sanctions over military force per the strategic probit model.  Dyads with only one 
state in an agreement are neither more nor less likely to experience MID according to the 
logit results and are slightly more likely to use economic sanctions provided trade 
diversion is modest.  The strategic probit models indicate a direct substitution effect, 
however, as trade asymmetry increases.  Hence, some preliminary support is found for 
this hypothesis.  The validity of these results, however, is contingent on the 
appropriateness of modeling the conflict process as a two-stage, substitution between 
sanctions and military force.  More work is required to fully understand this dynamic.  
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Table 6.1: One Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Militarized Interstate Disputes 
 
  
   Basic Logit Bivariate Probit          Imputed Logit 
Militarized Interstate Disputes  
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement     8.970 17.486     -0.137 8.123         -11.026 6.697 
Agreement*Asymmetry   -4.905 4.265     -0.319 1.646 10.315*** 3.221 
Agreement*Interdependence    6.919 13.608     6.538 5.387    -3.410 16.970 
Agreement*Diversion   -5.410 36.990     1.214 16.721     8.069 15.109 
Agreement*Diversion2   -3.309 20.132    -1.066 8.750     3.175 9.515 
Asymmetry    3.071 1.965     1.040 0.800      -5.651* 2.437 
Interdependence -23.625*** 6.694 -12.638*** 2.731    -13.872* 5.533 
Trade Diversion      33.992** 14.094      9.837* 4.533    -1.353 10.856 
Trade Diversion2        -20.014** 7.449       -6.603** 2.426    -6.239 7.954 
Alliance           0.363** 0.138    0.102 0.053      0.277* 0.123 
Contiguity 3.252*** 0.158 1.408*** 0.053 3.344*** 0.129 
Capabilities 0.163*** 0.043 0.063*** 0.017 0.254*** 0.034 
Democracy -0.041*** 0.010 -0.018*** 0.004 -0.059*** 0.009 
GDP 0.216*** 0.044 0.112*** 0.017 0.320*** 0.035 
IGOs        0.015** 0.005 0.010*** 0.002     0.007 0.005 
Major Power 1.326*** 0.175 0.482*** 0.067 0.989*** 0.156 
WTO    0.055 0.125   -0.056 0.047 0.505*** 0.112 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)   -0.369 9.892     3.245 3.531      10.245* 5.173 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)      27.788** 9.610 14.163*** 3.154 24.165*** 6.197 
Constant -23.859*** 6.867 -8.417*** 2.243    -4.516 4.229 
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Table 6.1: Continued 
 
N 191,887 191,887 368,562 
λ
2
 3,225.82*** 2,876.57*** ------------- 
Pseudo-R2 0.3535 ------------- ------------- 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -2,273.15 -3,183.382 ------------- 
ρ ------------- 0.460*** ------------- 
The dependent variables are Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs).  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where only one state is in an 
economic agreement.  Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.2, as 
they are produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience..  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 6.2: One Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Economic Sanctions 
 
  
Basic Logit Bivariate Probit Imputed Logit 
Economic Sanctions             
  Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Agreement -258.470* 121.717    -97.596* 46.901   36.186 54.609 
Agreement*Asymmetry  -0.226 5.008    -0.679 1.906     11.884* 5.874 
Agreement*Interdependence  23.150 18.328    14.730* 6.564     -2.951 18.926 
Agreement*Diversion 521.820* 245.567   196.357* 93.743 -114.302 124.399 
Agreement*Diversion2 -263.403*** 124.126    -98.785* 46.918    78.625 70.555 
Asymmetry 4.714*** 1.602        1.869** 0.647    -7.292 5.798 
Interdependence -14.401 10.271   -3.650 3.720   -14.250 12.739 
Trade Diversion 28.078 33.113  26.106 18.028  130.140 121.199 
Trade Diversion2 -15.442 18.047   -13.921 9.523  -85.712 69.085 
Alliance      0.605* 0.284        0.274** 0.098     0.393 0.233 
Contiguity    0.359 0.491    0.112 0.163 1.130*** 0.353 
Capabilities   -0.096 0.078   -0.032 0.025     0.013 0.053 
Democracy   -0.020 0.017   -0.005 0.005    -0.011 0.016 
GDP 0.921*** 0.112 0.292*** 0.037 0.883*** 0.099 
IGOs      -0.030** 0.010 -0.011*** 0.003    -0.016 0.009 
Major Power 1.392*** 0.325 0.432*** 0.099 1.221*** 0.334 
WTO       0.630** 0.226 0.238*** 0.072 0.938*** 0.220 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)    6.296 11.705    0.499 4.384    -5.490 13.403 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)     32.237* 15.813       12.841** 4.693 38.103*** 10.288 
Constant      -41.308** 15.096     -22.156** 8.520   -72.682 52.949 
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Table 6.2: Continued 
 
N 191,887 191,887 385,729 
λ
2
 824.55*** 2,876.57*** ------------- 
Pseudo-R2 0.223 ------------- ------------- 
Log Pseudolikelihood -928.327 -3,183.382 ------------- 
ρ ------------- 0.460*** ------------- 
The dependent variable is the threat or imposition of an economic sanction.  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where only one state is in an 
economic agreement.  Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.1, as they are 
produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience..  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 6.3: Opposing Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Militarized Interstate Disputes 
 
  
            Basic Logit Bivariate Probit   Imputed Logit 
Militarized Interstate Disputes 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Agreement     -517.941** 180.875 -188.135*** 57.221     -5.684 7.138 
Agreement*Asymmetry      1.266 4.889     0.809 2.023      5.495 3.326 
Agreement*Interdependence     -38.919* 18.300  -13.722 7.457      3.132 11.659 
Agreement* Diversion     1064.753** 363.892 386.185*** 114.681      3.436 15.740 
Agreement* Diversion2     -546.033** 183.186 -197.771*** 57.530      2.705 9.872 
Asymmetry      2.905 2.122     0.673 0.836        -8.068** 2.641 
Interdependence -27.923*** 7.021 -12.647*** 2.755       -15.640** 5.880 
Trade Diversion      37.738* 16.997       9.546* 4.899     -6.099 10.092 
Trade Diversion2     -22.755* 8.922       -6.668** 2.584    -5.104 7.733 
Alliance         0.396** 0.127     0.085 0.051     0.090 0.112 
Contiguity 3.221*** 0.146 1.409*** 0.052 3.354*** 0.114 
Capabilities 0.242*** 0.049 0.063*** 0.019 0.261*** 0.034 
Democracy -0.056*** 0.010 -0.024*** 0.004 -0.067*** 0.008 
GDP 0.261*** 0.043 0.119*** 0.017 0.252*** 0.035 
IGOs         0.017** 0.005 0.011*** 0.002 0.019*** 0.005 
Major Power 1.860*** 0.165 0.613*** 0.062 1.727*** 0.142 
WTO      0.047 0.122    -0.090 0.047     0.138 0.104 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)     -6.480 11.985    -1.643 4.904     9.071 7.162 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)     18.163 10.246 13.001*** 3.534 20.524*** 6.485 
Constant -25.775*** 8.311 -8.187*** 2.450     0.570 4.031 
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Table 6.3: Continued 
 
N 194,857 194,857 360,783 
λ
2
 3,282.32*** 3,021.92*** ------------- 
Pseudo-R2 0.364 ------------- ------------- 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2,396.75 0.554*** ------------- 
The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs).  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where both states are in 
different economic agreements.  Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.4, as 
they are produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience..  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 6.4: Opposing Agreement Dyads and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Economic Sanctions 
 
  
Basic Logit Bivariate Probit Imputed Logit 
Economic Sanctions 
  Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Agreement  -10.490 22.255     -2.657 11.664    13.832 59.699 
Agreement*Asymmetry     3.007 2.563      1.974 1.196    10.836 5.974 
Agreement*Interdependence  -35.301 28.876   -11.161 10.428   -15.937 30.450 
Agreement* Diversion     8.615 46.663     -1.009 23.804   -67.447 133.032 
Agreement* Diversion2     2.319 24.716      3.813 12.248   54.214 74.096 
Asymmetry 6.040*** 1.527 2.388*** 0.663    -5.148 5.787 
Interdependence  -11.503 9.947    -3.070 3.743    -9.369 11.806 
Trade Diversion   32.479 33.545    29.058 18.433 136.317 120.354 
Trade Diversion2  -17.126 18.419   -15.195 9.731  -86.838 68.167 
Alliance     0.113 0.291      0.076 0.104   -0.313 0.254 
Contiguity     0.082 0.537      0.002 0.168      0.849* 0.364 
Capabilities    -0.058 0.062     -0.022 0.021     0.085 0.052 
Democracy        -0.045** 0.015         -0.013** 0.005 -0.055*** 0.013 
GDP 0.778*** 0.098 0.254*** 0.035 0.758*** 0.086 
IGOs    -0.016 0.009      -0.006* 0.003   -0.003 0.009 
Major Power 1.733*** 0.282 0.511*** 0.089 1.834*** 0.284 
WTO      0.488* 0.198 0.216*** 0.064     0.365 0.177 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)    5.338 12.007      1.156 4.557    -4.829 12.373 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity) 56.817*** 8.051 20.347*** 3.170 45.042*** 7.179 
Constant      -40.741** 15.146      -22.949** 8.730 -74.404 52.707 
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Chapter 6.4: Continued 
 
N 194,857 194,857 377,459 
Chi2 864.08*** 3,021.92*** ------------- 
Pseudo-R2 0.244 ------------- ------------- 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1,028.976 -3,396.443 ------------- 
Rho ------------- 0.554*** ------------- 
The dependent variable is the threat or imposition of an economic sanction.  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads where both states are in different 
economic agreements.  Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   Model statistics for bivariate probit repeated on Table 6.3, as they are 
produced by the same regression and divided only for viewing convenience..  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 6.5:  Strategic Probit Estimation of Extra-Agreement Conflict  
 
  
One Agreement Opposing Agreements 
Defending State (Initiation of Either a Sanction or a MID) 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement  0.334  5.369     52.916**  20.03  
Agreement*Asymmetry  12.470***  3.579  -6.234***  1.709  
Agreement*Interdependence     -16.576  10.29         -1.724  9.194  
Agreement*Trade Diversion -2.150  10.45     -97.23*  39.07  
Agreement*Trade Diversion2  1.375  5.906        44.195*  19.14  
Asymmetry -1.619  1.337      -2.086**  0.725  
Interdependence   9.736*  4.727  10.412***  3.15  
Trade Diversion  0.492  1.254      -2.072**  0.708  
Trade Diversion2 -0.842  2.316  4.130***  0.735  
Contiguity    2.452*  1.132    0.005  0.121  
Capabilities   -0.092*  0.042       -0.079**  0.028  
Democracy   -0.016*  0.007    0.001  0.006  
Challenging State (Choice of Sanction or MID) 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement  -3.623  4.505  33.199***  9.158  
Agreement*Asymmetry  10.110*  4.012     -17.446**  6.070  
Agreement*Interdependence  6.167  10.63  15.102  42.25  
Agreement*Trade Diversion  3.260  4.406  -32.633***  9.039  
Asymmetry  1.346  1.050    0.956  3.362  
Interdependence -7.262  5.313  -9.262  11.56  
Trade Diversion  0.452  0.260  1.425***  0.340  
Contiguity  2.868***  0.287  3.062***  0.359  
Capabilities  0.083  0.046        0.243**  0.078  
Democracy  0.017  0.010  0.065***  0.018  
Constants 
βC Economic Sanctions    -5.952** 2.322 -0.947** 0.323 
N 18,589 17,188 
Mean Log-likelihood -0.123 -0.142 
The potential outcomes in the strategic probit are 1) no conflict initiation 2) threat or use of economic 
sanctions 3) threat or use of military force.  Estimates produced using STRAT software.  The 
"agreement" variable indicates dyads with either one state possessing membership in an economic 
agreement (left columns) or where both states are members of different agreements (right two columns). 
*p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table 6.6: Predicted Probabilities for Strategic Probit Estimation 
 
One Agreement Opposing Agreement 
% Change in Probability 
  
Conflict 
Initiation 
Economic 
Sanctions 
Military 
Force 
Conflict 
Initiation 
Economic 
Sanctions 
Military 
Force 
Agreement ---- ---- ---- -99.0% -48.9% 613.3% 
Agreement*Asymmetry -20.4% -21.4% 40.3% 13.3% 9.8% -15.0% 
Agreement*Interdependence ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Agreement*Trade Diversion ---- ---- ---- 137.5% 80.6% -57.6% 
Agreement*Trade Diversion2 ---- ---- ---- -99.0% ---- ---- 
Asymmetry ---- ---- ---- 14.9% ---- ---- 
Interdependence -10.2% ---- ---- -12.2% ---- ---- 
Trade Diversion ---- ---- ---- -95.0% -9.5% 172.3% 
Trade Diversion2 ---- ---- ---- 142.9% ---- ---- 
Contiguity -99.0% -1,260.0% 3,800.0% ---- -89.0% 232.5% 
Capabilities 189.6% ---- ---- 164.8% -11.8% 456.5% 
Democracy 28.5% ---- ---- ---- 55.8% -37.9% 
Baseline Probability 5.27% 1.36% 3.90% 3.23% 0.67% 2.56% 
Changes in the probability of conflict are calculated by shifting the value of the variable from minimum to mean value (or 0 to 1 for 
dichotomous variables) while holding all others at their mean value.  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads with either one state 
possessing membership in an economic agreement (left columns) or where both states are members of different agreements (right columns).  
*p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Figure 6.3: Strategic Probit Regressors 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS,                                         
INTERSTATE CONFLICT, AND POLICY SUBSTITUTABILITY 
 
At the outset of this project, I asked whether formal economic integration 
agreements influence interstate conflict.  I addressed this question by developing a 
deductive theory that builds on assumptions and findings in the extant trade and conflict 
literature.  My theory and formal model indicated economic agreements should impact 
conflict relations between states in several ways.  Members of the same economic 
agreement should engage in less overall conflict as interdependence and linkages 
increase.  Furthermore, my argument predicted asymmetric trade relations between 
agreement members leads to the use of military force by the dependent state and 
sanctions by the autonomous state.  Because economic agreements do not exist in a 
vacuum, I also derived predictions about conflict relations between members and non-
members of agreements.  Specifically, members and non-members are more likely to 
engage in conflict given reduced interdependence.  They also likely prefer militarized 
force as a strategy in disputes due to the same factor.   
The subsequent research design and statistical results in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
evaluate these arguments.  For some of my hypotheses, the statistical analyses reveal 
conditional support and/or partial confirmation.  For others, general patterns in the data 
suggested strong evidence against my hypotheses, extant scholarship, and possibly 
conventional wisdom.  Each of these findings is interesting in their own right, but the 
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combination of results and bearing on my overall project is the focus of my concluding 
remarks.  Overall, the results of my analysis raise interesting puzzles and avenues of 
future inquiry that are worthy of additional scholarly attention.   
To conclude, I first summarize my findings in terms of their overall consistency 
with my general argument on economic agreements and interstate conflict.  Then I build 
off of this summary and consider what we can draw from my analysis and findings.  In 
other words, what have we learned from the previous six chapters?  The third section of 
this chapter draws implications for policymakers from my argument and findings.  
Finally, I address the puzzles raised by my analysis and potential avenues of future 
inquiry for scholarly work.  That is, I ask – where do we go from here? 
7.1  Summary of Findings, or What Have I Done? 
 When considering the results of Chapters 5 and 6, the most notable outcome is the 
highly conditional nature of the influence economic agreements have on interstate 
conflict.  Agreements do not necessarily have direct and clear positive or negative 
influences on conflict initiation.  Rather, the economic relationships contain within and 
fostered by the agreements appear to be the mechanisms through which conflict is 
affected.  Table 7.1 is an attempt to help organize the myriad relationships contained in 
my empirical analysis.  Economic agreement status is shown on the left with the variables 
that increase (+) or decrease (-) the probability of conflict, sanctions, and military force in 
turn.  Also shown are regressions for which none of my primary explanatory variables 
achieved statistical significance (⃝).   
Surveying the results of the intra-agreement conflict chapter in the top half of the 
table reveals several interesting patterns.  First, membership in an economic agreement, 
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particularly a deep one, is practically sufficient for the suppression of economic sanctions 
between states.  Indeed, no two members of a customs union, common market, or 
economic union have experienced an economic sanction, suggesting deep economic 
integration is indeed sufficient for the non-use of sanctions.  This likely reflects aspects 
of the institutional structure of agreements, such as codified rules or formalized 
relationships, which prevent or dissuade sanctioning.  Second, asymmetry and intra-
agreement trade appear to have strong and robust pacifying influences on conflict and 
militarized force between members of all agreement types.  Hence, some aspects of 
agreements can indeed reduce the occurrence of conflict.  Third, however, trade 
interdependence and FDI dependence may actually encourage militarized conflict 
between members of low-level trade agreements.  This is an interesting finding that 
contradicts the current literature on commerce and conflict.  It also highlights the 
conditional nature of economic relations and conflict.  Some commercial linkages may 
induce peace while others may fan the flames of conflict. 
The bottom half of Table 7.1 shows the results for extra-agreement conflict 
between members of agreements and non-members.  In contrast to the intra-agreement 
model, conflict between members and non-members is noteworthy for differences 
between agreement types and economic relationships.  First, distinct differences exist 
between the basic logit and strategic probit results.  On one hand, this stands in stark 
contrast to the results of the intra-agreement analysis, where little strategic interaction 
appeared to be taking place with respect to policy substitution.  Some economic 
relationships, such as asymmetric trade, appear to encourage economic agreement 
members to consider their opponent and potential consequences when acting.  On the 
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other hand, the validity of the strategic probit rests on the assumption that a two-stage 
game is taking place where a state decides to coerce then determines the instrument to 
employ.  Confidence in my results depends on the accuracy of this assumption. 
Second, noteworthy differences exist between one and opposing agreement 
models.  According to the basic logit, the two arrangements are mirror images.  Having a 
dyad with one state in an agreement can affect sanctions, but not military force.  Having 
two states in different agreements affects military force, but not economic sanctions.  The 
strategic probit specification also shows key differences.  Asymmetric trade relations 
reduce overall conflict, reduce sanctions, and increase MIDs in one agreement dyads.  
For opposing agreements, however, asymmetry increases overall conflict, increases 
sanctions, and reduces MIDs.  Differences of this nature suggest different processes are at 
work in one agreement and opposing agreement dyads.  It may be that asymmetry in the 
context of one agreement dyads results in militarized disputes because the state without 
an agreement is isolated economically and possesses fewer coercive alternatives.  
Members have an established and robust trade network while non-members are 
marginalized by the growing economic distance.  Neither state is truly interdependent, 
thereby increasing the occurrence and severity of conflict.  Opposing agreements are less 
sensitive to asymmetry, however, because both states possess their own trade networks.  
Vulnerabilities may be less acute as a result, thereby warranting lower-level coercive 
action through sanctions.   
Third, the relationship between trade diversion and conflict is non-linear and non-
intuitive.  I argued in Chapter 3 that trade diversion represented relative gains for 
members and losses for non-members of agreements given the former simply shifts the 
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source of import/export while the latter experiences less overall trade.  Relative 
gains/losses from trade are further posited to exacerbate conflict between states.  My 
results do not lend credence to this argument, however.  If anything, high levels of trade 
diversion may actually reduce conflict.  The most conflict prone states are those with 
neutral levels of diversion or even mild trade creation.  I touched on this point in Chapter 
6, and will return to it in a more detailed discussion below. 
Table 7.2 summarizes the findings in context of my six hypotheses.  Consider 
each one in turn.  H1 argues that economic agreements reduce conflict between agreement 
members.  I find conditional support for this argument, as asymmetry and intra-
agreement trade reduce conflict (particularly MIDs) for both shallow and deep agreement 
members.  H2 states that conflict should be more likely between members and non-
members of agreements.  I again find conditional support.  Per the strategic probit results, 
asymmetry and mild trade creation increases conflict for opposing agreement dyads.  
This result does not hold for dyads with one agreement, however.  H3 holds that less 
dependent agreement members are more likely to use economic sanctions than military 
force as a strategy in conflict.  I do not find support for this argument, as states in the 
same economic agreement use sanctions with much less frequency than states without an 
agreement.  H4 builds on H3 by arguing that more dependent agreement members use 
military force instead of economic sanctions.  Again, no support is found for this 
argument.  Asymmetry actually decreases MID initiation for members of both shallow 
and deep agreements.  By extension, H5 that argues symmetric trade relations reduce the 
occurrence of military force receives no support.  Symmetry actually promotes military 
force between agreement members, it seems.  Finally, H6 argues that members and non-
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members of agreements are more likely to use military force in disputes.  I find 
conditional support for this hypothesis.  Per the strategic probit results, asymmetry 
increases the use of MIDs in dyads with one agreement.  Institutional structures increase 
the use of MIDs in opposing agreement dyads.   
7.2  Piecing Together the Implications, or What Have We Learned? 
Beyond the statistical results and their bearing on my hypotheses, it is important 
to consider the overall implications of my analysis for both scholars and policy makers.  
Several of my findings contradict portions of the literature on commerce and conflict.  I 
offer a preliminary discussion and possible answers to several of these puzzles in this 
section.  First, I consider in general the impact of agreements on conflict between 
members.  I then discuss the unintended consequences of economic agreements as they 
relate to the broader context in which they are formed.  Third, I revisit the substitutability 
of sanctions and military force along with a discussion of strategic behavior by states 
regarding coercive instruments.  Finally, it is necessary to revisit the relationship between 
commerce and conflict in light of my results.   
7.2.1  Summing Economic Agreements and Conflict 
Perhaps the most basic point gleaned from my analysis of intra-agreement conflict 
is that economic agreements can indeed influence the conflict behavior of states.  The 
structure of some trade relationships will encourage peace while others promote conflict.  
Specifically, trade symmetry, trade interdependence, and FDI dependence between some 
agreement members promotes conflict while asymmetry and intra-agreement trade 
encourage peace.  Likewise, in the most basic sense, my analysis of extra-agreement 
conflict shows that economic agreements can influence conflict between members and 
 226 
 
 
non-members.  Relying on the strategic probit results, it appears that trade asymmetry 
discourages conflict (particularly militarized conflict) in dyads with only one agreement.  
In contrast, asymmetry and mild values of trade creation encourage conflict between 
states in different economic agreements.  This is tempered by the institutional influence 
of opposing agreements and extreme values of trade creation and diversion, which 
decrease conflict.  The strategies used in conflict also shift between opposing agreement 
members, as asymmetry and diversion promote sanctions while institutional structures 
encourage military force.  Economic relationships thus appear to be contextual 
phenomenon which states interpret with some degree of latitude.   
They key point, however, is that economic agreements appear to be moderating 
the influence of these factors.  In other words, economic agreements do not simply 
accelerate the mechanisms by which commerce operations in international relations.  
Instead, they materially change the way in which states view and act on these 
relationships.  On one hand, asymmetry tends to increase militarized conflict between 
states that do not share membership in an agreement.  When two states form an 
agreement, however, asymmetry tends to pacify relations.  On the other hand, trade 
interdependence and FDI dependence reduce militarized conflict in states without 
economic agreements.   It is only through the influence of formal economic agreements 
that these factors result in disputes.  This suggests agreements are the key factor in 
attenuating the influence of certain economic variables.  It follows logically that certain 
structures of economic agreements, the relationships they foster, or characteristics of the 
states that form them alter the lens through which states view economic relationships.   
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Several possibilities exist for explaining the particular influence of economic 
agreements.  As I argue in Chapter 3, economic agreements draw states into coordinated 
economic management and are difficult to shed as a result.  Agreements also impose 
certain structures on economic relations between members that may institutionalize 
commercial relationships and give them a sense of relative permanence.  Such factors 
may alter the way states view certain relations.  With respect to asymmetry, for example, 
the institutionalized nature of agreements may bind highly dependent states to particular 
agreement members.  Militarized conflict may be less likely, despite the vulnerability of 
the more dependent state, because the cost of conflict is simply too high.  In other words, 
more dependent states may capitulate to stronger states instead of risking exclusion from 
the agreement by fighting.  Symmetrically dependent states, on the other hand, are better 
poised to withstand the cost of conflict given their proportional reliance on each other.   
Alternatively, economic agreements may highlight the policy differences or 
security issues between member states, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict.  
Integration may increase economic competition between member states by bringing 
business into direct competition for markets and resources.  High degrees of trade 
interdependence between states may therefore be indicative of competition instead of 
cooperation.  Furthermore, foreign direct investment may flow from outside the 
agreement to particular agreement members and not others, thereby advantaging one state 
over others.  Instead of developing internationally invested constituencies, economic 
agreements may encourage reactionary elements opposed to cooperation with other 
agreement partners.  While this may not create conflict, it can neutralize the pacifying 
influence of domestic business constituencies on interstate conflict.  Hence, while 
 228 
 
 
vulnerabilities to states may have existed before integration, economic agreements may 
exacerbate or solidify them by imposing binding structure on commercial relations.   
Likewise, the institutional structure of economic agreements may prevent or 
severely restrict the use of economic sanctions.  On one hand, the legal framework of 
agreements may prohibit their use.  That said, military conflict seems a more costly 
policy despite the “illegal” 
nature of sanctions.  On the other, a state that uses an economic sanction against another 
member may face a coordinated response from other states in the agreement.  In other 
words, agreements may practice “collective economic security” by responding to 
sanctioning states with coordinated, “overwhelming” economic force.  Hence, sanctions 
are unlikely to succeed on their own.  Military force, however, may actually work by 
raising the stakes of conflict and demonstrating more clearly the resolve of aggrieved 
parties. 
Exclusion from economic agreements also appears to affect the influence of 
economic relationships on conflict.  In particular, agreements also appear to structure the 
way members and non-members view their trading relationship.  States may value trade 
differently depending on the context within which it exists.  Again, interdependence in 
dyads with one agreement or opposing agreements does not appear to discourage conflict 
as reliably as it does between states without an agreement.  My theory predicts as much 
by arguing that the salience of trade ties between members and non-members decreases 
when economic agreements are formed.  Even though trade may exist, the pacifying 
influences are muted as members rely more on other members and less on the outside 
world for resources and markets.  The more states look to agreement members for future 
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commercial relations, the less important non-members become.  Once states form 
economic agreements that exclude others, in other words, the pacifying benefit of 
interdependence is sacrificed.  Other commercial relationships may in turn become more 
important.  Competition between members and non-members, which may manifest in 
trade symmetry or mild trade creation, can increase in importance and influence on 
conflict.   
7.2.2  The Unintended Consequences of Economic Agreements 
 My results also highlight the unintended consequences of formal economic 
integration.  Agreements are generally created to draw member states closer together 
economically.  What is not readily apparent, however, is how such arrangements may 
alter commercial relationships with the external world.  The existence and operation of 
finite international institutions influence relations with states excluded from membership 
precisely because they are excluded from membership.  Hence, not all trade openness can 
be expected to purchase a state security.  Indeed, those states that seek economic 
integration as part of a security plan aimed at excluded states may exacerbate conflict 
under certain economic conditions.  States that seek intra-agreement security through 
economic agreements risk worsening tensions with those outside the agreement.  
Likewise, economic agreements created to exclude a particular adversary or rival may 
backfire, as agreements can exacerbate tensions between members and non-members.    
Creating agreements may also have unintended consequences for conflict between 
agreement members.  In particular, one of the more puzzling findings in my analysis is 
conflict-inducing tendencies of FDI dependence for shallow agreement members.  The 
current scholarship on FDI and conflict indicates that inward FDI tends to reduce conflict 
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between states by providing information about capabilities, increasing opportunity costs, 
or providing alternative means of acquiring resources (Brooks 1999; Souva 2002; Souva 
and Prins 2006; Bussmann 2010; Lee and Mitchell 2012).  Indeed, my analysis shows 
that two states without an economic agreement do experience less MIDs.  When two 
states form a shallow agreement, however, FDI dependence actually increases the 
probability of conflict.  This suggests the conditionality of FDI’s influence on conflict.  I 
offer potential explanations for this result in Chapter 5 and augment them with a case 
study of the East African Community.  To summarize, however, the conflict inducing 
tendencies of FDI for shallow agreement members may reflect competition between 
businesses (and states) for resources.  I return to this point in section 7.2.4 with a more 
thorough discussion of the liberal peace in light of my analysis. 
7.2.3  The Puzzle of Economic Sanctions and Military Force 
Overall, I find little evidence that states substitute economic sanctions for military 
force.  One of the theorized mechanisms through which the liberal peace works is the use 
of sanctions to send costly signals in disputes, thereby obviating the need for war 
(Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Drezner 2003; Verdier 
2004; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007).  By severing beneficial trade linkages, states are able 
to demonstrate their resolve and willingness to fight.  It logically follows that the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions is a function of the interdependence between 
disputants (Allen 2008; Jing, Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2003).  Economic agreement 
members, intuitively, are strong candidates to use economic sanctions given their explicit 
attempts at fostering interdependence and institutional ties.  In turn, states that form 
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separate economic agreements excluding other trade partners appear less likely to use 
sanctions given reductions in interdependence.   
My research indicates the opposite, however.  Economic agreement members are 
in many ways the least likely group to use economic sanctions in disputes.  Likewise, 
certain commercial relationships between members and non-members actually encourage 
the use of economic sanctions.  Hence, the most likely group per my theory does not use 
sanctions while the least likely group does.  In each empirical chapter I offered potential 
explanations for these results.  By way of wrapping up this discussion, I draw together 
these two puzzling findings and offer general explanations about the process of sanctions. 
One possible explanation of the sanctions results is that certain threshold effects 
are at play.  Economic sanctions may be used for particularly low-level conflicts while 
military force is reserved for more serious disputes.  Issues of relatively minor 
importance to states or in their early stages of development may warrant economic 
sanctions as a resolution attempt.  Once the salience of a particular issue rises high 
enough, states might abandon sanctions in favor of more forceful policies that involve 
militarization.  In this way, economic sanctions may not actually substitute for military 
force, but simply expand the range of issues over which states are willing to use coercive 
mechanisms.  Sanctions and military force may be complementary policies in states’ 
foreign policy tool kit. 
Economic agreements may alter the cost-benefit calculus of these decisions 
depending on how they impact interdependence.  Between agreement members, for 
example, the cost of sanctions may be relatively high given increases in trade between 
members and investment into the region.  Fewer issues therefore warrant the cost of 
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economic sanctions between these highly interdependent states.  Issues of mild 
importance are thus tolerated or resolved through diplomatic or less coercive tactics.  In 
contrast, reduced interdependence between members and non-members may lower the 
cost of sanctions such that they are more frequently employed in low-level conflicts.  The 
low cost of sanctions between members and non-members may increase the range of 
political issues decision-makers deem worthy of coercive action.  To the extent trade 
blocs increase competition between members and non-members, sanctions may actually 
make a great deal of sense.  Drezner (1999) models the effects of conflict expectations on 
economic statecraft.  He finds that as concerns over relative gains and reputation 
increase, a state’s decision to utilize sanctions increases as well.  Alternatively stated, 
policy makers may be more willing to use sanctions to coerce – materially or 
symbolically – given it is unlikely to hurt the sender.  There still exists, however, a range 
of issues over which even interdependent states are willing to risk lost trade and 
investment.  Indeed, economic agreements may increase these issues due to commercial 
competition between states.  For these issues, sanctions are inappropriate, as they might 
signal something less than total commitment (Fearon 1997; Hufbauer 1998).  
Consequently, the rate with which agreement members use military force against both 
other members and non-members can remain unchanged while sanctions become 
unnecessarily costly compared to other options. 
This raises an additional point about the substitutability of coercive policies.  I 
have modeled two alternative coercive policies in this study.  The reality, however, is that 
coercion is a continuum on which many strategies exist.  For example, diplomatic actions 
can serve as coercive tactics (e.g., boycotting the Olympics or withdrawing diplomats).  
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Alternatively, positive inducements like foreign aid or technical assistance can be used to 
“coerce” states into adopting more favorable policies.  Economic agreements may indeed 
results in the substitution of coercive policies, just not economic sanctions as a preferred 
substitute.  My analysis does not capture these potential substitutions given its focus on 
the more popular and costly coercive activities of sanctions and military force.  While 
exploring these options is beyond the scope of this particular study, it might provide 
fruitful avenues of future research into substitutability.   
Another possible explanation for my puzzling sanctions results concerns my 
modeling of the decision-making process.  My theory and formal model sketch a two-
stage approach where the sanctions/military force decision follows conflict initiation.  In 
this way, decision-makers first decide to initiate conflict and subsequently determine the 
means by which they will coerce.  Economic sanctions and military force are therefore 
outcomes of the same decision-making foreign policy process.  This logit may be too 
rigid, however, as sanctions and military force may be compliments rather than 
substitutes.  Likewise, sanctions may be viable for one set of issues and military force 
another.  Modeling the two policies as potential outcomes of the same process in such 
cases would be comparing apples and oranges.  The assumption of complements or 
substitution is a critical in both my research and policy generally, and deserves future 
attention. 
In light of this, the strategic model and argument I develop may be inappropriate 
for analyzing the use of economic sanctions.  It certainly appears that economic 
agreement members are not acting strategically when engaging in disputes with other 
members given the near absence of economic sanctions.  This is somewhat puzzling 
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given extant research.  Tsebelis finds that strategies of target and sender depend on the 
payoff of the opponent rather than their own payoff in the case of sanctions.  This 
suggests that leaders in the sending state are interested in punishing the target even at 
their own cost, which would seem to make sanctions more likely between agreement 
members given interdependence implies high costs.  Likewise, Eaton and Engers (1992) 
find that sanctions and threats are more likely to be successful when expectation of future 
interaction exists, as we might expect between economic agreement members.  The 
abstention from economic coercion by agreement members, in spite of the seemingly 
strong incentives, casts doubt on the use of strategy in using economic sanctions.  It may 
be instead that states are primarily concerned about their own payoffs and costs when 
selecting coercive strategies.  Hence, sanctions may be expressions of disapproval or 
attempts at punishment for the transgressions of other states instead of active compellent 
measures (Nossal 1998).  Alternatively, they may serve a deterrent function meant to 
demonstrate the potential cost of objectionable policies rather than actually change the 
target state’s policies (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 2007).  These factors might lend 
credence to the notion that sanctions and military force are more often compliments than 
substitutes.   
In a similar vein, it may be entirely inappropriate to model economic sanctions as 
an outcome of a primarily foreign policy focused process.  In addition to my assumption 
that sanctions and military force are outcomes of the same process, I assumed more 
fundamentally that sanctions are used exclusively (or at least primarily) to achieve 
foreign policy goals.  It may be the case, however, that the use of sanctions reflects a 
domestically oriented policy process.  Sanctions may demonstrate strong leadership or 
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sympathy to domestic constituencies by governments in order to gain political support 
(Drury 1998; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; Mundo 1999; Whang 2011).  Likewise, 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988; 2003) and Eaton and Engers (1992) argue that 
sanctions may be more expressive than instrumental, whereby the goal of the sender is 
not necessarily to coerce the target state, rather to satisfy domestic audiences.  This 
argument parallels the arguments made by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) with 
respect to foreign aid.  Leaders care first and foremost about maintaining political power.  
Consequently, foreign aid is doled out by leaders with large winning coalitions to extract 
policy concessions from other states, not necessarily to achieve foreign policy goals.  
Sanctions, in turn, can be used to extract concessions for domestic political gains instead 
of security concerns.  Consequently, the sanction process may not be so much 
strategically as domestically focused, an effect outside the scope of my model and study.   
7.2.4  Puzzles in the Liberal Peace 
My results also have interesting implications for the liberal peace.  In some ways 
my theory and analysis pertaining to extra-agreement conflict supports the important 
pacifying forces behind arguments of interdependence and conflict.  Exclusion from 
economic agreements, I argue, reduces the salience of trade ties.  Consequently, 
integration severs the mechanisms by which the liberal peace operates between members 
and non-members.  The core of liberalism is intact and possibly augmented by my 
analysis.  What I do, however, is refine the conditions under which economic liberalism 
may succeed in preventing conflict between states.  Economic integration may create 
security externalities for states if they significantly reduce the importance of external ties 
or allow security concerns to develop.   
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Likewise, my finding that intra-agreement trade reduces conflict may strengthen 
and expand some aspects of the liberal peace.  Intra-agreement trade, as I have modeled it 
in this study, is all trade a state conducts with agreement members less bilateral trade 
with the specific dyadic partner.  So in the case of NAFTA, the influence of intra-
agreement trade between the United States’ and Mexico is the geometric mean of US-
Canada and Mexico-Canada trade.  In this way the measure captures purely third-party 
influence.  This suggests actors outside the immediate dyad in question can constrain 
conflict behavior between a particular pair of states.  This suggests a somewhat unique 
causal process at work that goes beyond simple dyad relations and considers the broader 
effect of trade networks.  The codified framework of trade relations established by 
economic agreements and the inherent excludability of benefits in the advent of conflict 
may in fact increase opportunity costs in ways that reduce conflict.  Such findings lend 
themselves well, in theory, to a network analysis study that more formally models 
multilateral trade ties.  While beyond the scope of this study, network analysis may prove 
a useful tool in exploring the affects of trade agreements on conflict in the future. 
Yet my analysis raises several puzzles inherent in the liberal peace.  First and 
foremost is the finding that foreign direct investment actually increases militarized 
conflict between members of shallow economic agreements.  This challenges a 
burgeoning literature and requires more careful theory and testing of investment 
dynamics.  Just as important, however, are my findings that the structure of trade 
relationships matter for conflict in certain situations.  Indeed, this may be the most 
poignant criticism of the liberal peace in my analysis.  While traditional liberal arguments 
hold that states value absolute gains in trade, and therefore are loath to sacrifice them 
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through conflict, I show that the structure of trade relations, specifically symmetry, 
matters in the decisions of states.  Likewise, in the classic sense of the liberal argument, 
the diversion of trade due to economic agreements should not meaningfully influence 
state behavior.  States instead tend to focus on extant trade and the benefits that accrue 
from it.  The fact that trade diversion influences conflict behavior in any way suggests 
states do indeed care about the structure and context of trade.  Consequently, states may 
value trade differently depending on the circumstances within which it exists.  That is not 
to say, of course, that interdependence is not relevant to conflict between members and 
non-members.  Rather, interdependence is only one aspect of economic relationships that 
influence conflict behavior.  In other words, it is not sufficient to only identify the extent 
of commercial exchange between states to accurately understand their propensity to 
coerce.  One must also understand how they value their commercial relationship and in 
what context it exists.   
Overall, to the extent my findings contradict or challenge the liberal peace, they 
are not completely confirmatory of the logic I posit in Chapter 3.  In particular, I argue 
that relative gains concerns between members and non-members of agreements are likely 
to be witnessed in trade asymmetry and diversion.  These factors, in turn, are likely to 
increase conflict between members and non-members due to relative gains concerns.  
What I find, however, is that trade diversion and asymmetry may actually decrease 
conflict and the use of military force.  Likewise, I argue that FDI dependence should 
reduce conflict between agreement members, as conflict introduces uncertainty that 
drives businesses away from states.  I present some possible explanations in Chapters 5 
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and 6 for these results.  A common theme extends across these results, however, that 
warrants discussion.   
My argument in Chapter 3 may mischaracterize, or at least misstate, the ways in 
which relative gains concerns and vulnerability manifest between states.  Relative gains 
concerns as related to economic exchange are likely to emerge in instances where states 
have the opportunity for cooperation (Powell 1991; Snidal 1991).  That is, two states that 
do not anticipate commerce, due to geographic or political factors for instance, have no 
need to concern themselves with their hypothetical gains from trade.  It stands that 
relatively close, competitive economic relationships are the most prone to the influence 
of relative gains.  This is analogous to rivalries in various sports.  Ohio State is unlikely 
to be concerned with the recruiting class of the University of South Carolina.  While 
hypothetically they may be well matched and play a close game, they are highly unlikely 
to face each other in competition.  Ohio State is much more concerned, however, with the 
University of Michigan’s recruiting class given they face each other annually.  A recruit 
that goes to South Carolina is unlikely interested in Ohio State, whereas a recruit for 
Michigan is likely a lost prospect for Ohio State.   
The translation to economic agreements is more straightforward than one might 
initially think and relates specifically to the FDI findings.  A firm that decides to invest in 
Brazil is implicitly a decision not to invest in Argentina.  In the abstract, this is a relative 
loss for Argentina as it sacrifices manufacturing capacity and revenue that Brazil now 
gains.  If the competition for FDI is sufficiently fierce, as might be expected when both 
states are highly dependent on FDI, relative gains concerns may manifest that influence 
conflict.  Economic agreements may actually increase competition over resources and 
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expose vulnerabilities by institutionalizing these competitive commercial relations 
through a codified structure.  In other words, competition may increase as agreements 
bring states into closer and fiercer competition for investment.   
A similar process may take place between agreement members and non-members 
with respect to trade diversion.  States with relatively mild levels of trade creation may 
simply be the most competitive commercial relationships.  Economic agreements may 
provide certain exporters with sanctuary profits collected from the trade bloc, which in 
turn permits them to compete more fiercely with other regions.  Trade may actually be 
created between members and non-members by different economic agreements as a 
result.  Instead of highlighting absolute gains in trade, however, states may grow 
concerned about who gains more as competition over markets and resources develops.  
This includes both direct competition between trade blocs and competition for third-party 
markets and resources.  As businesses from different trade blocs compete, states may 
become more acutely aware of being potentially disadvantaged by the success of 
competitors.  Concern about vulnerabilities may develop in ways that encourage states to 
act more aggressively.  Indeed, relative gains concerns are likely to manifest when the 
use of force is a potential issue (Powell 1991).  Relative gains concerns may still apply to 
my analysis, therefore, but may require a different theoretical construct to explain my 
puzzling empirical results.   
7.3  Implications for Policymakers, or What Do We Do? 
Given the extensive use of economic agreements in today’s global economy, my 
results have potentially important implications for policymakers.  Many agreements (the 
early incarnations of the European Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, ASEAN, etc.) 
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are formed with the specific goal of encouraging peace between member states.  
Likewise, many alliances contain an economic component aimed to deepen cooperation 
and ties.  This strategy may or may not be wise depending on the economic relationship 
between members.  My results suggest deep, hierarchical agreements with a dominant 
economic power are least likely to result in conflict.  This is because hierarchical 
agreements likely generate asymmetry, intra-agreement trade from complementary 
economies, and less FDI competition (as the dominate state likely attracts most FDI).  
Such agreements create a hub-and-spoke system of economic relations revolving around 
one economically central country.  Fortunately, this type of agreement is relatively 
common, as evident in NAFTA (United States dominant), the South African 
Development Community (South Africa dominant), Commonwealth of Independent 
States (Russia dominant), MERCOSUR (Brazil dominant), and others.   
Agreements between equals, however, may not purchase the security states 
expect.  Trade relations are likely symmetric with intense competition for FDI.  This type 
of agreement is most likely to exist between less developed states in the global south.  
Ironically, the proliferation of agreements between developing states is an attempt to 
break dependence on more developed countries (Mayda and Steinberg 2007; UNCTAD 
2008).  Caution should be taken when pursuing such agreements, however, as they may 
bring states into tighter competition that can exacerbate tensions and result in conflict.  
The case of the East African Community in Chapter 5 is an example of an agreement 
between equals that resulted in conflict.   
States considering economic agreements may also need to consider their broader 
impact on conflict with non-members.  Exclusion from economic agreements, I argue, 
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reduces the salience of trade ties and reduces interdependence.  That is, agreements sever 
the pacifying mechanisms of trade.  Agreements should be structured such that trade with 
the external world receives limited negative disruption.  At a minimum, newly formed 
agreements should avoid raising barriers to the outside world.  This reduces the 
likelihood of adverse effects from disengagement.  A better solution is to create economic 
agreements that lower barriers to trade with non-members (i.e., agreements that create 
areas more open to global trade).  Such agreements are more likely than other types to 
generate trade creation and in turn peace.  Alternatively, creating highly discriminatory 
agreements that completely marginalize the outside world by generating high levels of 
trade diversion are also likely to encourage peace.  The overall welfare effects of 
discriminatory agreements are quite high, however, and represent a less compelling 
solution to potential conflicts between members and non-members.   
Although I do not test the effectiveness of coercive policies in this paper, my 
analysis casts doubt on the ability of sanctions to do the work of military force.  Highly 
interdependent states, as we might expect with agreement members, should be the best 
poised to use economic sanctions.  This is not the case, however, given the paucity of 
sanctions between members.  Likewise, the partial severing of interdependence between 
members and non-members intuitively should reduce the use of sanctions.  As my 
analysis indicates, however, sanctions are more likely between states with presumably 
limited interdependence due to differing economic agreements.  This suggests sanctions 
are employed to address a separate set of issues than military force.  Indeed, sanctions 
may symbolically used to express anger or disgust without intention of successfully 
compelling or coercing targets. 
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When all is taken into consideration, it is prudent to ask whether economic 
agreements are an overall advisable policy.  The answer to this question is complicated 
and highly contextually.  If nothing else, the results of my analysis point to the highly 
conditional relationship between economics and security.  Some relationships encourage 
peace and others war between members.  Others do not affect relations between 
members, but instead encourage or discourage conflict with non-members.  The most 
important point is that economic agreements are not a ready-made solution to security 
issues.  While it can be argued that economic agreements succeeded in encouraging peace 
in Europe, it would be foolish to assume identical results in other areas given the 
complexity of possible economic and political relationships compared to Europe.  States 
must consider their most likely partners and competitors in determining the net impact – 
in both economic and security terms – before forming agreements.   
7.4  Implications for Scholars, or Where Do We Go From Here? 
My analysis has implications for several different veins of literature in 
international relations.  Overall, I link diverse literatures that include conflict processes, 
economic statecraft, international organizations, and foreign policy analysis.  I also 
explore methodological issues concerning imputed trade data in my statistical analysis.  
Many of these efforts contribute to the growth of the literature.  Perhaps more 
importantly, however, they identify new puzzles for future exploration and research.    
First, I contribute to the growing body of literature exploring the effects of 
economic relationships on interstate conflict.  The proximate literature to which I speak 
concerns the relationship between economic agreements and interstate conflict.  While 
agreements may foster peace, the effect is largely dependent on the structure of 
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commercial relationships between members.  More work is needed to help resolve the 
puzzle I identify concerning the conflict inducing tendencies of FDI for certain agreement 
types.  This finding contradicts a broad body of research showing the opposite effect.  I 
presented brief case illustration in Chapter 5 to help identify potential causal pathways.  
More careful case study analysis may aid in identifying the processes at work.  
Alternatively, additional statistical research into the conditional nature of FDI’s influence 
on interstate conflict may be useful.  Identifying relationships that encourage competition 
and relative gains concerns is particularly important in this vein.  Another avenue of 
future research linking economic relationships to conflict behavior involves the pacifying 
influence of intra-agreement trade.  This finding suggests trade networks have a role in 
constraining the behavior of actors.  A more thorough look at trade networks using actual 
social network analysis techniques may reveal interesting relationships at the global or 
regional level. 
Second, I consider the empirical validity of policy substitution in coercive 
situations.  While economic sanctions have long been posited as alternatives to war, few 
studies bring empirical results to bear.  My analysis fails to find compelling evidence that 
economic sanctions substitute for military force in disputes.  Indeed, my evidence 
suggests two different decision-making processes are at work between economic 
sanctions and military force.  More research is required to identify the underlying 
linkages between disputes and coercive strategies.  While economic sanctions may not 
substitute for military force, it is more likely I have yet to identify the appropriate 
circumstances in which they are successful in doing so.  In particular, a range of issues 
may exist for which economic sanctions are likely and military force less so.  Military 
 244 
 
 
force may be likely in certain disputes for which economic sanctions are unlikely.  
Finally, a range of issues may exist where both sanctions and military force are viable.  If 
substitutability is to be found, these are the most likely issue areas.  Alternatively, the 
choice between sanctions and military force may deal more with domestic than 
international politics.  Exploring the influence of regime type on strategies, for example, 
may prove more fruitful regarding substitutability.   
Third, my analysis addresses a generally neglected area of international relations.  
Specifically, how might the existence and operation of finite international institutions 
influence states excluded from membership?  State decisions to seek integration are 
strategic choices that necessarily exclude certain parties.  It follows, therefore, that 
institutions may have as profound consequences for non-members as they do members.  
My analysis looks specifically at economic agreements and institutions.  However, there 
is no reason to believe the effects of exclusion from institutions are limited to the 
economic realm.  For example, omission from particular alliances may alter the conflict 
behavior of the excluded state.  Other types of agreements may also produce changes in 
the security environment within which states exist.  My work here provides one piece of 
what might be a dynamic and interesting research program.    
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Table 7.1: Summary of Statistical Findings for Economic Agreements and Conflict 
  
Basic Logit Strategic Probit 
General 
Conflict 
Economic  
Sanctions Military Force General Conflict 
Economic 
Sanctions Military Force 
Economic Agreement Members (Intra-Agreement Conflict) 
Shallow 
+ 
Interdependence                                 
FDI Dependence ⃝ 
Interdependence                                 
FDI Dependence ------- ------- ------- 
- 
Institution                                      
Asymmetry                                             
Intra-Agreement 
Institution
Institution                                      
Asymmetry                                             
Intra-Agreement  
------- ------- ------- 
Deep 
+ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ------- ------- ------- 
- 
Asymmetry                                             
Intra-Agreement Institution 
Asymmetry                                             
Intra-Agreement  ------- ------- ------- 
Members and Non-Members (Extra-Agreement Conflict) 
One 
Agreement 
+ ------- 
Mild Trade 
Creation ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ Asymmetry 
- ------- 
Institution                                          
Diversion/Creation ⃝ Asymmetry Asymmetry ⃝ 
Opposing 
Agreement + ------- ⃝ 
Mild Trade 
Creation 
Asymmetry                                   
Mild Creation 
Asymmetry                                   
Trade Diversion Institution 
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⃝ Indicates nonsignificant findings 
 
Table 7.1: Continued 
 
Basic Logit Strategic Probit 
General Conflict 
Economic  
Sanctions Military Force General Conflict 
Economic  
Sanctions Military Force 
Members and Non-Members (Extra-Agreement Conflict) 
Opposing 
Agreement - ------- ⃝ 
Institution                                                    
Interdependence                                           
Diversion/Creation 
Institution                                         
Diversion/Creation Institution 
Asymmetry                        
Trade Diversion 
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Table 7.2: Summary of Findings for Hypotheses  
 
H1: Economic agreements decrease the likelihood of conflict between member states. 
  
Conditional - Asymmetry and intra-agreement trade reduce conflict (particularly MIDs) for both shallow and deep agreement 
members.  Interdependence and FDI increase conflict for shallow agreement members, however. 
 
H2: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of conflict between members and non-members of the agreement. 
  
Conditional - Per the strategic probit results, asymmetry and mild trade creation increases conflict for opposing agreement dyads.  
Institutional structures and high trade diversion/creation decreases conflict for opposing agreement dyads.  Asymmetry decreases 
conflict for one agreement dyads. 
  
H3: Less economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use economic sanctions against other members as a tool of 
coercion.   
  
No Support - States in the same economic agreement use  sanctions with much less frequency than states without an agreement. 
 
H4: More economically dependent agreement members are more likely to use military force against other members as a tool of 
coercion.   
  
No Support - Asymmetry decreases MID initiation for members of both shallow and deep agreements. 
  
H5: Symmetrically dependent agreement members are less likely to use military force against other members as a tool of coercion 
than asymmetrically dependent members.   
  
No Support - Symmetric trade relations increase the probability of MID initiation for members of both shallow and deep agreements. 
  
H6: Economic agreements increase the likelihood of militarized conflict between members and non-members. 
 
Conditional - Per the strategic probit results, asymmetry increases the use of MIDs in dyads with one agreement.  Institutional 
structures increase the use of MIDs in opposing agreement dyads.  Asymmetry and trade diversion reduce MID initiation in opposing 
agreement dyads. 
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APPENDIX A – EQUILIBRIUM CALCULATIONS 
Challenger’s decision of sanctions over war: 
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APPENDIX B – MISSING DATA AND MULTIPLE IMPUTATION 
 
Given this inherent difficulty in imputing trade data, I first tested the quality of 
imputed trade values against available data.  I used the following procedure to evaluate 
how closely imputed trade data resembled actual trade reported between countries.  
Specifically, I: 
1. Created a dataset containing only observations for which trade data is available 
(using Correlates of War data developed by Barbieri and Keshk (2011). 
2. Randomly deleted trade values for 20% of observations (approximately 81,000). 
3. Using Amelia II, imputed missing trade data using the recommendations of King 
et al (2001), which includes: 
a. Include all variables to be used in the final statistical model. 
b. Adding additional variables to help estimate missing values. 
c. Accounting for temporal and cross-sectional continuity statistically using 
Amelia. 
4. Performed various diagnostic tests comparing the imputed trade data against 
actual trade data to determine the adequacy of fit. 
A complete list of the variables I used in the imputation model is included in 
Table B.1 (along with the percentage missing in my analysis).  Table B.2 briefly 
compares the summary statistics between the imputed and actual trade data.  The 
summary statistics – particularly the mean, median, and standard deviation – seem to 
suggest the imputed values roughly follow the distribution of the actual trade data with 
one notable exception.  The imputed values do not perform well at particularly low levels 
of actual trade.  That is, the imputation model struggles to report actuate values when the 
expected level of trade is low.  This is evident in the scores for first quartile.  The actual 
first quartile value is 
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4.605 (zero trade) while the imputed first quartile is 6.324 – a difference of 37%.26  
Consequently, the imputation imposes trade relationships in dyads where none exist.   
Figure B.1 graphically represents several important relationships between 
imputed trade values and key predictors.  The top left panel of Figure B.1 plots 
histograms of the actual and imputed trade values along with kernel density lines.27  As 
the summary statistics indicate, the imputation model performs remarkably well if an 
actual trade relationship exists, given the nearly identical kernel density lines between 
logged values of 10 and 20.  However, the imputed model vastly underestimates the 
proportion of zeros in trade data.  Indeed, while approximately 30% of actual trade values 
are zero, only 11% of imputed trade values are zero or less.  As I will discuss later, this 
may prove problematic for statistical analysis. 
While the overall distribution of imputed values is an important consideration, my 
unit of analysis is the dyad-year.  It is therefore important that the imputed values not 
only match a general pattern but also perform well in predicting the trade occurring 
between specific states.  To evaluate the imputation model’s performance in this respect, 
I focus on the variance between actual and imputed trade values.  I calculate this by 
subtracting imputed trade from actual trade such that positive (negative) values reflect 
overestimation (underestimation) by the imputed model.  The top right panel of Figure 
B.1 is a scatterplot of variance against actual trade values.  From this figure, the only 
discernible pattern to the variance is a tendency for the imputation model to overestimate 
trade at low values, as might be expected given my analysis of the summary statistics.   
                                                           
26
 In order to impute trade values, which are logged, I added $100 to the trade variable for all observations.   
27 Because the data are logged, zero trade in my analysis is actually a trade value of $100 (or a logged value 
of 4.605).  In other words, it is impossible for an actual trade value to be less than 4.605.  Approximately 
10% of imputed values, however, are less than 4.605.  The difference between 4.605 and anything less, 
however, is marginal and by definition less than $100.   
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Closer inspection of the variance metric, however, reveals two major influences 
on the accuracy of the imputation model.  First, observations where GDP is missing for at 
least one state in the dyad result in greater differences between imputed and actual 
values.  The mean variance for observations missing GDP is 0.488 compared to 0.011 for 
observations possessing valid GDP scores.  The bottom left panel of Figure B.1 
graphically represents this relationship using histograms and kernel density plots for 
observations according to whether they are missing GDP or not.  As can be seen from the 
histograms, observations with valid GDP scores cluster around zero variance.  Those 
missing GDP values, however, are more diffuse and result in relatively higher variance.   
The second noteworthy influence on variance, as might be expected, is whether an 
actual trade relationship exists or not.  That is, as I have indicated prior, the imputation 
model struggles to accurately estimate trade when two states do not trade (i.e., when trade 
is zero).  The mean variance for observations where trade is zero is 0.704 compared to -
0.255 for observations where trade is non-zero.  The bottom right panel of Figure B.1 
includes histograms for 1) non-zero trade relationships and 2) zero trade relationships 
along with kernel density plots.  Two items are noteworthy from this panel.  First, the 
peak distribution of dyads with zero trade is above zero variance, indicating that the 
imputation model tends to fit trade relationships even when none exist.  Second, the tail 
of the zero trade distribution is fatter than for non-zero trade dyads.  This suggests a 
greater proportion of the high variance observations are zero trade dyads.  In other words, 
dyads where the actual trade is zero are more likely to be inaccurately estimated 
(potentially egregiously) by the imputation model.   
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Before exploring the potential impact of missing GDP and zero trade dyads on my 
analysis, Figure B.2 summarizes these relationships.  The top left quadrant of Figure B.2 
plot the difference between actual and imputed trade values over time according to 
whether the dyad contains GDP scores for both states (black dots) or is missing at least 
one GDP value (grey Xs).  Likewise, the top right quadrant plots differences for dyads 
with non-zero and zero trade (black dots and grey Xs respectively).  From these plots, the 
highest variances in my analysis appear to be dyads with zero-trade.  In this light, GDP 
does not appear as problematic.  The bottom left quadrant reflects dyads both missing 
GDP and possessing zero trade.  As might be expected, this results in consistently and 
relatively severe differences between actual and imputed values.  In other words, missing 
GDP and possessing zero trade is highly likely to skew imputation values.  Finally, the 
bottom right quadrant plots variance for dyads missing data on any other variable.  The 
black dots reflect observations without any missing data and positive trade scores while 
the grey Xs are observations missing data on at least one variable, but possessing GDP 
scores and non-zero trade values.  I provide this plot as a comparison for the others.  As 
can be seen, variances are generally less pronounced and erratic if a variable other than 
GDP is missing or trade is zero between states in a dyad.
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Table B.1: Imputation Model Variables 
 
Variable Measure % Missing 
Primary Imputed Variable 
Trade (logged) Dyadic exports + Imports 26.8% 
Gravity Variables 
Contiguity Dichotomous, shared border or separated by 150 
miles of water or less 0.0% 
Distance Capital to Capital 0.0% 
Regional Dummies UN definitions (9 total regions) 0.0% 
Same Region Dichotomous, two states in the same region 0.0% 
GDP, high (logged) Real GDP for both states 16.0% 
GDP, low (logged) Lowest GDP score in dyad 16.0% 
Common Language Dichotomous, two states share the same language 0.0% 
Major Power Dichotomous, coded 1 if one states in the dyad is a 
major power  0.0% 
Major Powers Sum of major powers in dyad 0.0% 
Population (high, 
logged) Sum of population in dyad,  highest score in dyad 5.5% 
Population (low, 
logged) Sum of population in dyad,  lowest score in dyad 5.5% 
Political Variables 
Affinity Gartzke political affinity scores 1.8% 
Alliances Dyad shares a defense pact, neutrality pact, or entente 0.0% 
Democracy, high POLITY IV composite measures (-10 to 10), highest 
score in dyad 23.3% 
Democracy, low POLITY IV composite measures (-10 to 10), lowest 
score in dyad 23.3% 
Regime Similarity POLITY IV (0 to 20), absolute difference in democracy scores 20.0% 
Openness, high National trade as a share of GDP,  highest score in dyad 21.0% 
Openness, high National trade as a share of GDP,  lowest score in dyad 21.0% 
IGO Membership Count of organizations of which both states are 
members 4.18% 
Trade Agreement, 
level 
Ordinal variable (0 to 5) indicating the depth of 
economic integration 0.0% 
Trade Probability 
Predicted probability of a trade relationship between 
states in a dyad (based on a gravity model used to 
predict trade diversion values) 
10.6% 
MID Initiation Dichotomous, a MID initiates between states in the dyad 0.0% 
Fatal MID Initiation Dichotomous, a MID initiates between states in the dyad where at least one fatality occurs 0.0% 
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Table B.1: Continued 
 
Variable Measure % Missing 
Political Variables 
 
 
Political Sanctions Dichotomous, a sanction between states in the dyad for political reasons 0.0% 
Sum of MIDs Rolling sum of MIDs in dyad, 1950 to 2001 
 Sum of Fatal MIDs Rolling sum of fatal MIDs in dyad, 1950 to 2001 
 Sum of Political 
Sanctions 
Rolling sum of political sanctions in dyad, 1970 to 
2001  
Peace Years (cubic) Years since last MID (cubic polynomial term for temporal dependence) 0.0% 
Fatal Peace Years 
(cubic) 
Years since last fatal MID (cubic polynomial term for 
temporal dependence) 0.0% 
Sanction Years 
(cubic) 
Years since last sanction (cubic polynomial term for 
temporal dependence) 0.0% 
Spatial Lag, MID Spatial lag variable for MID initiation using 
contiguity as connector 0.3% 
Spatial Lag, 
Sanctions 
Spatial lag variable for sanction initiation using 
contiguity as connector 0.3% 
Variables Used in Statistical Analysis  
One Agreement Only one state in the dyad is a member of any 
economic agreement 0.0% 
Opposing 
Agreements 
Both states in the dyad are members of different 
economic agreements 0.0% 
Shallow Agreements Shallow economic agreements 0.0% 
Deep Agreements Deep economic agreements 0.0% 
Trade 
Interdependence Total bilateral trade as a share of GDP, dyadic score 36.7% 
Trade Asymmetry Absolute difference in trade interdependence scores, higher values indicating greater asymmetry 36.7% 
FDI, high Total inward FDI, highest score in dyad 34.3% 
FDI , low Total inward FDI, lowest score in dyad 34.3% 
FDI Dependence Total inward FDI as a share of GDP, dyadic score  34.3% 
One Agreement 
*Interdependence 
Interaction between dyads with one agreement only 
and trade interdependence 38.4% 
One Agreement 
*Asymmetry 
Interaction between dyads with one agreement only 
and trade asymmetry 38.4% 
Opposing 
Agreements 
*Interdependence 
Interaction between dyads with separate agreements 
and trade interdependence 38.4% 
Opposing 
Agreements 
*Asymmetry 
Interaction between dyads with separate agreements 
and trade asymmetry 38.4% 
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Table B.1: Continued 
 
Variable Measure % Missing 
Variables Used in Statistical Analysis 
Shallow*Dependence Interaction between dyads with shallow agreements 
and trade dependence 27.2% 
Shallow*Asymmetry Interaction between dyads with  shallow agreements 
and trade asymmetry 27.2% 
Shallow *FDI Interaction between dyads with  shallow agreements 
and FDI dependence 34.3% 
Deep*Dependence Interaction between dyads with deep agreements and trade dependence 27.2% 
Deep *Asymmetry Interaction between dyads with  deep agreements and trade asymmetry 27.2% 
Deep  *FDI Interaction between dyads with  deep agreements and FDI dependence 34.3% 
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Table B.2: Actual and Imputed Trade Data Comparison 
Actual Imputed 
% Difference 
(Imputed – Actual) 
Mean 12.100 12.129 0.2% 
Median 13.415 13.110 -2.3% 
Standard Deviation 5.513 5.286 -4.1% 
Minimum -1.595 4.605 -388.7% 
Maximum 26.651 28.827 8.2% 
1% 4.605 3.005 -34.7% 
25% 4.605 6.324 37.3% 
50% 13.415 13.110 -2.3% 
75% 16.490 16.266 -1.4% 
99% 21.995 22.036 0.2% 
  
 
275 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
0 10 20 30
Trade (logged)
Actual Actual Imputed Imputed
Distribution of Trade Values (Actual vs Imputed)
-
1
0
-
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
D
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
A
c
t
u
a
l
 
-
 
I
m
p
u
t
e
d
)
5 10 15 20 25
Actual Trade Values (Logged)
Imputed Observations
Actual vs. Imputed Trade
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
Deviation (Actual - Imputed)
Valid GDP Scores Missing GDP
Distribution of Variance (GDP vs No GDP)
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
D
e
n
s
i
t
y
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
Deviation (Actual - Imputed)
Non-zero Trade Zero Trade
Distribution of Variance (Trade vs Zero Trade)
Figure B.1: Evaluation of Imputed Trade Data 
  
 
276 
-
1
0
-
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
(
A
c
t
u
a
l
 
-
 
I
m
p
u
t
e
d
)
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Valid GDP Missing GDP
GDP
-
1
0
-
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
(
A
c
t
u
a
l
 
-
 
I
m
p
u
t
e
d
)
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Positive Trade Zero Trade
Trade
-
1
0
-
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
(
A
c
t
u
a
l
 
-
 
I
m
p
u
t
e
d
)
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Valid GDP and Positive Trade Missing GDP and Zero Trade
GDP and Trade
-
1
0
-
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
(
A
c
t
u
a
l
 
-
 
I
m
p
u
t
e
d
)
1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
All Data Available Missing Data (excluding GDP and Trade)
Other Missing
Figure B.2: Variances (Actual – Imputed) 
 277 
 
 
APPENDIX C – ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In this appendix, I present variations on the models in Chapters 5 and 6 to address 
potential concerns and qualify my results.  I separate the robustness tests by chapter, 
beginning with Chapter 5 concerning intra-agreement conflict. 
A.1  Intra-Agreement Conflict 
Chapter 5 analyzes conflict between states in the same economic agreement using 
basic and imputed logit analysis.  I also offer a robustness test in-chapter addressing 
potential endogeneity concerns using a Heckman selection model.  In this section, I 
elaborate on my analysis of intra-agreement conflict presented in Chapter 5 by: pooling 
sanctions and MIDs as the dependent variable, limiting the dependent variable to fatal 
MIDs only, and disaggregating agreements into five categories based on finer criteria 
than that used in Chapter 5.28   
A.1.1  Pooling Sanctions and MIDs 
Hypothesis 1 argues that two states in the same economic agreement are less 
likely to engage in conflict than states that do not share an agreement.  My analysis 
showed that agreement members tend to avoid sanctions, but still use military force with 
some frequency.  It is difficult, therefore, to evaluate their overall propensity to engage in 
disputes given the paucity of sanctions.  I address this by pooling sanctions and MIDs 
                                                           
28
 In addition to the tests in this appendix, I also conducted several others that I do not report.  These 
include rare-events logits, transformations of the primary variables (i.e., logs), simultaneous equations, and 
samples using only politically relevant dyads.  The results of these tests were identical to those included in 
Chapter 5, and are therefore omitted for space and clarity.    
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into one dependent variable.  This effectively treats the two strategies as one decision, 
thereby allowing me to evaluate whether agreement members are more or less likely to be 
involved in disputes compared to states that do not share membership in an agreement.  
All other aspects of the research design remain constant, to include control variables and 
use of basic logit estimation techniques. 
Table C.1 contains the logit results of the pooled sanction/MID model.  Overall, 
the results for shallow agreements are identical to those reported in Chapter 5.  The 
agreement variable, the interaction with asymmetry, and intra-agreement trade tend to 
reduce the use of a coercive instrument in a dispute.  The interactions between 
agreements and interdependence and FDI (separately) tend to increase the probability of 
two states in a shallow agreement using a coercive instrument.  Given these results, I 
have greater confidence in the conclusions I draw from my primary analysis in Chapter 5. 
The results of the deep agreements model differ from my primary analysis in one 
respect.  While intra-agreement trade achieves statistical significance in my Chapter 5 
analysis, it fails to do so in the pooled sanctions/MID model.  Intra-agreement trade 
therefore reduces the likelihood of MIDs between deep agreement members, but does not 
influence the overall use of coercion when compared to dyads without agreements.  In 
other words, as states in an agreement grow more reliant on trade with other agreement 
members, they are neither more nor less likely to experience disputes or use coercive 
instruments.  They are less likely, however, to use militarized force if viewed in isolation.  
The overall impact of this finding, therefore, is to add nuance to my analysis.  In 
particular, intra-agreement trade does not appear to influence the overall rate of disputes 
between deep agreement members.  It does, however, dissuade them from militarization.  
 279 
 
 
The decision to use military force is likely a function of other factors, such as relative 
capabilities, the ability to project power, and neighboring disputes. 
A.1.2  Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Militarized Interstate Disputes set a relatively low threshold for entry into the 
dataset.  Any threat, display, or use of force is coded as a MID.  In particular, threats and 
displays can be relatively innocuous and involved more posturing than serious intent (see 
Downes and Sechser 2012 for an analysis of MID types).  Fishing disputes, for example, 
often result in observed MIDs without actual violence taking place.  Including such low-
level incidents in analyses of conflict can be problematic, as they may not reflect true 
intent to engage in full-fledged hostilities.  One means of remedying this supposed 
problem is limiting the dependent variable to MIDs where at least one individual has 
died.  This washes out low-level disputes and focuses only on meaningful conflicts. 
My analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 uses the full sample of MIDs and are not 
restricted to only ones with fatalities.  This is a conscious choice in my research design 
made with sound reason.  One of my focuses is on the decision to use either economic 
sanctions or military force.  Consequently, I theorize that states choose between using 
economic or military coercion as strategies in a dispute.  It follows that even low-level 
disputes reflect a conscious choice to use military force instead of economic sanctions.  
Fishing disputes that result in militarization reflect a set of national policies that allow for 
such actions instead of economic ones.  Even if threats are cheap talk, leaders choose 
between militarized or economic cheap talk.  Allowing for even the slightest difference in 
cost between threatening the two strategies justifies the inclusion of all MIDs and 
sanctions episodes.  In other words, I am truly testing the decision between instruments 
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and not necessarily the use of those instruments.  This requires a full sample of MIDs and 
sanctions to include threats, displays, and uses of instruments.   
It is still theoretically interesting and important, however, to consider the higher 
threshold of MIDs as it is influence by economic agreements.  To do this, I use MIDs in 
which at least one fatality occurs as my dependent variable.  I use the same primary 
explanatory and control variables as my primary analysis in Chapter 5.  In total, 156 fatal 
MIDs occurred between shallow agreement members (1.16% of observations) compared 
to 475 for no agreement dyads (0.28% of observations).  A total of 32 MIDs occurred 
between deep agreement members (1.26% of observations).  Given the infrequency of 
fatal MIDs, I am required to use rare-events logit for estimation.29 
Table C.2 contains the results of the fatal MIDs estimation.  Looking first at the 
shallow agreements model, several differences are evident between the all and fatal MIDs 
estimations.  In particular, while intra-agreement trade, the interaction between shallow 
agreements and asymmetry, and the interaction between agreement and interdependence 
are statistically significant with respect to all MIDs, they fail to achieve significance with 
fatal MIDs.  Consequently, while these asymmetry and intra-agreement trade reduce the 
overall use of MIDs, they do not influence the occurrence of fatal MIDs.  Likewise, 
interdependence may increase the likelihood of a MID, but does not impact the actual use 
of violence.   
The two remaining primary explanatory variables impact both all and fatal MIDs 
models.  The agreement variable, indicating that two states are in an economic 
agreement, is negative and significant in line with the all-MIDs model.  Two states that 
                                                           
29
 Significant differences are evident between the regular and rare-events logit, suggesting the rare-events 
specification is the appropriate estimator.   
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share membership in a shallow agreement are less likely to experience a MID or see it 
escalate to violence by virtue of their association.  In contrast, the interaction between 
agreements and FDI is positive and significant.  Greater FDI dependence between 
shallow agreement members both increases the occurrence of MIDs and the likelihood 
they escalate to actual fighting.   
Turning to the deep agreements model, notable differences are evident.  First, 
intra-agreement trade fails to achieve significance in the fatal MIDs model, suggesting 
that members that trade with other agreement members are less likely to have a MID, but 
are neither more nor less likely to see it escalate.  Second, the agreement variable is 
positive and significant such that two states in a deep agreement are more likely to 
experience a fatal MID.  This stands in contrast to the all MIDs model where it failed to 
achieve significance.  The intangible aspects of deep agreements, therefore, do not 
influence MID initiation, but tend to increase the likelihood that MIDs will tend towards 
the use of force.  Third, both interactions between agreements and interdependence and 
FDI are negative and significant.  Deep agreement that trade heavily and rely on FDI are 
less likely to experience fatal MIDs, but neither more nor less likely to experience overall 
MIDs.  Finally, the interaction between asymmetry and agreements actually switches 
signs between the all and fatal MIDs specifications.  While asymmetry between 
agreement members reduces the likelihood of a MID, it actually increases the likelihood 
of fatal MIDs.  This suggests asymmetric dyads have less but bloodier MIDs than no 
agreement dyads. 
The overall impact of these results on my analysis is to provide addition context 
and raise puzzles for future research.  My analysis focuses in large part on the choice 
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between militarized and economic coercion.  This necessitates a broad view of both 
instruments to include threat and use.  To the extent I am modeling the decision and not 
the outcome, my analysis of fatal MIDs is therefore suggests useful context and 
limitations to my analysis.  Certain factors influence threats and “cheap talk” that may or 
may not impact the actual implementation of policies.  Increased trade interdependence 
between shallow agreement members, for example, appears to result in more bluster and 
threat, but not necessarily more action by states.  In contrast, FDI dependence between 
shallow agreement members results in both bluster and action.  Likewise, asymmetry 
between deep agreement members may reduce overall incidents, but makes it more likely 
those incidents escalate to violence.  These are important  considerations even if they are 
not necessarily appropriate for my broader research design. 
Perhaps as important as providing context, however, are the practical implications 
for scholarly and policy work.  It is interesting to note, for example, that FDI dependence 
promotes both the threat and use of force between shallow agreement members.  This 
suggests a truly interesting and robust puzzle that contradicts extant literature.  Likewise, 
the interplay of threats and actual use of violence between deep agreement members is 
interesting.  Some economic relationships do not influence the overall rate of disputes, 
but might make those disputes more or less bloody in the end.  On the scholarly side, it is 
important to give effort to the conditional nature of these effects and determine the 
circumstances under which conflict occurs and how it escalates.  On the policy side, it is 
perhaps more important to understand when and under what circumstances violence 
occurs compared to how decisions are made.  Future research in these areas is warranted.   
A.1.3  Disaggregating Agreements 
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In Chapter 4, I discussed the coding of economic agreements according to a five-
tier scale.  For use in my statistical analysis, however, I collapse the five tier scale into 
two dichotomous variables capturing shallow and deep agreements.  I do this for several 
reasons.  First, there are strong reasons to believe a threshold effect exists with respect to 
economic agreements.  Partial scope agreements (PSAs) and free trade areas (FTAs) are 
qualitatively different from customs unions, common markets, and economic unions 
because they deal exclusively with intra-agreement dynamics.  They remove barriers to 
trade between members without addressing the external world beyond the agreement.  In 
other words, only negative cooperation is necessary in the sense that removing obstacles 
is the limits of collaboration.  Deep agreements, on the other hand, go beyond PSAs and 
FTAs by requiring cooperation vis-à-vis the external world.  All deep agreements require 
a common external tariff.  Hence, member states must actively coordinate broader trade 
policy.  This suggests a clear threshold of cooperation above and below which we might 
expect different outcomes.   
Second, there exists a degree of conceptual slippage with respect to economic 
agreements.  Drawing the line between shallow and deep is easy given the 
aforementioned common external tariff requirement.  Distinguishing common markets 
from customs or economic unions is more challenging, as it is difficult to distinguish 
when “free movement of labor” is truly achieved.  Likewise, the standard for most 
economic unions (and my coding) is a common market with the addition of a common 
currency, yet it can be argued that many agreements possess a common currency without 
the free movement of labor.  The distinction between shallow and deep, therefore, may 
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actually be more informative and accurate than between common markets and economic 
unions.   
It is still empirically interesting and important, however, to evaluate the 
differences between different, more specifically defined agreement types.30  
Consequently, I conducted the same statistical analysis from Chapter 5 (basic logit 
specifications) using the full five-tier classification of economic agreements in separate 
models.  First, however, consider the distribution of MIDs by agreement type given the 
disaggregated typology.  Figure C.1 depicts the relative frequency of MID initiation 
broken down by agreement type.  For dyads without an agreement, there are 443 MIDs 
for a frequency of 0.27%.  PSAs and FTAs experienced MIDs at a rate of 0.60% and 
0.80% respectively.  Although customs unions (CU) and common markets (CM) have 
MIDs at higher rates, 1.27% and 1.39% respectively, there are only 23 and 7 occurrences 
respectively.  Likewise, economic unions (EU) have a frequency of 0.58%, but only 2 
instances of MIDs.  For common markets, all MIDs are related to the East African 
Community and the actions of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania.  For the economic unions, 
both MIDs involve the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and 
specifically the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and Chad.  Here the conceptual 
difficulties are evident.  The ECCAS has a customs union and a common currency in the 
central Africa franc, but labor movement is suspect.  The overall point is simply that 
relatively few agreements achieve common market or economic union status, thereby 
                                                           
30
 I also created an ordinal variable scaled 1 to 5 (shallow to deep, PSA to EU) according to the five levels 
of integration for analysis.  The results show that each increase in agreement level decreases MID 
initiation.  In addition, the interactions with asymmetry and intra-agreement trade reduce MIDs.  FDI 
dependence interacted with agreements increases conflict.  These results are generally consistent with my 
analysis, but are largely driven by shallow agreements given they possess the majority of observed 
agreements. 
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reducing the number of unique cross-sectional units drastically.  With the reduction in 
cross-sectional units is a proportional decrease in observed MIDs, which potentially 
complicates statistical analysis.  The infrequency of MIDs, an already uncommon event, 
in deep agreements means caution should be taken in analyzing these results.   
Table C.3 contains the logit results for shallow, PSA, and FTA agreements.  The 
shallow agreement results are reproduced from Chapter 5 for convenience and 
comparison.  First, note the similarity in estimates for my primary explanatory variables 
between the PSA and FTA models.  The agreement variable, indicating joint membership 
in a PSA or FTA, is negative and significant such that membership reduces militarized 
conflict.  The interaction with FDI dependence, however, is positive and significant.  
Dyads with a PSA or FTA are more likely to experience a MID as their dependence on 
FDI increases.  Both these results are consistent with the pooled shallow agreement 
model and suggest relatively robust findings.   
The remaining variables deviate from the pooled shallow agreement model.  
Trade asymmetry, interdependence, and intra-agreement trade do not influence MID 
initiation between members of a PSA or FTA.  The difference in statistical significance 
between the pooled and disaggregated models suggests a threshold effect is indeed in 
effect.  States that cooperate to lower trade barriers (and avoid deeper cooperation) 
experience pacifying influences from asymmetry and intra-agreement trade, but may 
exacerbate conflict as trade interdependence increases.  These effects are a consequence 
of cooperation on trade and not necessarily the degree of cooperation.  Consequently, 
when shallow agreements are broken out the effect is not immediately evident.   
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Table C.4 displays the deep agreement results.  The results from Chapter 5 for the 
pooled model are again included for comparison.  The results of the disaggregated 
models are less consistent with the pooled deep agreements model.  First, in the pooled 
model, trade asymmetry and intra-agreement trade both reduce MIDs between deep 
agreement members.  However, in the disaggregated models, asymmetry fails to achieve 
statistical significance.  This again suggests a threshold effect.  Cooperation vis-à-vis 
external tariffs triggers the influence of asymmetry, which then washes out once 
disaggregated.  This effect might reflect animosity between asymmetric members.  
Strong, economically powerful states in an agreement may force self-serving external 
tariffs on junior partners, thereby exacerbating asymmetries and dependence.  Second, 
intra-agreement trade achieves significance only in the economic union model.  This 
might suggest unions are the primary driver behind the influence of intra-agreement trade 
in the pooled deep agreement model.   
Third, despite failing to achieve statistical significance in the pooled deep 
agreements specification, the interaction between agreements and FDI dependence is 
statistically significant and positive in both the customs and economic union models.  The 
lack of significance in the pooled model suggests the relatively strong influence of 
common markets, for which no primary variables achieves statistical significance.  It may 
also simply reflect the paucity of dyads that share membership in economic unions.  It is 
also noteworthy that four of the five agreement types indicate FDI dependence increases 
conflict.  Fourth, the agreement variable in the customs union model is negative and 
significant.  This lends credence to the presence of threshold effects, as it is the 
institutional arrangement of an external tariff that the agreement variable captures.  
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Finally, it is noteworthy that none of my explanatory variables achieve significance in the 
common market model.  Again, this may reflect the relatively small number of states 
sharing membership in such agreements. 
The results of the disaggregated agreement models suggest several points for my 
broader analysis.  First, differences between the pooled and disaggregated models suggest 
the role of threshold effects in conflict between agreement members.  The effects of 
asymmetry, interdependence, and intra-agreement trade are only evident if PSAs and 
FTAs are considered jointly in a pooled variable.  I believe this is an appropriate 
approach, as the two agreement types represent fundamentally similar institutional 
frameworks.  Cooperation on trade, but not external tariffs, is the key component to 
identifying the influence of these particular economic relationships.  Likewise, 
asymmetry and intra-agreement trade are only influential in the pooled deep agreement 
model, suggesting the common external tariff is key to recognizing these effects. Second, 
the disaggregated results bolster some of the key findings in my analysis.  In particular, 
shallow agreements reduces MID initiation while FDI dependence exacerbates it in 
almost all models.  This provides strong supporting evidence for one of the more 
counterintuitive findings in my analysis.  Overall, these results add richness to my overall 
theoretical and empirical story without necessarily refuting or contradicting my primary 
statistical analysis. 
A.2  Extra-Agreement Conflict 
Chapter 6 analyzes conflict between members of economic agreements and non-
members states using basic logit, imputed logit, and strategic probit analyses.  In this 
section, I elaborate on my analysis of extra-agreement conflict presented in Chapter by: 
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limiting the dependent variable to fatal MIDs only and using Heckman selection models 
to address selection into different agreements.31   
A.2.1  Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes 
In section 1.2 of this appendix, I discuss the use of all MIDs in my primary 
statistical analysis of intra-agreement conflict.  Because Chapter 6 also deals with the 
decision between military force and economic sanctions, the all MIDs approach is 
appropriate for my primary statistical tests.  I offer an analysis of fatal MIDs here to 
embellish on the results of Chapter 6 and offer greater insight into the influence of 
economic agreements. 
Table C.5 contains the results of the fatal MIDs model for extra-agreement 
conflict.  None of my primary explanatory variables achieve statistical significance in 
either the one or opposing agreement model.  Hence, economic relationships neither 
increase nor decrease the likelihood of fatal militarized force.  This can be viewed two 
ways.  First, economic relationships between agreement members do not exacerbate 
tensions and increase conflict.  Hence, little support exists for the notion that relative 
gains concerns as they relate to trade between members and non-members increase 
violent conflict.  Second, economic relationships fail to restrain violent conflict between 
members and non-members.  In this way, the pacifying influence of economic interaction 
that much of the literature finds fails to function with members and non-members.  To be 
sure, however, none of the economic variables achieve statistical significance in either 
                                                           
31
 In addition to the tests in this appendix, I also conducted several others that I do not report.  These 
include rare-events logits, transformations of the primary variables (i.e., logs), simultaneous equations, and 
samples using only politically relevant dyads.  The results of these tests were identical to those included in 
Chapter 6, and are therefore omitted for space and clarity.    
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model.  The overall impact of these results for my analysis, therefore, is negligible given 
my justification for the use of the all MIDs design.   
A.2.2  Selection Into Separate Agreements 
In Chapter 5, I address the tendency for states with strained political relations to 
avoid cooperation and economic agreements in my analysis of intra-agreement conflict.  
The same logic holds for my analysis of extra-agreement conflict.  Specifically, states 
with a propensity for conflict are unlikely to join the same economic agreement and, 
indeed, may form other economic agreements to isolate potential enemies.  Given that 
states may select out of joint economic agreement membership, I offer a series of 
Heckman selection models accounting for the potential selection effect.  The selection 
criterion is creation of a one or opposing agreement dyad.  That is, dyads either select 
into a situation where one only state is in an agreement or both form different 
agreements.  Predictors for the selection equation are identical to those used in the 
selection models for intra-agreement conflict - interdependence, asymmetry, alliances, 
contiguity, democracy, GDP, major power status, peace years and WTO membership, 
inter-capital distance, common language, the geometric mean of logged population, 
political affinity, and the cumulative total of dyadic MIDs since 1950.  The outcome 
equation includes all my primary explanatory variables as well as allies, contiguity, 
capabilities, democracy, GDP, IGO membership, major power status, WTO membership, 
and both spatial and temporal controls.   
Table C.6 contains the selection model results for MID initiation.  The outcome 
equation is show in the top half of the table.  Overall, the results are identical to those of 
the basic logit model presented in Chapter 6.  None of my primary explanatory variables 
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achieve statistical significance in the one agreement model.  With respect to opposing 
dyads, however, trade interdependence tends to reduce the occurrence of MIDs.  Again, a 
curvilinear relationship is evident with trade diversion.  The opposing agreement dyads 
least likely to engage in conflict are those with high degrees of trade creation or 
diversion.  Dyads with relatively neutral values of trade diversion are the most conflict 
prone.  Finally, the ρ statistic for the opposing agreement model is statistically 
significant, indicating a selection effect may indeed be taking place.  The results of the 
selection model are identical to those of the basic logit, however, suggest my primary 
analysis using basic logit is likely acceptable.   
The results of the selection model for economic sanctions is contained in Table 
C.7.  The outcome equation is show in the top half of the table. Again, the results of the 
outcome equation are identical to those of the basic logit.  A curvilinear relationship 
exists between one agreement dyads and trade diversion.  Dyads with high trade creation 
and diversion are the least likely to experience a sanction while neutral values are the 
most likely.  For dyads with membership in separate economic agreements, trade 
asymmetry tends to increase the likelihood of observing economic sanctions.  Both ρ 
statistics are statistically significant for the one and opposing agreements model.  While 
this might imply basic logit is biased by selection into different agreements, the similarity 
of results suggests the similar basic logit specification is preferable.   
Finally, while it is not the focus of my analysis, the selection equation predicting 
exclusion from joint economic agreement membership is interesting.  Overall, the results 
of the one and opposing agreement selection equations (both sanctions and MID 
specifications) are nearly identical.  First, trade asymmetry increases the likelihood of 
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exclusion.  This may reflect the disadvantaged partner attempting to form agreements to 
break its trade dependence on one state through preferential arrangements.  Second, trade 
interdependence increases the likelihood of one agreement dyads, but has no relationship 
with opposing agreement dyads.  Again, this may reflect one state in the dyad attempting 
to diversify trade partners by forming agreements.   
Third, several variables predict both one and opposing agreement dyads.  
Interestingly, geographic contiguity and major power status increase exclusion from 
agreements.  Contiguity may predict exclusion because geographically proximate 
partners may not need agreements to generate trade.  Close neighbors, furthermore, are 
those most likely to be adversaries.  The result of the major powers variable is more 
logical, as powerful states likely form their own exclusionary trade blocs.  GDP and 
population also predict exclusion, which likely reflects the same logic as major powers.  
Large states likely form their own exclusionary blocs.  Fourth, two variables – affinity 
and WTO membership – decrease the likelihood of exclusion.  Both make sense, as states 
with similar policies and global trade agreement membership are more likely to join the 
same agreement.   
The remaining variables are mixed in nature.  First, alliances positively predict 
one agreement dyads, but negatively predict opposing agreement dyads.  In other words, 
dyads that are allies are somewhat more likely to have only one agreement, but less likely 
to form separate agreements.  This suggests they either form joint agreements or avoid 
membership rather than divorce security and economic interests.  Second, the more 
democratic the dyad, the less likely they are to be one agreement dyads.  They are more 
likely, however to be in opposing agreements.  This may simply reflect the propensity of 
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democracies to form organizations and institutions.  Third, inter-capital distance only 
influences opposing agreement dyads (negatively).  Finally, the total number of conflicts 
between dyads negatively predicts one agreement dyads but positively predicts opposing 
agreements.  This indicates that states with past conflict tend to form different economic 
blocs.  Given that one agreement dyads are less likely, it also points to the domino theory 
of regionalism; if a state’s competitor forms an agreement, that state is likely to form its 
own agreement.  
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Table C.1: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Pooled Coercion 
Shallow Agreements Deep Agreements 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement -14.798*** 2.804        -0.566 3.844 
Agreement*Asymmetry   -12.815** 3.275    -52.092** 19.891 
Agreement*Interdependence 27.913*** 10.596        -2.994 16.637 
Agreement*FDI 14.779*** 2.767         0.946 3.741 
Intra-Agreement Trade -7.201*** 1.890  -2.615 1.989 
Asymmetry 3.416*** 1.027   1.949 1.418 
Interdependence -23.759*** 6.509 -21.975*** 6.528 
FDI      -3.988** 1.432    3.005 2.519 
Alliance    0.075 0.112    0.088 0.110 
Contiguity 3.361*** 0.122 3.361*** 0.122 
Capabilities     0.087* 0.038    0.086* 0.038 
Democracy -0.051*** 0.009 -0.052*** 0.009 
GDP 0.235*** 0.040 0.235*** 0.042 
IGOs 0.023*** 0.005 0.024*** 0.005 
Major Power 1.153*** 0.149 1.112*** 0.152 
WTO      -0.317** 0.107     -0.309** 0.106 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)      -10.897 16.572 -11.268 16.555 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity) 35.239*** 7.639 35.789*** 7.475 
Constant -6.518*** 1.601 -13.584*** 2.759 
N 182,708 182,708 
λ
2
 3,596.64*** 3,696.13*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.347 0.344 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2,748.87 -2,761.70 
The dependent variable is the use of either a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) or threat or 
imposition of economic sanctions.  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads stats share membership in 
either a shallow or deep economic agreement. Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for 
space   Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table C.2: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Fatal MIDs 
Shallow Agreements Deep Agreements 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement    -24.303** 8.017 35.319*** 6.942 
Agreement*Asymmetry      -25.963 25.020 402.032*** 28.231 
Agreement*Interdependence  17.809 48.046   -637.868* 258.180 
Agreement*FDI      24.156** 7.897 -34.137*** 6.865 
Intra-Agreement Trade    2.156 3.290   3.081 2.601 
Asymmetry   -3.450 16.748      -15.901 16.958 
Interdependence -11.418 35.786   3.616 25.797 
FDI   -15.328* 6.794   5.419 5.084 
Alliance    0.017 0.357   0.109 0.362 
Contiguity 5.155*** 0.696 5.249*** 0.710 
Capabilities    0.152 0.136   0.174 0.129 
Democracy   -0.050 0.036  -0.052 0.035 
GDP   0.144 0.137   0.189 0.148 
IGOs   0.008 0.018   0.007 0.018 
Major Power   0.579 0.826   0.613 0.753 
WTO   0.343 0.428   0.347 0.416 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)  -9.879 32.228  -7.698 31.869 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)  45.513 33.310  42.663 32.749 
Constant    4.143 7.823 -17.881 6.530 
N 182,621 182,708 
The dependent variable is Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes (Fatal MIDs).  The "agreement" variable 
indicates dyads stats share membership in either a shallow or deep economic agreement. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   *p < .05  ** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table C.3: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Disaggregated Shallow Agreements 
 
  
Shallow Agreements               
(FTA and PTA) PSA FTA 
  Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Agreement -14.935*** 2.710 -12.809*** 2.939 -16.797*** 4.339 
Agreement*Asymmetry -13.14*** 3.359 -2.582 4.286 -7.250 4.570 
Agreement*Interdependence 25.676* 10.194 12.641 14.296 0.688 18.224 
Agreement*FDI 14.902*** 2.667 12.668*** 2.891 16.098*** 4.253 
Intra-Agreement Trade -8.842*** 1.882 -3.647 2.490 -0.954 3.262 
Asymmetry 2.627** 0.986 2.168 1.316 1.921 1.175 
Interdependence -17.307** 6.251 -17.637* 7.229 -11.309 7.148 
FDI -5.126*** 0.921 -5.333*** 1.069 -5.963*** 0.906 
Alliance 0.243* 0.115 0.108 0.127 0.184 0.140 
Contiguity 3.111*** 0.130 3.072*** 0.135 3.001*** 0.148 
Capabilities 0.125*** 0.038 0.118** 0.041 0.121** 0.043 
Democracy -0.053*** 0.010 -0.063*** 0.009 -0.061*** 0.010 
GDP 0.183*** 0.040 0.177*** 0.044 0.198*** 0.048 
IGOs 0.018*** 0.005 0.035*** 0.006 0.027*** 0.006 
Major Power 1.366*** 0.156 1.442*** 0.173 1.467*** 0.186 
WTO -0.126 0.109 -0.180 0.116 -0.123 0.128 
Spatial Lag (Alliances) -9.41 15.676 -4.467 14.097 -9.271 16.642 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity) 34.655*** 8.185 31.205*** 9.040 31.388*** 9.639 
Constant -3.715*** 1.132 -3.870** 1.293 -3.519** 1.209 
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Table C.3: Continued 
 
N 182,708 175,562 159,628 
λ
2
 3,811.54*** 3,556.64*** 3,020.26*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.3457 0.351 0.339 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2752.54 -2,475.15 -2,152.91 
The dependent variable is the use of a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs).  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads stats share membership in either a 
particular agreement (contained in the header). Robust standard errors in parentheses.   Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   *p < 
.05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table C.4: Agreements and Intra-Agreement Conflict, Disaggregated Deep Agreements 
 
  
Deep Agreements         
(CU, CM, and EU) CU CM EU 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement        -3.827 3.870 -13.210*** 3.266 196.778 223.284     -11.697 6.475 
Agreement*Asymmetry    -56.429** 21.632      -43.768 24.410    -207.349 248.442 32.357 131.062 
Agreement*Interdependence   6.802 16.515 -20.353 19.900 46.638 69.036   -306.060 344.747 
Agreement*FDI         4.020 3.783 13.128*** 3.107    -192.984 222.593  12.980* 6.140 
Intra-Agreement Trade    -4.384* 2.061  -1.125 3.402 -64.022 42.139 -81.174*** 13.848 
Asymmetry         1.494 1.368  2.244 1.303   2.219 1.316 2.219 1.313 
Interdependence   -17.557** 6.187 -17.742* 7.240 -17.478*** 7.300     -17.512* 7.289 
FDI   0.208 2.626 -5.462*** 1.047 -5.502*** 1.063 -5.479*** 1.060 
Alliance     0.249* 0.115  0.110 0.144   0.057 0.151 0.064 0.150 
Contiguity 3.121*** 0.130 3.008*** 0.149 3.004*** 0.152 3.010*** 0.152 
Capabilities 0.126*** 0.038      0.128** 0.044      0.135** 0.045      0.137** 0.045 
Democracy -0.052*** 0.010 -0.056*** 0.011 -0.066*** 0.011 -0.065*** 0.011 
GDP 0.175*** 0.042 0.200*** 0.049 0.192*** 0.050 0.190*** 0.049 
IGOs 0.019*** 0.005 0.031*** 0.006 0.034*** 0.006 0.034*** 0.006 
Major Power 1.329*** 0.159 1.350*** 0.191 1.478*** 0.198 1.489*** 0.198 
WTO -0.117 0.109  -0.153 0.131  -0.157 0.134  -0.158 0.134 
Spatial Lag (Alliances) -9.773 15.727  -5.461 15.227  -4.943 14.820  -5.607 15.206 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity) 35.200*** 8.036    30.846** 9.948    30.814** 10.062     31.036** 10.085 
Constant -8.934*** 2.739     -4.141** 1.336    -3.982** 1.359     -3.940** 1.356 
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Table C.4: Continued 
 
N 182,708 156,947 155,645 155,486 
λ
2
 3,884.23*** 3,083.22*** 2967.53*** 2,945.16*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.3420 0.344 0.347 0.341 
Log Pseudolikelihood -2768.06 -2,092.95 -2,018.90 -2,017.21 
The dependent variable is the use of a Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs).  The "agreement" variable indicates dyads stats share membership in either a 
particular agreement (contained in the header). Robust standard errors in parentheses.   Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   *p < 
.05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
 299 
 
 
Table C.5: Agreements and Extra-Agreement Conflict, Fatal MIDs 
 
  
One Agreement Opposing Agreements 
Shallow Agreements         
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Agreement -1753.575 1535.796 -1491.660 1220.390 
Agreement*Asymmetry   -146.034 82.715 
           -
7.519 24.150 
Agreement*Interdependence      87.933 119.296 -37.416 122.565 
Agreement*Diversion  3640.476 3095.051 3112.217 2520.294 
Agreement*Diversion2 -1887.134 1561.241  -1620.237 1300.1 
Asymmetry         9.029 13.895   1.144 16.869 
Interdependence      -65.295 49.194 -59.303 43.186 
Trade Diversion       96.719 132.352   3.876 66.472 
Trade Diversion2      -40.488 56.829  -2.374 26.894 
Alliance       -0.044 0.423   0.459 0.468 
Contiguity      6.387*** 0.873  5.262*** 0.698 
Capabilities       0.515** 0.168    0.402* 0.162 
Democracy   -0.052 0.042   -0.105* 0.046 
GDP    0.273 0.148      0.398** 0.142 
IGOs   -0.015 0.016  -0.005 0.016 
Major Power   -0.068 0.834   1.264 0.859 
WTO    0.506 0.441     0.848* 0.427 
Spatial Lag (Alliances)     0.378 17.286  18.709 17.521 
Spatial Lag (Contiguity)     57.547* 22.507   28.241 32.726 
Constant   -70.379 74.695  -17.842 39.695 
N 191,828 194,782 
λ
2
 243.95*** 478.61*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.448 0.4342 
Log Pseudolikelihood -204.61 -224.368 
The dependent variable is Fatal Militarized Interstate Disputes (Fatal MIDs).  The "agreement" variable 
indicates dyads where one state is in an agreement (one agreement) or separate agreements (opposing 
agreements).   Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space   Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Table C.6: Economic Agreements and External MIDs, Heckman Selection 
  
  
One Agreement  Opposing Agreements 
Militarized Interstate Disputes  
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Asymmetry         0.400 1.539   -0.070 2.035 
Interdependence        -5.038 5.075  -16.702* 7.246 
Trade Diversion        11.421 13.969   367.799** 117.329 
Trade Diversion2         -7.663 7.458 -189.948*** 59.084 
Alliance          0.063 0.172     0.180* 0.088 
Contiguity          1.032 0.435 0.683*** 0.157 
Capabilities 0.091*** 0.025      0.062* 0.026 
Democracy         -0.002 0.020 -0.025*** 0.006 
GDP          0.047 0.229   -0.032 0.041 
IGOs            0.008* 0.004     0.011* 0.004 
Major Power          0.133 1.066    0.136 0.171 
WTO        -0.141 0.330    -0.123 0.075 
Spatial Lag 
(Alliances)         1.243 5.925      -26.41* 11.143 
Spatial Lag 
(Contiguity)         11.975* 5.243      8.552 5.765 
Constant       -6.512 9.256     -177.514** 58.730 
Exclusion from Economic Agreements 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Asymmetry 1.419*** 0.151 0.481*** 0.148 
Interdependence 2.188*** 0.682   -0.015 0.624 
Affinity            -0.056** 0.019 -0.353*** 0.013 
Alliance 0.103*** 0.019 -0.144*** 0.016 
Contiguity 0.229*** 0.029 0.149*** 0.025 
Democracy -0.016*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.000 
Distance         0.001 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
GDP 0.164*** 0.005 0.165*** 0.004 
Language 0.067*** 0.016 0.201*** 0.013 
Major Power 1.074*** 0.015 0.639*** 0.016 
Population 0.204*** 0.005 0.104*** 0.005 
Total Dyadic MIDs          -0.020* 0.009 0.026*** 0.004 
WTO -0.378*** 0.009 -0.090*** 0.008 
Constant -8.050*** 0.109 -6.301*** 0.091 
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Table C.6: Continued 
 
N 208,979 211,949 
Censored 188,743 188,743 
Uncensored 13,235 23,206 
λ
2
 596.54*** 569.79*** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -53208.53 -64,072.08 
ρ 0.040 15.450*** 
The dependent variable is the initiation of a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MIDs).  The "agreement" 
variable indicates dyads where one state is in an agreement (one agreement) or separate agreements 
(opposing agreements).   Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space.  *p < .05  ** p < 
.01 *** p < .001 
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Table C.7: Economic Agreements and External Sanctions, Heckman Selection 
  
  
One Agreement  Opposing Agreements 
Economic Sanctions  
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Asymmetry        1.385 1.805      2.817* 1.266 
Interdependence        2.373 6.102  -10.501 10.066 
Trade Diversion      153.133* 76.648   17.191 14.387 
Trade Diversion2      -77.134* 38.318   -6.677 7.067 
Alliance       0.186 0.120    0.081 0.107 
Contiguity       -0.042 0.188    -0.636* 0.274 
Capabilities       -0.003 0.033    0.022 0.021 
Democracy        0.000 0.009      -0.018** 0.006 
GDP        0.126 0.093    0.014 0.053 
IGOs       -0.005 0.004   -0.000 0.004 
Major Power           -0.642** 0.228     -0.216* 0.110 
WTO 0.394*** 0.095      0.155* 0.067 
Spatial Lag 
(Alliances)     -21.158 14.128  -40.631 25.350 
Spatial Lag 
(Contiguity)       -5.863 10.505 18.000*** 3.469 
Constant       -79.720* 39.346 -11.287 7.804 
Exclusion from Economic Agreements 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Asymmetry 1.414*** 0.150 0.477*** 0.148 
Interdependence 2.219*** 0.680      0.039 0.624 
Affinity -0.060*** 0.016 -0.357*** 0.012 
Alliance 0.104*** 0.019 -0.142*** 0.016 
Contiguity 0.227*** 0.028 0.148*** 0.025 
Democracy -0.016*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.000 
Distance          0.001 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
GDP 0.164*** 0.004 0.164*** 0.004 
Language 0.067*** 0.016 0.202*** 0.013 
Major Power 1.073*** 0.014 0.637*** 0.016 
Population 0.204*** 0.005 0.105*** 0.005 
Total Dyadic MIDs -0.019*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.004 
WTO -0.378*** 0.009 -0.091*** 0.008 
Constant -8.043*** 0.101 -6.301*** 0.091 
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Table C.7: Continued 
 
N 208,979 211,949 
Censored 188,743 188,743 
Uncensored 13,235 23,206 
λ
2
 202.74*** 112.67*** 
Log Pseudolikelihood -52,918.78 -63,760.15 
ρ 10.30** 35.91*** 
The dependent variable is the threat or imposition of an economic sanction.  The "agreement" variable 
indicates dyads where one state is in an agreement (one agreement) or separate agreements (opposing 
agreements).   Temporal control variables (peace years3) omitted for space.    *p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p 
< .001 
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Figure C.1: MIDs by Agreement Type 
